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ART. I. ON THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA RESPECTING GOD.

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THE idea of a God is of all others the most familiar to our minds. Impressed on our earliest childhood, it is interwoven with the great variety of our associations, while it may be regarded as emphatically second to every prominent thought in the view of reflective intelligence. In general no doubt is entertained regarding it. We believe as firmly in the being of a God, as in our own, or the existence of the material world. We recur to Him, with the facility which characterises the mental reference of children to their parent, or subjects to their ruler. We admire his works, recognize his providence, contemplate his perfections, and join in his praise; but while entertaining the sentiment, or even practically acknowledging the relations which it involves, how few, comparatively, have reflected on its probable *origin*. Yet it is a question of fundamental importance, *from whence has man derived the idea of God*—a Being spiritual in his nature, infinite in his attributes, the self-existent Creator of the universe.

Whether it originated in the fears of mankind; or was a device of kings and priests to secure their political ascendancy; or whether it was the deduction of unassisted reason in its native aspirations after unknown good, or simply its unaided suggestion to account for the otherwise inexplicable phenomena of nature; or whether it cannot be traced through tradition to original revelation; are questions which have agitated speculative minds, and successively secured their respective advocates.

We proceed, then, in this enquiry; and not without the
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hope that our effort, however unrelieved by that interest which appertains to periodical writing, may yet be in not a few respects useful to the cause of truth.

But, as preparatory to our argument, two remarks may be considered for their bearing on its designed conclusion.

1. In man's moral nature there is a constitutional provision for the idea of a God. If there were not, it is a question of no moment in what manner the idea originated; it could never be cordially entertained, nor constitute the basis of religious action. We readily designate the various orders of animal existences, from their physical adaptations. No one can doubt that beasts were formed to graze the verdant lawn; birds to soar in the atmosphere; or fish to swim in the liquid element. Physiology has noted the starting pinions and plumage of the unfledged bird; the impatient search of the duckling, scarcely disengaged from its shell, for water which it has not yet seen; the movements of the new-born infant's longing lips for the yet untasted fountains of the mother's breast; nor fails to recognize in these instinctive desires, the designed gratifications and ends of the animal to which they belong. Now the science of Pathology may demonstrate, from equally conclusive indications, the existence of a religious instinct in man. There are moral elements in his bosom which can be explained only on the supposition that he has been formed for the adoration of his great Creator. Be he where he may, or in whatever condition of solitude and untutored rudeness, he is the conscious subject of emotions which virtually say—"Where is God, my Maker?"

If we were not naturally susceptible of love and reverence, it would be in vain to present to us an object of blended loveliness and majesty. No appropriate emotions could, in this case, be elicited. We might ponder the attractive lineaments of the object, but our's would be "a brute, unconscious gaze." In like manner, were there no susceptibility to the impression of a God in the constitution of man's bosom, it would be conclusive evidence that he was no more formed to admit and act on the idea, than the brutes which perish. But what is the fact? We speak not of what seem to be the natural yearnings of high and serious intellect after communion with its unknown God. The human heart receives the impression of a God almost with the same mechanical facility with which the infant receives its appro-

priate nourishment. It matters not whether he have ever heard of God by the hearing of the ear : let man be placed amid the towering palaces of nature, and there is something within him which lifts his spirit above their cloud-capped summits to the invisible Creator. It is not in human nature to look over the vast heaving deep, the illimitable firmament, or wander amid mountain scenery, without emotions of awe and sublimity ; and in these we recognize the natural conviction of a God. There is to man's consciousness a Spirit in the midnight storm, as there is in the remorse of his guilty bosom a Revenger of his crimes. No impression is so common to mankind as this. It seems the spontaneous sentiment of human nature. It may be a mere abstraction, or assume an embodied form ; it may be rational in its expression, or deformed by superstition ; in every instance it may be modified or shaped by birth, training and temperament ; but wherever man is to be found, be he in solitary wilds or crowded city ; be he barbaric or philosophic ; there is the impression of a God. Or if among the rude sons of the forest one exception could be found, let the intelligence of a God be announced, and the deep emotion with which it is heard, shows the adaptedness of the human bosom to receive and cherish the sublime sentiment. Hence, in every attempt to inculcate true religion on the uncultivated mind, the difficulty has been found to consist in displacing false notions of a Supreme Being, rather than in demonstrating his existence. And we cannot but regard this, as one reason for that absence of all proof which characterises the Scriptures, whenever they allude to the Almighty ;—as if his existence were a fact rather to be felt, than to be apprehended chiefly by the understanding.

Such are man's religious susceptibilities, that the idea of a God needs only to be announced, to produce its designed impression. As well attempt to prove the existence of the sun after the eye has received and is enjoying its light, as to demonstrate the being of a God to the heart which already thrills with awe under the consciousness of its high relations. Like the adaptations of nature to our bodily organs, the idea of a God is suited to the affections of our bosoms ; and when once it obtains a lodgement within us, like that image of himself which Phidias wished to perpetuate by stamping it so deeply on the buckler of Minerva that no one might be able to erase it without injuring the whole statue, it cannot be dis-

placed without destroying the balance of the mind or the sensibilities of the soul. Man must lose himself in the Hercynian wood of illegitimate speculation, or merge himself in the brute ; or he cannot escape the conviction—"there is a God." He must be sure to preclude any interval of reason or sobriety ; or the awakening fears of his guilty bosom respond with awful emphasis to the deathless conviction of his soul—"there is a God." He may repudiate Christianity, but he has not banished the ever intruding suggestion of a God. He may declare himself an Atheist, but he has simply invested the true God with forms and qualities more flattering to the pride of his intellect or the lusts of his heart. It is still the practical conviction of his nature—"there is a God." The idea may exist in a material aspect, but it cannot be annihilated.

2. As any impression may be erroneous having no foundation in fact, it is important to remark in the second place, that a belief in the existence of an infinite creative intelligence, is perfectly consonant with right reason. If the heart admit the sentiment without reluctance, it is no less obvious, that reason corroborates the belief without difficulty. Perceiving, on experience, the connection which subsists between cause and effect, we never fail, on reflection, to refer the existence of this world to some adequate power. It matters not whence our idea of cause ; or however inscrutable the cause may be ; still there is no proposition to which our minds more readily assent, than that the phenomena of nature do not exist uncaused. The relation of cause and effect is inseparable from the perceptions of the human mind ; and though some have chosen to call in the agency of what they term Nature ; still that is their God ;* and though others have presumed to resolve every thing into the operations of Chance, still that, in reality, is their God. Employ whatever terms,—fate, chance or matter, the would-be Atheists have never been able to escape the idea of an eternal First Cause ; and however often and eagerly they have essayed the Hercu-

* "Si par Athée l'on désigne un homme qui nieroit l'existence d'une *force inhérente à la nature, et sans laquelle on ne peut concevoir la Nature, et si c'est à cette force motrice qu'on donne le nom de Dieu, il n'existe point de Athées, et le mot sous lequel on les désigne n'annonceroit que des fous.*" *Système de la Nature. Part 2, chap 11th.* What an admission by an author who attempts to shew that there is no God ! It is of itself the strongest evidence that there is no escape from the idea of *necessary creation*. It reduces the controversy to this question ; shall we worship that *undefinable thing* without which nature cannot be conceived, or acknowledge an uncreated and supreme intelligence ?

lean task, they have only, by their reference to an eternal series, to casual existence, to the powers and operations of blind nature, involved themselves in a necessary succession of hypotheses and absurdities—like certain Greek philosophers in the middle ages, who, having settled it in their own minds that a circle is the most perfect of figures, concluded that the movements of the heavenly bodies must all be performed in exact circles, and when the plainest observation demonstrated the contrary, instead of doubting their position, had recourse to endless combinations of circular motions to preserve their ideal perfection.

Should it ever be reduced to ocular demonstration, that the First Cause of all things were a material agent, we could not conceive it possible for a Supreme Being, whose spiritual nature precluded the cognizance of our senses, to afford stronger proofs of his existence, than those which stand out so legibly on the whole frame of the visible world. Devoid of any spiritual ideas, but impressed with the belief of superior powers, the unenlightened mind among all the early nations of our race identified their existence with the sun and moon, or the elements of nature. It was a natural conclusion; and though an easy error into which the benighted intellect might have fallen, it may serve to teach us, that while no material object, however stupendous and glorious, can be God; yet, that if there be a God who is necessarily invisible to mortal sight, the unsophisticated conviction of the human mind is, that He has afforded us ample evidence of his existence in the phenomena of the universe. Regarding the idea of an uncreated, infinite Spirit, as a mere supposition, if He designed to impress on such a being as man the belief of his existence, what more could He do, but to show in space an exact transcript of the present material economy—the earth which we inhabit, with its “blue etherial sky,” its starry firmament, its verdant carpeting, its gigantic mountains, its foaming cataracts, its fathomless oceans, lordly rivers, crystal lakes, its pathless forests, its endless diversities and immense multitudes of animated existences, each forming a complete system within itself, replete with proofs of design, and in all its parts so arranged and proportioned, as to constitute one grand and harmonious whole. Stand still, O man, and contemplate the wonders in the midst of which you are placed. Mark the regularity with which the orb of day rises to diffuse light and impart warmth, and sets to

give repose to animated nature. Mark the beautiful succession of the seasons, each bearing appropriate provisions for thy varying wants. Mark the adaptation of the air, the rain, the sunshine, to the revivescence and growth of the vegetable world—the vast economy, by which the diversified myriads of earth-born existences are daily fed. Mark the storm, the lightning, the volcano, the earthquake. Consider the mysterious and wonderful powers of knowledge, virtue, and moral action which belong to the world of mind. Lift up your eye to those unnumbered suns and stars and systems which revolve so harmoniously in the immensity of space; or examine the structure of that curious organ, by aid of which you are able, “at a small inlet which a grain might close,” to take in the greatness of an infinite creation; or of that yet more wonderful organ, which by a single beat, diffuses its life blood through all the arteries and veins of your bodily frame; and tell us if he be not unreasonable to the last degree who demands farther evidence, that a God exists. Do we admire the genius of him who by the combinations of light and shade has thrown upon the canvass some likeness to the beauteous or sublime scenes of nature; or of the statuary who has transformed his block into a senseless and inert imitation of man; and shall we say that nature herself knows no intelligent Author? that man, endued with sense and motion, has not been formed by some stupendous intelligence? When such are the marks of design which may be seen on every hand and through every medium; when unnumbered adaptations of means to beneficent ends are so plain that no stupidity can mistake them; when the Author of nature has afforded us glimpses of still greater contrivances, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; we are not surprised that Lord Bacon, the greatest of modern philosophers, should have declared, that “he would rather believe all the fables of the Legend, and the Talmud, or the Koran, than that this universal frame is without a mind.”

No proposition admits of such variety of proof as this,—that there is a God. With Locke, we may reason from the certainty of our own existence; with Berkeley, from the motions, actions and speech of others, as mere effects of a living, acting, thinking thing in man, which cannot be immediately discerned by our senses; with Bolingbroke, from the fact that non-entity cannot produce entity, and non-intel-

ligence, intelligence ; or with Kant, from the fact that the systematic adaptation of material things is not essential to their nature ; and on either of their celebrated positions build an irrefragable argument for the existence of an omnipotent and all-wise Creator. But it is needless to multiply arguments for the existence of a Supreme Being ; as it was injudicious in an ancient poet to load his invulnerable hero with a cumbersome panoply.

We retire in summer heats from the dust and noise of the town which man has built, and seek the renovating repose of the rural scene. The matin freshness revives our languid frame ; the grateful verdure relieves our wearied eye ; the aroma of flowers regales our sense ; the glad voices of nature's songsters rejoice our hearts :—Then mounts the sun his fervid chariot, and sheds his genial rays over the luxuriant fields, yet glittering with the dew-drops of the night. We seek the canopy of shade ; and as we look up to the firmament all beautifully blue, and around on golden crops, and ripening fruits, and grazing herds, and busy bees, and sportive insects, the heart catches the spirit of the scene, beats in conscious enjoyment, rises in instant gratitude to the "first good, first perfect, and first fair," and we wonder that any rational being can be an Atheist !

The heart responds so cordially to the intelligence of a Creator, we are not surprised, that for many ages, it was regarded as an innate sentiment ; or from its congeniality to the most enlightened reason, that it should seem to be its unpremeditated result. We are almost forward to assert, that the natural capacity of the human understanding, is of itself amply sufficient to ascertain and establish the point in question.

But the complete assent of reason to a fact, is no evidence that it was discovered by reason. It is an easy matter to discover that, which is already seen to be demonstrably certain. It is the characteristic propensity of not a few minds, to measure their original capabilities by the zest with which they ponder, or the readiness with which they comprehend, the original productions of others. How often do the conceptions of genius, from their very simplicity, delude us with the impression that we might originate, or induce us to wonder that we had not originated, the same brilliant thoughts ! Let them be frequently revolved, and, forgetful of their origin, we unconsciously appropriate them as our

own. Thus does the simplicity of inventions impose on our understandings. Who could not,—we are ready to exclaim, in that delusion which has been induced by the familiarity of knowledge,—have discovered the law of gravitation, or a western continent? But ages rolled away, and mighty minds rose and set, leaving scarce a trace behind, before the power of reason formed a Columbus, or a Newton. We doubt not that the stupendous achievements of these immortal names, might be traced to the expansive and energizing influence of *Revelation* on the human intellect. And who can say, that, at this very moment we might not be immersed in Egyptian darkness as respects our knowledge of the true God, had He not raised up and inspired his servant Moses!

For ourselves, notwithstanding the constitutional provision which may be found in man's moral nature for the belief of a God; notwithstanding the triumphant amount of evidence and cordial assent which reason brings to His existence; and though we once thought (and who has not after a perusal of Paley's incomparable argument?) that man never needed any other Scriptures than those which are written in the characters of beneficent design on the whole face of nature,—we are now not backward to acknowledge, that reflection on simply the opening declaration of the book of Genesis, has changed our opinion, and grounded us in the conviction, *that we are indebted for our knowledge of the nature and attributes, if not the very being of God, to an original revelation of Himself to man.*

If reason corroborate the declaration that “in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,” we doubt not, that from an application of the principles of philosophical investigation, reason also will be heard to speak, in tones of moral certainty, that God wrote this passage by the hand of Moses.*

1. That Moses, in the exercise of his unaided powers, should have excogitated this rational doctrine, is a supposition fraught with extreme improbability. Considering the mental character of the early ages of the world, it is not reasonable to admit the thought that mankind then engaged in any speculations respecting the Creator of the universe. Even amid all the advantages which are afforded by revela-

* That Moses was the author of the book of Genesis will not be deemed a gratuitous assumption, if convenient reference be made to Art. I. No. VI. of the Lit. and Theol. Review. But see in particular Faber's argument: *Horæ Moisaicæ*. Vol. I. Sect. II. Chap. IV.

tion, whose rays are scattered on the remotest hamlet and habitation in a Christian land, what multitudes exist devoid of any knowledge of God, save that which consists in a vague and indefinite idea of His existence! How few ever think of enquiring respecting His nature, attributes and works! The sun unveils to their sight the magnificence of creation; but seldom do their thoughts range beyond this "visible, diurnal sphere." The orb of day sets amid golden clouds, and the moon peers above the horizon to diffuse her mellow light, and the stars come forth in twinkling lustre, and the planets irradiate the depths of ether, as they move on in harmonious grandeur; but all these worlds, so radiant with the glory of their Creator, immense in magnitude, countless in number, inconceivable in the rapidity of their motions, interest the mass of human minds far less than the lamps which mark our streets, or the bursting and scintillation of the sky-rocket. Necessitated to secure the means of animal subsistence, the throng of human kind enjoy no leisure for speculation. The rising glories of the morn suggest no other thought, but that they must rise to toil; and the coming on of evening, unfolding yet greater wonders, tells them only that now is the hour of their rest; or the time which might be devoted to high enquiries is squandered by others in low and mundane gratifications, incapacitating them ultimately for religious thought.

Now if such be the state of the general mind in an enlightened age, much more must a hebitude of the mental faculties have characterized mankind at the period in which Moses lived. Still in bondage to Egyptian tyranny, which for ages had pressed them in the dust, if the ignorance of the Hebrews might possibly have been less than their miseries, no facts need be adduced to prove, that slavery knows no leisure nor incitements for the exercise of profound thought. Nor is it reasonable to suppose, that any greater disposition or capacity for high and serious enquiries could have existed among co-etaneous nations, whose strength was expended in the conflicts of war abroad, or wasted in the indulgence of every lust at home. Among unenlightened tribes, little or no thought is entertained aside from the immediate wants of nature, and the gratification of depraved passion. We could as readily conceive of a paralytick, accomplishing the labours of a Hercules, as of an ignorant mind putting forth a voluntary and successful enquiry respecting the Infinite Intelli-

gence. It is the most sublimated enquiry which can engage the human mind; and it is not to be credited that the knowledge of an immaterial creative Power was struck out by the gross faculties of a dark age.

So simple does the analogical argument from effect to cause appear, as to be adapted almost to the comprehension of a child; still it involves a process of reasoning which could never be attempted by the human mind, unless it were in some degree improved and abstracted from sensible objects. Hence, the earliest speculations on this subject, of which we have any account, can be traced no farther back than the period when the cultivation of reason disposed the mind to reflection.*

Milton has made Adam a philosopher; but with as little propriety, we apprehend, as some Divines have made him a scholastic theologian. The Adam of "Paradise Lost," was Milton himself, rather than the Adam of "Genesis." That the first man, if he rose from the dust in the full perfection of his bodily and mental faculties, might have been astonished at the glorious phenomena of nature, seems far from improbable; but, poetically beautiful, or consonant with our feelings as may be Milton's description, the justness of his reasoning may fairly be questioned. The new created mind might have found "no end, in wondering mazes lost," rather than it should have been led to the analogical inference of a Creator, before experience had impressed it with the relations of cause and effect. Strictly speaking, no *à priori* argument can be framed. That of Clarke is an illustrious failure. It is founded on experience derived from an observation of external objects. Some previous intimation, then, of a God, is necessary to justify the supposition, that the immediate perception of a mind just waking up to the magnificence of

*According to some ancient philosopher, "primos in orbe deos fecit timor;" and it is not improbable, that the system of Polytheism originated in the fears of the ignorant multitude; but to attribute all speculation respecting a First Cause to the same ignoble origin, is a supposition not only gratuitous but fraught with the greatest absurdity. No enquiry has been more common and pleasurable to cultured intellects. The farther removed from want and disquietude, and the greater its improvement and discipline by study, the more inclined has been the human mind to engage in this lofty speculation. There is no foundation, then, for the opinion, which some atheistic writers have advanced, that speculation is the offspring of pain and want, and that man would never have undertaken the painful task of arguing on a First Cause, had he always lived in circumstances of ease and plenty. It might with more truth have been said, that atheistic speculation had its origin in the fears of ungodly men. To what unwelcome labour is the Atheist subjected!

creation, would be that of a Creator. Accordingly the supposition of an ancient, to whom Cicero alludes, is no less philosophically correct than curious: "That if persons who had long lived in subterraneous habitations, and had enjoyed *only a vague report* of the existence and power of the gods, should suddenly emerge into the light and lustre of the world which we inhabit, they would no sooner behold the earth and sea and sky, or *understand* the regular order of seasons and the vastness of the heavenly bodies, than they would at once acknowledge both the existence of superiour powers, and that these wonders were of their creation."

But man neither springs into existence in the full vigour and enlargement of his faculties, nor emerges from caverns of darkness into the effulgence of day. Familiar with the fabric of the universe before we are capable of reflection, the influence of gradual perception has precluded any emotions of wonder. It is only the man to whom the spectacle is novel, or whose faculties have been rendered inquisitive by education, who regards the steam engine with intelligent curiosity. So to the traveller, every scene is replete with absorbing interest, and suggests at every view appropriate enquiries, while the natives in general of that very land, which to him is a theatre of wonders, and a field of knowledge, are as little solicitous respecting its antiquities and history, as if they were incapable of thought. Multitudes may be found in different sections of the globe, who have never entertained even the suspicion, that those shining points in space were worlds of light; and it is because the power of education has never been brought to counteract that paralysis of mind which necessarily results from visual familiarity. It might be as reasonably supposed that the infantile body would grow and strengthen without the aliment which nature has furnished for its wants, as that man's unaided faculties would spontaneously assume the proportions of the philosophic intellect. The human mind must be taught, as the body must be fed; it must be stimulated by the force of education or of intellectual example or exposed to the influence of suggested thought, or it is physically incapable of any high enquiries respecting the causes and relations of things.

We are wont to speak of untaught native intellect; but the history of self-educated men will disclose in every instance, the influence of appropriate external causes in eliciting and shaping their undeveloped energies. The mechani-

cal inventions of Vaucanson may be traced to his having been obliged, while young, to attend his mother to the residence of her confessor, where, as a relief from tediousness, he was led to examine the pendulum of an old clock. The incident of having found in his mother's apartment Spencer's "Fairy Queen" made Cowley a poet; of having in an idle hour met with *L'Homme de Descartes*, made Malebranche the Plato of his age. Newton might never have deduced the principle of gravity, nor Franklin disarmed the lightning, had not the former been struck on his head by a falling apple, and the latter incidentally found De Foe's "Essay on Projects."

That the human mind, so degraded through ignorance as it must have been in the infancy of society, should have enquired after God; or that even the few among the mass who might have been endued with natural talent, could have discovered God, unless circumstances had conspired, or some incident had occurred, to arrest their attention, and elevate their thoughts, will then be admitted to be improbable.

Now it may be suggested, that Moses was favourably situated for the development of intellect; nor will it be denied, that to superiour native powers, were added advantages of education, which distinguished his lot in life, not only from any of his kindred, but from the mass of mankind. Rescued in his infancy by an Egyptian princess from the waters of the Nile, he was brought up in her father's palace, and educated as her own son. What he was taught, it is difficult to determine with certainty; though Philo, as quoted from Clemens by Faber,* specifies in his allusion to the education of Moses, arithmetic, geometry, medicine, music, rhythm, hieroglyphical philosophy and astronomy. But Egypt was celebrated at that period for its science and literature, and as Moses, from our authentic information, was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians," it is not improbable from our knowledge of the Grecian philosophy,—the elements of which were borrowed from that nation, that he was disciplined to the investigation of natural, moral and theological subjects.

We have been thus explicit, not only to preclude any impeachment of our candour in meeting a plausible objection to our train of reasoning, but to render it the more apparent, that the Egyptian education which Moses received, could not

* Hor. Mos. Vol. I. page 212.

have furnished him with his ideas respecting the Creator of the world.

Let it be granted that the far-famed wisdom of Egypt embraced moral apothegms, the economy of politicks, some knowledge of physiology and medicine, and not a few refined speculations on mind and matter; still, the same writings which acquaint us with the early history of Moses, afford ample evidence, that the God whom he knew was altogether unknown to the father of his royal patroness. "Who is the Lord," said Pharaoh, "that I should obey his voice to let Israel go? I know not the Lord neither will I let Israel go." Skilled as the Egyptians might have been in certain sciences; with all other nations at that period, they were alike immersed in the darkness of Polytheism. So far from entertaining any sublime notions of God, they were more degraded than the nations which prostrated themselves before the heavenly bodies, or deified their ancestors with the elements of nature, by the homage which they rendered to an indefinite multiplication of bestial and vegetable deities. The Mosaic worship, in not a few of its peculiar rites, is expressly guarded against the insinuating idolatry of Egypt; and if this be not sufficient to satisfy every reasonable mind that the notion of a Supreme Intelligence could not have been derived from that nation, can the contrary supposition be any less than absurd, when it is recollected, that the Egyptians themselves were ridiculed by surrounding Polytheists for the grossness of their idolatry?

That there might have been a few minds, as was subsequently the case in Greece, who from habits of thought were led to perceive the absurdity of the popular mythology is not improbable; but that any esoteric doctrine existed among the priesthood which embraced the pure principles of Natural Theology, is a suggestion replete with difficulties. Even if it be not reasonable to suppose that the Greek philosophers* who visited Egypt were initiated into the mysteries of their belief, would the king, who in all the early ages was linked with priests, have been ignorant of the principles which they withheld only from the knowledge of the vulgar herd? But if the priest, from the impression that his royal protectress designed him for their order, had admitted Moses alone into the arcana of hieroglyphical theism, how is it to

* The Greeks derived their religious ceremonies and borrowed the names of almost all their gods from Egypt. Herodotus, Eut. 58, 9.

be accounted for, that, contrary to the policy of his supposed instructors, and the universal custom of the heathen priesthood, he did immediately promulgate this rational doctrine to the multitude; nay, proscribed the polytheistic worship of the Egyptians, under penalty of death to the guilty Hebrew! So peculiarly circumstanced from being the adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, would have been forward to act in opposition to the sentiments of his education? But let it be admitted, that the vigour of native intellect, the aspirations of ambition, or the enkindling emotions of long-smothered patriotism, led him to declare his greatness and authority by throwing off the shackles of prejudice, defying the priests, and enlightening the people; it can never be satisfactorily explained, why, if his theistical views are to be ascribed to priestly tuition, he did not avail himself of their belief in the metempsychosis or immortality of the soul,—a doctrine (and so considered by all heathen legislators, whether they in reality regarded it as true or not;) of the last importance in facilitating the designs, and securing the influence of a political aspirant. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact, that the patriarchs were not ignorant of a future state. But the sanctions of the Mosaic law are so exclusively temporal, that while no sceptic since Bolingbroke has failed to adduce this circumstance in *prima facie* objection, Warburton (with whatever success our position is not concerned) has rendered it the basis of his celebrated argument in defence of Moses' divine legation.

Let it not be said, that if the Egyptians had attained the knowledge of immortality, they could not have been ignorant of the true God. It might be shown that these points involve processes of reasoning so different, that while the human mind could not exclude the presumption of its future existence, it might be wholly in darkness respecting its great original. But in all probability, it was *their very ignorance of the Creator* which induced the belief of the Egyptians in the doctrine of metempsychosis. Certain it is, that the heathen philosophers have furnished us with the data of their conclusions on this subject. "Nothing can be produced out of that which has no existence," said Democritus, *nor can any thing be reduced to non-entity*. Or as Perseus expresses it,

"De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti."

Now if they had entertained any suitable notions of God as an omnipotent Creator, obviously an act of annihilation would have appeared as easy a matter on the part of Deity, as the act of creation ; but supposing matter to be eternal and indestructible, it secured a necessary inference to their minds, that the soul of man, which for aught they knew had always existed, could never cease to exist. Yet what involves greater ignorance of the true God, than this prominent doctrine of Egyptian belief ? It implied that God, had no distinct existence ; that all souls were an emanation from him, and ultimately absorbed into his essence, identifying God and the Universe.

There is, however, one more recourse for the advocates of natural theology. The Greeks, it is known, improved upon the rude principles of science which had been introduced from Egypt, until Pythagoras discovered the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid, and Thales predicted an eclipse ; and in like manner, it may be thought, that Moses from his instruction by Egyptian priests and sages was stimulated to essay discovery in the regions of metaphysical speculation. However unsatisfying or enormous might have been the reserved opinions of his supposed instructors, with a mind disciplined for thought by early education, it is evident that no one could have been more favourably situated for calm reflection and successful enquiry than he, during his forty years residence in the deep seclusion of the wilderness. Removed from Egypt, we can readily imagine that his mind might often revert to its moral condition, and loath its degrading superstitions. We see his eye moisten in commiseration, and his heart beat with indignation, as he thinks of the oppression and wretchedness of his enslaved kindred. Involuntarily he lifts his eye to Heaven, as if to invoke retribution on the tyrant and deliverance for the slave. Or again, the vague notions of superiour powers which his youth had imbibed recur to his mind. Whose mind in that early age, if not his, shall be led to enquire, how came this glorious scene into existence ? "Must there not of necessity be an adequate and intelligent Cause ? What spirit is that which thinks in mine, and shines in yonder firmament, and speaks to my heart in the tranquillizing stillness of the desert ? Why do I exist with all these faculties so distinguished from the herds around me ? Whence this aspiration after something, I know not what ? Whence

this sense of right and wrong? Has man no Maker; the injured no avenger? Is this universal frame without a thinking head and beating heart?—Surely, there is a God—the Creator and moral Governour of the world.”

But our imagination, wafted by the breath of revealed truth, has carried us away from the decisions of natural reason. So easy is the process by which we attain to the demonstration of an Almighty Ruler, it is difficult to conceive that Moses, so endowed by nature and education, and so long embosomed in the depths of reflective solitude, could have resisted the high conclusion, or failed to discover the true God.

In arguing, however, concerning the natural capacity of the human understanding, it would be as unfair to decide from the attainments of the mind assisted by revelation, as to assume the present state of mechanical improvement as a criterion of the degree of civilization to which the ancients had attained. Nor is any *à priori* reasoning admissible. To ascertain what Moses was capable of achieving by his own unaided powers, there is but one legitimate course; and that is, to institute an enquiry respecting the theistical sentiments of the most civilized nations, at a period when human reason was confessedly unassisted, but most intent on metaphysical speculation.

It cannot be maintained, that the attention of Moses was more particularly directed to this subject. The existence and attributes of a Creator were the especial and all-absorbing themes among the Grecian sages. It cannot be supposed, that Moses enjoyed greater advantages than they for the prosecution of this subject. Aside from the fact that the latter had visited Egypt with a view to directing or enlarging their minds, they constantly enjoyed that stimulus to intellectual exertion which arises from philosophic associations and conflicting opinions. Much less may it be presumed, that however energetic the intellect with which the former was endowed, it was superiour to that of the latter. The native elements of the human mind, never shone forth with more dazzling radiance, than from the recesses of the academic grove; or assumed such forms of beauty and sublimity as immortalized the schools. Giants in intellect, their works remain as monuments of the might of human achievements. The greatest of modern minds have been their most enthusiastic scholars. The very despisers of Moses have

bowed in adoration at the shrine of their acknowledged, perhaps unapproachable greatness. Yet must it not be conceded by every candid mind, that all their writings are but melancholy records of the incapacity of human reason to discover God. Is not the result of their every speculation confirmation strong of the apostolic position, that "the world by wisdom knew not God." The vagueness and confusion of the speculative opinions, which brooded over the Gentile world, before it was visited by the "day spring from on high," can be likened to nothing short of that chaotic darkness, in which the earth existed before God said, "Let there be light."

If Moses had originated his views respecting the Deity, it must have been through one of two mediums,—either from perceiving the necessity of a First Cause, or from nature's marks of manifest adaption to specific ends. Now both of these modes of reasoning were so familiar to the heathen philosophers, that neither Clarke nor Paley may justly be considered in any other light, than as the Aristotle and Socrates of modern times.

But to what purpose was their mastery of these arguments? Did they attain to any clear, consistent, or correct views of the uncreated mind? All their mighty speculations tended to little else, than a perception and esoteric acknowledgement of the absurdity of the reigning superstitions.

The Monad of Pythagoras was the universe itself; the Deity of Zeno was an active ethereal fire which pervaded and informed the passive material mass; of Aristotle, an external, physical power; of Plato, an independent mind having no creative power. But it is unnecessary to particularize. Having no definite views of the spirituality, personality, and unity of the godhead, in general, the god of the schools was an infinitely extended soul, not a simple, indivisible essence. He was a mere philosophical agent, invented by reason in attempted explanation of existing phenomena; not an object of praise and prayer. He was controlled by a fatal destiny,—not omnipotent. He was wrapped in the shades of impenetrable darkness; existing in indolent quietude, and at an unapproachable distance,—not the father of mankind, ever active in his universal, beneficent agency. If they may not properly be denominated Atheists, still less may they justly be regarded as Theists. If universally they were not

absolute Pantheists, it cannot be proved that in more than one instance they had any idea of the divine unity.

As he was pronounced by the oracle to be the wisest of men, so is Socrates the only one whose unassisted ken almost pierced the veil which shrouded the true God from mortal knowledge. But let it be distinctly considered, that his recognition of the divine unity* and personality, (if indeed, it may not be traced to a report of the belief which separated the Israelites from all the surrounding nations,) was scarcely more than a mere suggestion, which never assumed in his mind the shape of logical conviction, nor in his teachings the form and consistence of system; that he used the terms *god* and *inter gods* changeably; and that his constant practice in sacrificing both in private and public to the popular deities, his frequent recourse to divination, to say the least, were not very consistent with so sublime a belief. Blinded, indeed, by the most unworthy prejudice, must be the mind, which can degrade the theistical views of Moses, by a comparison with Socrates, much more with the speculations of other pagan philosophers.

That many sublime conceptions of the Divinity may occasionally irradiate our search into the antique regions of metaphysical speculation will readily be conceded; but like

* Warburton, has endeavoured to show, that the secret of the Mysteries was the doctrine of divine unity; and adduces in evidence the *Palinodia* of Orpheus, but it cannot be proved that the Hierophant taught this doctrine to the initiated. It is alike uncertain whether the *Palinodia* were written by Orpheus, whether its date be antecedent to Christianity, and whether it were recited in the ceremonies of initiation. Eusebius (*Praepar. Evang. Lib. 13. chap. 12.*) has cited the *Palinodia* from a Jew who lived 200 years before Christ, but in connection there is an incidental allusion to Moses and Abraham which has induced a belief in the minds of some critics that these verses were fabricated or interpolated by Aristobulus, or some other Jew. St. Justin's (*Exhort. ad Graec. p. 18.*) quotation differs from Eusebius, but all that can be deduced from his reading, is, that the author, whoever he might be, or at whatever period he might have lived, has not expressed himself respecting the Supreme Being in a more definite and consistent manner than Cleanthes, or Aratus from whom St. Paul quoted. The early Christians were so anxious to recommend the Scriptures by referring the heathen to points of similar belief in their own authors, that the most obvious interpolations have been detected in their version of Pagan hymns. In the hymns, as preserved by Pagan writers, of each of the poets to which we have alluded, the idea of a Supreme Governour is confounded with that of the stories which identified the Deity and the world. Were they conclusive, however, as to the belief of the divine unity, no evidence can be gathered from ancient authors to prove that it constituted a profession of faith at Elusis. Socrates refused to be initiated, and on this account was thought to be destitute of religion; but if the unity of God were the secret, how happens it that he alone should have discovered it? In connexion, the remarks of Faber, *Hor. Mos. 1. Vol. Sec. II. Chap. VII.*

those brilliant coruscations, which light up for an instant the midnight sky, involving the traveller in tenfold darkness, these glittering thoughts serve only to render more sensible to the surrounding obscurity. It need not be shown, that the imposing splendour of these infrequent conceptions, fades away and dies, when compared with declarations so overpoweringly effulgent, as those which the Mosaical writings contain. Pause, for a moment, in reflection on this single sentence, (and it is among the most sublime which have been preserved to us,)—"I am whatever has been and is and shall be ; and my veil no mortal has ever drawn aside"—and say, whether it does not, of itself, more than intimate the existing and hopeless darkness, in which the ancients felt themselves involved ; whether the temple at Sais, on the architrave of which this sentence was written, might not most appropriately have contained an altar, bearing a corresponding inscription—"To the unknown God."

Let the utmost weight, however, be attached to the golden sentences of the ancient philosophers ; let it be granted, that they caught some glimpses of the Infinite Majesty. Which of the schools arrived at a definite conclusion ; what philosopher ever inculcated Mosaical sentiments of God, or taught one simple principle of theistical belief ? Would not the whole array of philosophic minds have been smitten with amazement, had one of their number exclaimed, "There is one only living and true God ?" Think of the obscurity and perplexity which characterize their speculations. It need not now be essayed, whether the whole range of their philosophy could furnish us with even a plausible system of eclectic theism. In this we have been anticipated, not only by some of the ablest of the Christian writers, as Justin Martyr and Augustin, who according to their own confessions, vainly searched and agonized for truth, until their minds were brought in contact with the Hebrew Scriptures ; but even by Cicero, whose treatise *de Natura Deorum* amounts to nothing more, than a triumphant exposure of the uncertainty and vanity of all the existent systems of philosophical theism. Nor is it a result which should excite our surprise, when Plato, whose mind was still more profound than that of his immortal master, himself declared, "that, to discover the Artificer and Father of the universe, is indeed difficult, and that when found, it is impossible to reveal him, through the medium of discourse, to mankind at large."

If the later Platonists shall be found to be more consistent and satisfactory in their views, it will be recollected, that their date is posterior to the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into the Greek language,—a circumstance which was not without its immediate influence on all philosophical speculations.

A dispassionate enquiry precludes all doubt, that amid the irradiations of their schools, the wisdom of their senates, and the magnificence of their architecture, they were “without God in the world.” That altar erected in the centre of enlightened Athens, too truly tells us *all* that the Gentile world knew of God, after an elaborate enquiry of four thousand years. Mark well that inscription;—TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.

Oh ! how should all deistical pretensions be abashed, and the pride of reason be humbled in the dust ! Look back to an earlier age, thou boasting sceptic ! Pry into the desert of Midian—thou shalt find that a greater than Socrates is there ! He is engaged in recording theistical instruction for all coming ages. Are his enquiries embarrassed by difficulties ? Does he combat no doubts, or shield his views from the possibility of scepticism ? Is he irrational, inconsistent, or unsystematic in his positions ?—Where else can be found such sentiments of God ? Uncreated, He has existed from eternity. Purely spiritual, strictly individual, essentially immaculate, He is as infinitely removed from all contact with matter, as distinct from all other existences, as his nature is free from imperfection and sin. Guided not by destiny, but by the unerring law which emanates from his infinite wisdom and goodness, He exists in absolute independence. Omnipotent to execute his sovereign pleasure, the world is not an emanation from his nature, but a creation of his will. Invisibly omnipresent, He does not, with Epicurean indolence, disregard the affairs of his creatures, or attend only to the things which are great in human estimation ; but fastening his vision on each revolving world, with each revolving thought of man, He knows all that can happen, either in time or space ; provides for every want, both of man and beast ; directs and orders all that takes place ; holds in his hands the destinies of every rational being, as amenable to his moral government ; and subserves the universe of mind and matter to the undivided, unrivalled glory of his incommunicable name.

Such is a faint delineation of the Being whom Moses knew and adored. Wonderful man ! Amid millions of idolaters, sole iconoclastic monotheist ! In thy conceptions of an immaterial Creator, a supreme Intelligence,—all-wise, all-mighty, all-good, obscuring the brightest, proudest speculations of the mightiest minds of philosophical antiquity !

Now, we ask, how are we to account for the fact, that Moses, in an uncultivated age, should entertain theistical views, which the greatest of heathen philosophers failed to discover ; but which appear the more agreeable to reason, the more our reason is disciplined by philosophy and enlarged by science ? Admitting that the heathen world, in the midst of its polytheism, entertained some indefinite notion respecting one *Optimus Maximus*, when all their speculations tended only yet more effectually to deface its impression, *is it credible* that Moses should have attained these rational and sublime views by the bare power of his own unassisted mind ?

2. It is highly probable (i. e. admissible of the strongest moral evidence) that Moses derived his knowledge of God from original Revelation. Admitting his being, it cannot be asserted without denying his omnipotence, that a revelation from God is abstractly impossible ; nor can such an occurrence be regarded as improbable, unless it be reasonable to believe, that the Creator of this world is not all-wise ; or that He has formed the human race for no assignable end. Surely, man was not placed here through caprice. Look at his rational and moral constitution. Why alone gifted with intelligence ? Why able to discern the reflected lineaments of wisdom and goodness ? Why this mysterious faculty of thought, which can stretch itself into immensity and almost grasp infinity ? Why this exhaustless capacity for the love and adoration of excellence, if he were not formed for high communion with his Maker ? To suppose the contrary, is to brand his being as an enigma, and render all the phenomena of the universe less coherent and intelligible than the “leaves which the Sybil scattered on the wind.” To reject, consequently, the presumption in favour of an original revelation to man is, to impeach the wisdom and beneficence of his Maker ; it is to accuse Him of having wantonly formed man, and then abandoned him to be the sport of accident ; or of having formed him for a high end, and then, paradoxically, attempting to effectuate his purpose by most studiously with-

holding from his rational creature any communications of divine knowledge.

If, according to the speculations of some of the most profound philosophers, it be probable that He who endued man with the organs of speech taught him their use; that even in relation to some of those arts which contribute to the comfort of civilized life, man in the infancy of our race was not unassisted by his Maker; much less is it reasonable to believe, that man was left by God in ignorance of his high relations.

Let it not be said, that, on account of his rational endowments and moral sensibilities, there was no necessity for any immediate revelation. Aside from the futility of unassisted reason, which is sufficiently obvious from the history of heathen philosophy, it is questionable, whether man uninstructed could ever have entertained general ideas; whether it would not have been impossible for him to conceive the idea of an infinite, simple Spirit; while it is certain, from universal observation and experience, that man must be taught, or he remains forever ignorant and incapable of mental exertion. As to natural conscience, it will not be maintained, we presume, that however she may intimate the existence of a moral Governour, her teachings could be available to all that knowledge of God which is indispensable to our well-being.

How absurd is it, we had almost said, to contend against the probability of man's having been immediately instructed by his Creator. Why not gravely argue, that God need not have furnished animal existences with the means of attaining the end of their being? "In the course of time they would have discovered them." * * * "If, indeed, they had not died on the eve of dawning success." The existence of animal instincts, is not only a proof of infinite wisdom in the Creator, but a living refutation of deism. Has God thus beneficently endowed the young of every animal; and did He withhold from man alone the means of at once accomplishing the sublime purposes of his being? If instinct were necessary to the brute, not less indispensable was revelation to man. It is now to man, as a heaven-born instinct, teaching him what reason cannot. And the same arguments which may be adduced in favour of probable revelation, prove that it was *ab origine*. It would be a violation of the constitution of things, infinitely more flagrant, had the Father of the universe abandoned his rational creature for ages before making Himself known, than if earthly parents should with-

hold shelter and nourishment from their new-born child, until they had convinced themselves, by its parched and pallid lips, its piteous cries, its dying struggles, that it could not thrive and live without their sustaining agency. Hence, the abstract falsity of any religion bearing date posterior to the creation. Hence the impregnable vantage ground which Christianity maintains amid the array of antagonist systems. The latest of his posterity may know the same eternal God whom Adam knew.

That Moses, therefore, must have enjoyed the advantages of divine revelation, may be logically deduced from three considerations which have been suggested to our minds, by the opening sentence of his history.

1. The clearness and positiveness with which he speaks of *one immaterial Creator*. Had he been present when "the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy," he could not have uttered a declaration more express and decided. In vain shall the records of profane history be searched for any statement which can bear a moment's comparison with this: *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.* God, the supreme reality—the omnipotent intelligence, filled the whole sphere of his vision. He stood sublimely apart from all other existences. Amid the unnumbered deities of surrounding nations, like Sinai rearing its cloud-capped peak above the wide spread sands of the desert, He towered in solitary majesty, to a height which was inaccessible and full of glory. It is the lucid distinctness of his views respecting God, which constitutes the marked distinction and surpassing glory of the Mosaic system. Not one, of all the philosophical schools, ever proposed the immaterial, independent existence of one only God, as its distinguishing tenet; nor amid the multitude of their conflicting opinions, can any distinct recognition, much less any positive expression of it be discovered. Unblessed by a revelation from the source of light, how could they avoid obscurity or contradiction in their sentiments? Most congenial, as it may be to our minds, to conceive the existence of one intelligent Supreme; it is, nevertheless, so difficult to form any idea of a Being, whose nature is purely spiritual, that to speak of him with definite precision is not unlike the vain attempt of a blind man to describe light. If ever we speak of God in terms of confidence and lucid distinctness, it is with our hand on the Bible; and however "rooted and

grounded" we may be in the belief of supreme, spiritual unity, as characterizing the divine nature; yet no one, in the least accustomed to reflect on the operations of his own mind, will deny that it is of all conceptions the most difficult to retain in vivid, operative remembrance; that we involuntarily invest God with a material form; that we never think of Him without unconsciously proposing to ourselves some visible object.

We are not surprized, therefore, at the constant proneness to idolatry which all uncivilized nations have evinced; or that the Hebrews, despite of the instructions and warnings of their leader, should so repeatedly abandon his God in favour of heathen deities. The adoration of a brazen calf is better adapted to an ignorant people; nay, of the sun and moon to a mind however improved, if uninstructed by Heaven itself, than the worship of the invisible, intangible, inconceivable God. If Moses, considered as a political aspirant, had determined by the vigour of his own native intellect to devise an effective system of priestcraft, is it not probable, that he would have advanced other notions respecting the nature of God, than such as are the most difficult for even the enlightened mind to apprehend or retain;—which could not possibly be impressed on the efficient belief of such a race as the Hebrews, without the miraculous, corroborative interposition of the Creator himself? If he had not enjoyed this actual assistance of Almighty God, could he, in an uncultivated age,—his own mind but poorly furnished and disciplined in comparison with unnumbered minds of after ages,—have expressed himself with that clearness and positiveness of authority, which alone proceeds from conscious certainty? A self-taught child of nature, and thus speak of Him "whom eye hath not seen, nor can see?" O tell us, ye would-be wise, ye self-adoring sceptics! how happens it, that he should—

"So get the start of this majestic world
And bear the palm alone."

I wonder not that ye should have branded him as an enthusiast; a dupe; an impostor; and conspired to rob him of his crown.

"Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world
Like a Colossus; and we petty men
Walk under his huge legs, and peck about
To find ourselves dishonourable graves."

2. The cosmogony of Moses affords presumptive evidence of original revelation. Compared with that of the early pagan nations, it is brief and simple, while theirs is arrayed in all the gaudy colours of allegory; his is sober detail, theirs vague and marvellous; his, as a system, is consistent and rational, theirs is merely a group of wild and distorted images. If his, therefore, bears a stronger resemblance to an authentic history, it is equally obvious that those events, a mutilated account of which is interwoven with the mythological cosmogonies of every pagan nation, must actually have transpired (else whence this universal tradition respecting them?), and that the Mosaical is the true account.* We need not enquire, whether it be probable, that any unassisted mind, in any age of the world, could have drawn up such a history as that which is found in the first chapter of Genesis. Let our view be confined to the first verse of that chapter. It contains information of a fact which can be found nowhere else. In the beginning God created—*Created?* How came he by that idea? The wisdom of Egypt, the philosophy of Greece, the discriminative powers of the Roman intellect, the inventive imagination which characterized all the oriental nations, were unequal to its conception. The earliest philosophers of whom we have any knowledge, alike with Ocellus, Plato, and Aristotle, maintained that matter was eternal. *Ex nihilo, nihil fit*, was the fundamental maxim of all their speculations. Aristotle has attributed the opinion, οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μηδενος γενέσθαι—as common to those of his day with all preceding philosophers: and Plutarch, in his representation of the Platonic doctrine, says, “that the substance or matter of which God made the world was not created, but always lay ready for the Artificer, to be arranged and ordered by Him; for the creation was not out of nothing, but out of what had been without form, and unfit; as a house, or a garment, or a statue is made.”† The inference, consequently, is by no means inadmissible, that the human mind could not have excogitated the idea, that this world was produced from nothing. The spontaneous impression of the mind, on a survey of creation, is, that all things ever were, and ever will be, as they are. The resistless conviction of not a few of the

* See Faber's Sketch of Heathen Cosmogonies, *Hæc Mosaicæ*, Vol. I. Sect. I. Chap. II.

† Hence, though pagan writers not unfrequently used the term Creator, they attached no other idea to it than that of an Artificer.

pagan philosophers was, that the creation of the world is too stupendous a work for even God to accomplish ; and despite of all our superiour knowledge, when we contemplate the vastness of the material universe, and find ourselves lost amid countless suns and stars, to the smallest of which our earth dwindles into insignificance, and from the nearest of which the disk of our world can scarcely be discerned, we involuntarily exclaim, how is it possible that these revolving bodies, whose numbers and dimensions stagger our calculations, should have emerged from nothing into being ? Admit that the *creation* of the world has been authentically declared ;—we may even believe it to be a fact, and yet it is a fact of which we can form no conception. That this vast frame should have been *created*, equally surpasses finite comprehension, as that the Creator himself should have existed from eternity. But if the latter proposition must of necessity be admitted,—though it be inscrutable to our minds,—so must we concede the yet more inscrutable proposition of Him

“ Whose word leap'd forth at once to its effect ;
Who called for things that were not, and they came.”

To assert that nothing can exist uncaused, is to violate the primary conviction of the mind that something must have existed from eternity ; and in like manner, to assert that matter cannot be produced from nothing, is to involve us in all the absurdities of the heathen schools, worse confounded by modern Atheists. Socrates did not fail to perceive the difficulties which embarrassed every existing theory respecting the genesis of the world ; and by consequence leaving this *quæstio vexata* to the vain logomachies of the sophists, has told us, with greater emphasis than by positive affirmation, not only that he was ignorant of the *Almighty* God, but that he did not regard human reason as competent to successful enquiry on a subject so remote from possible knowledge, as that of the world's origin. Yet when the *creatio ex nihilo* has been suggested as a fact, it clears up a thousand difficulties ; appears the more rational as our enquiries extend, and gathers proof from the phenomena of nature.

Unaided, then, by supernatural light, was it Moses who has disclosed to us the secrets of the beginning ? We could with equal facility believe that it was his spirit, and not the Spirit of the Almighty, which dissipated the primordial darkness that brooded over the unformed earth.

3. Regarding this passage as a simple proposition, it admits of no philosophical explanation, except on the ground, that the Hebrews were not destitute of either the historical or sensible evidence of a divine revelation. The advocates of the Bible have been wont to contrast the poetical addresses of the Hebrews to their God, with the immortal effusions of Cleanthes, Euripides, or Orpheus to Jupiter; and destitute indeed must he be of all sensibility to the sublime and beautiful, who does not perceive the incomparable superiority of the former. But still, though the high excellence of Hebrew poetry may be traced to the more rational and sublimated opinions which they entertained of the Supreme Being, it may not be adduced as a conclusive argument that they enjoyed a revelation from Heaven. The imagination is the only faculty which seems to be at all developed among an uncivilized people. The very expressions of an early and rude state of society are to a degree poetic. Every vestige of remote antiquity denotes the character of the human mind in the infancy of the world; and it is not unreasonable to admit the supposition that the age which nurtured the genius of a Homer, might have given birth to the most rapt descriptions of Deity. But the elements which contribute to the growth of poetic genius, preclude the formation of the philosophic mind. The very habits of mankind, in an uncivilized state, are at variance with that mental quietude which is indispensable to speculative thought. To expect to discover any traces of metaphysical enquiry among erratic hordes, composed of shepherds or savage hunters, were to betray unpardonable ignorance at once of the operations of mind and the history of our race. If any writings are found among such classes, they invariably disclose an exuberance of sympathetic feeling, with no capacity for thought; thus demonstrating that the poet, rather than the philosopher,—the singer, not the sage, is demanded by the wants of an uncultivated people. It is not until men have been gathered into permanent abodes, and a division of labour has been introduced, and a collision of intellects takes place, that arts are invented, science cultivated, or education sought. The first attempts at reasoning, compared with the speculations of erudite and disciplined minds, are as the lisplings of the infant, to the perfection of speech. History proves, that the earliest traces of incipient civilization are discoverable, in sententious sayings on human life, isolated moral periods, and philosophi-

cal fables. The nature of mind precludes any discovery or deduction, whether physical or moral, until experiments have been made, or proofs investigated; and the progress of science, during the last century, most conclusively teaches us, that the last attainment of a philosophic mind, as the result of all its inductive enquiries, is the power of forming a simple proposition. To this end, how did Newton toil, that he might trace the demonstrations which enabled him to assert the laws of the planetary system !

Now on the supposition that the notion of one omnipotent Creator, who formed all things out of nothing by his mere will, was excogitated by reason, must not the discovery have been preceded by the most elaborate enquiry ? Could the proposition, that "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," have possibly been framed, except by a most improved and philosophic mind ; and that, as the result of the most profound, inductive abstraction ? No one will contend that the application of steam power, or the invention of the lightning rod, might have been hit upon by an uncivilized people. "When the intellectual faculties are just beginning to unfold," says Dr. Robertson, "and their feeble exertions are directed towards a few objects of primary necessity and use, it is preposterous to expect that men should be capable of tracing any relation between effects and their causes." Yet, though no speculation is confessedly attended with so many difficulties as that respecting the origin of the world ; and though no state could have been more unfavourable to the expansion of the reasoning powers than that which characterized the first ages of the world ;—*here is the son of a Hebrew slave*, in the midst of an ignorant, degraded, long-enslaved race, themselves surrounded by a nation of the grossest idolaters, authoritatively declaring to them, *as a fact*, that which no philosopher of later and the most cultivated ages, however protracted and repeated their efforts to demonstrate it, or render it probable by analogical reasoning, *ventured to affirm !* Unlike men whose aim is to convince, or to secure an intellectual reputation, by a display of their powers of reasoning, he adverts to no train of thought,—aduces no proofs ; but simply throws down the naked, unsupported proposition, "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

Now we are reduced to this alternative : either to believe, contrary to evidence, that the world was then advanced to a

state of civilization and intelligence superiour to any subsequent degree of mental improvement, or that Moses was endued with the most enlarged intuitive perception ; either, that all analogical reasoning and all historical experience are directly violated by his declaration, or that he spoke on the authority of Heaven, to a people already acquainted, either through the medium of tradition from their fathers, or evidence addressed to their senses, with the fact asserted. If God were not previously known by the Hebrews, the bare affirmation of Moses would have been instantly rejected by that law of the mind which demands evidence just in proportion to the end proposed. He might have laboured to induce the belief ; but with infinitely less success than Newton, had he simply persisted in the assertion, that our earth and the planets revolve round the sun, instead of presenting to the world the series of demonstrations by which the discovery was at once made and established. But if, on the other hand, the memory of the Creator had been faithfully transmitted to the Hebrews ; and especially if sensible evidence of the Creator's power had been afforded by the recent and unequivocal interpositions of his Providence in their behalf ; then, all necessity for argument was alike anticipated and superseded by God himself ; and it was at once philosophical and sufficient for Moses to declare the fact in the form of a simple proposition.

Why does infidelity prate against the credibility of physical miracles ? If Moses were not indebted to original revelation, this single declaration involves a greater miracle. We can sooner believe, that God appeared to him in the burning, unconsumed bush ; that the waters of the Red Sea opened to admit the passage of the Hebrews ; nay, that the sun stood still in the heavens, at the command of Joshua, than that this declaration was made without supernatural aid. The infidel professes to believe in the existence of a God.—Why ? Because he fails not to perceive in any of the objects of nature, the marks of an agency impossible to man. We take up the Bible ; on its first page this declaration meets our eye :—"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."—We cannot but pause in profoundest astonishment. What powers of intellect, what capacious stores of knowledge, what sublimated conceptions must its author have had ! Who could he have been ? Tell me not, that any finite, unassisted mind lighted up that moral luminary for the world of mankind.

If, according to the shrewd suggestion of John Foster, a man must possess the very attributes of Divinity before he can be competent to certain knowledge that there is no God ; to our mind it is scarcely less apparent, from reflection on the unnumbered difficulties which embarrass every attempt to account for this declaration on sceptical principles, that if Moses were not inspired of God, it was *Himself* who in the beginning created the heaven and the earth. Absurd ! do we hear the infidel rejoin ? Then tell us of the mysterious processes of reasoning by which you are able to falsify the marks of a divine origin which are at once inscribed on the date, the authority, the form, and matter of this primary declaration. Reckon the incalculable chances which are arrayed against the supposition of unthinking ignorance, that it was a *happy hit*. Demonstrate (not dogmatize) that Moses was not aided by heaven to promulgate a fact which the history of literature and science, the experience of all past ages, teach you never would have been known, had he not declared it. Give us the evidence of your omniscience, for no less an attribute is necessary before *you can know*, despite of all probabilities, that the rational and sublime historian of Creation was not inspired by the Creator of heaven and earth.

1. If, then, such be the nature, attributes and works of God, He has given a special revelation of himself to man. If, according to our prefatory remarks, the idea of God be most suited to our moral nature and most agreeable to reason ; it is equally obvious from the train of argument which we have pursued, that without the lights of a divine revelation, we should have been enveloped in utter ignorance of *the one only living and true God*. It was to impress the belief of his independent existence and spiritual unity, that He made himself known to Moses by signs which could not be mistaken or disputed. It was to perpetuate the pure faith, that by the most singular polity, He separated the Hebrews from all connexion with the idolatrous nations of the earth, committing unto them the "lively oracles of God" until the time should come, predicted by his own word, when a more resplendent manifestation of his attributes would be made to the world in the mysterious constitution of his "only begotten Son."

Here is God's revelation to man. Wonderful book ! Does it stagger credulity ? Is its admission accompanied

with difficulties which the finite mind cannot satisfactorily solve?—But as God exists, the Creator and moral Governour of the world, so surely is this the word of God. The evidence that this volume suggested the belief of an immaterial creative intelligence, is as certain as that all nature corroborates the belief. It is owing to the radiance of Nature's evidences, that so many minds, whether sceptical or not, have been blinded to the true origin of our idea respecting God. We are not unaware of the authority of *names* which may be arrayed against our position. Let the remark be repeated a thousand times, that "no miracle was ever wrought to convince Atheists, because they might always arrive at the knowledge of a Deity by the light of nature." *Did* its well known author? We trow not. Lord Bacon had never been able, with so much significance, to designate the history of nature's phenomena, *volumen operum Dei, et tanquam altera scriptura*, had he not enjoyed a previous acquaintance with Revealed Truth. Clarke essayed, independently of revelation, to enforce conviction on the atheistic mind; but his inference by no means follows from his metaphysical premises. Aristotle might have said that "a self-existent Being must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice, truth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the Supreme Governour and Judge of the world," if the inspired Scriptures had previously unfolded to him the divine nature and attributes. Revelation is the telescope of reason; and it is owing to this fact, that the suggestions of God's word have been mistaken for the deductions of man's reason. So to our supernaturally illuminated vision, the feeble glimmerings of nature's light have become the planets moving in their respective orbits.

It may be in vain to attempt to wrest from the Deist a candid acknowledgement of his obligations to revealed truth. When a lie has been long cherished by the human mind, it seems to incorporate itself with all its moral elements. But we soberly aver, that the disbeliever in revelation should turn Atheist—yes, go out beneath the broad expanse of the firmament, and declare in the hearing of listening worlds,—*There is no God!* Can you not screw your philosophy up to such a point? Do you shudder at the very thought? Then bow down, in the docility of penitence, before the injured majesty of Revealed Truth. To stop short of this, is to convince us, not of your profundity, but of your

pride; not of the soundness of your reason, but the hollowness of your heart. No honest man will attempt to palm on the world the deductions of another, as his own. None truly great in intellect will vaunt the powers of human reason.* No one capable of appreciating the difficulties under which the greatest minds of antiquity laboured in their speculations concerning God, will be reluctant to acknowledge, that Moses must in some manner have received supernatural illumination. "Call to-morrow," said a Heathen sage† when asked 'what God was?' Again and again, "call to-morrow." The answer was the instinctive tribute of natural reason, to the inscrutable majesty of the Supreme Existence. It is the humble acknowledgement of every profound thinker, whenever he attempts to embody his conceptions of that *something* which his thoughts and reasonings cannot grasp. Shall we then reject a volume, which, in no wise derogatory to his high attributes, discloses the Supreme Reality to the eye of our faith, in the most sublime, and yet endearing attitude,—reject it, on account of trifling, irrelevant difficulties, when our most philosophical and honourable and operative views of God are found *there* and no where else—bearing the most conclusive testimony to the divinity of its origin? No; perish all human systems of philosophy, but leave us our Bible; or you have left us "without God in the world."

2. If the idea which Moses entertained of the nature of God be correct, we may infer that the Divine Being would have adopted precisely such a method of revealing himself to man, as is found in the Holy Scriptures. It having been already shown, that no reasonable objection can be adduced against the probability of a revelation, we will not discuss the question whether man should have been endued with the intuitive knowledge of his Maker. Let his rational and moral constitution, with the nature of God as an infinitely perfect spirit, be distinctly retained in mind. Now through what medium shall a revelation be made? Shall it be by a law written on the heart? But this, at the utmost, could only impel man to a certain course of action, without impart-

* "In my opinion," said Sir Humphrey Davy, "profound minds are the most likely to think lightly of the resources of human reason; it is the pert, superficial thinker who is generally strongest in every kind of unbelief."

† "Quanto diutius considero, tanto mihi res videtur obscurior." Symonides.

ing to him any definite knowledge of his lawgiver. Shall it be by an internal, spiritual illumination? But what evidence could we have that the light within us was not darkness? or wherein would such a clearness of mental perception differ from intuition? Adam might in some manner have been made acquainted with the Divine nature and attributes; but no one would contend for tradition, save the lover of ghostly power, or he who has not sufficient enlargement to perceive that it could in no manner be effectually secured from corruption, except by a succession of inspired men, or rather the inspiration of every man through all generations; which is as much a contradiction in terms as a perpetual miracle. We may not suppose that God would have formed man without acquainting him at once with the author and end of his being. Could the Divine purpose, then, in reference to the successive ages of the world, be in any manner so effectually answered, as by employing human instruments to embody authentic history, or immediately inspiring them to record the knowledge of his attributes and will?

Some have contended for the all-sufficiency of the light of nature to this end; and it is not surprising. We have seen how perfectly agreeable to reason are the disclosures of the Bible respecting God; and no believer, if in the least conversant with science, can be ignorant that all nature may be rendered tributary to the illustration and defence of revealed truth. The evidence of nature may be indispensable to corroborate the teachings of revelation. But how happens it, that nature so brightly symbolizes to our view the attributes of her great Creator? If the eye of reason, however perfect its construction, do not necessarily require a medium of vision equally with our bodily eye, sure we are, it *cannot be proved* that natural theology has instructed us in the true knowledge of God. The history of all nations furnishes indubitable evidence, that man, unblessed by revelation, knows not the High and Holy One. Without the aids which inspiration has afforded, we might now be looking up to the hosts of heaven as our gods; and God would look down upon a world of benighted, degraded idolaters.

Should it be intimated, that from a jealous regard to revelation we do wrong to reason, it may be in truth replied, that it is no disparagement to this noble faculty of the mind, if in attempting to ascertain its real powers, the history of

the world proves them to be limited. But if, in any instances, the advocates of revelation have verged to one extreme, certain it is that the devotees of natural theology have gone to the other. It is not uncommon at the present day for the deistical illuminati to talk about the light of science, and the superiour faculties which the march of mind has afforded to our theistical speculations, and *they* are not surprised at the darkness which environed the heathen intellect; but in all their pride and fancied greatness, to the great ones of antiquity they are as midday insects compared with midnight stars. It was well said, and I think by Goëthe, that Deists are butterflies who have thrown off the covering under which they attained their perfect organization. To us they have ever appeared not unlike the sage critics of Columbus. O, vain men! it is owing to this blessed volume that reason commands such reach in investigation, and can bring to her purposes such energy in action. It is because she sits where the light of heaven streams upon her, in all the effulgence of the sun of righteousness, that she seems so godlike in her powers, so radiant with glory.

Others have thought, the best possible manner, and the only efficient way, in which God could reveal himself, would be by some striking manifestation to the senses. Suppose this were done. We see his flaming car as it rolls through the darkness of the midnight heavens. We hear the thunder of his voice, which breaks, in startling accents, on the leaden ear of universal sleep. The long extinguished fires of Sinai are rekindled on yonder mountain, in token of his descent. He throws himself in some undefined, appalling shape across the path of the transgressor; or strikes the unbeliever dead before our terrified sight. What is the consequence? He has annihilated our moral freedom; precluded the ennobling exercise of our spiritual faculties on his high attributes, and degraded us in the scale of intellectual being. Man is operated upon by his Maker as if he were a brute. Instead of a rational and moral being, guided by reflection, believing on evidence, obedient from free choice, he has become a trembling slave, overwhelmed by the visible display of the Divine Majesty.

We admit that a representation of Deity which shall constitute a violation of the laws of nature (if such, indeed, be an accurate definition of a miracle), may be indispen-

sable to corroborate a written revelation; but it could be permanently adapted only to a people who, from ignorance and the circumstances of their condition, were incapable of appreciating any other evidence than such as might be addressed to their senses. Nor could any material representation, however sublime, of such a being as God, bear any proportion to his essential glory, or any relation to his spiritual nature; while it would for ever restrict us, in our contemplations of God, to an image, at once degrading to his perfections, and contracting to our faculties of thought.

But a revelation addressed to us through the medium of inspired written language, while it respects our rational constitution and progressive susceptibilities, may shield the Divine character from erroneous and unworthy notions. Our conceptions of Him will be clearer and more enlarged, our approximation to Him, in mental elevation and moral excellence, will be more near, just in proportion to our study of his word and obedience to his spiritual requirements. Faith, as an intelligent, voluntary exercise, will secure the glory of his name, and the true dignity of our nature. With such a revelation as this, what themes of meditation are presented to us! what questions for the trial of the highest intellect! what room for the excursive faculties of mind! what fields for the acquisition of knowledge! By the influence which it is calculated to exert over our being, how may we be elevated above the grovelling perceptions of sense! how may we hold communion with the Supreme Intelligence, and be fitted to take part in the sublime exercises of immortality! Look at the man who consecrates his mind and heart to the practical belief and intimate knowledge of the inspired Scriptures;—

“How near he presses on the Angel’s wing!
Which is the Seraph, which the child of clay?”

The very conception of such a Being as the God of the Bible, elevates man to the consciousness of himself, as possessing an immaterial, deathless principle. It cannot be steadily entertained for a moment, without the most profound abstraction of mind; while it is capable of illimitable expansion. We may add thought to thought, and image to image, and still with the certainty that all is infinitely short of the reality. It opposes itself to all that is material and mutable; surpasses all that is beauteous or sublime;

eclipses all that is splendid; subordinates to itself all that is great and good; until earth-born existences fade away from our vision, and the universe itself vanishes into nothing.

3. To reject the Holy Scriptures is to deny God. The Deist scorns to submit to the grand requisition of inspired truth;—*faith* is derogatory to his reason! Now could he prove that the human mind, by its unaided energy, attained to the knowledge of God, it may be doubted whether, in his theistical belief, he is not acting on the very principle which he repudiates in the Christian believer. Certain it is, he cannot demonstrate an eternal First Cause; he cannot disprove the suggestion of the Atheist, that it is a mere hypothesis, to account for the phenomena of the universe.* Would it not seem, then, that his belief is founded in faith?—his entire system being reared on that which, independently of inspired authority, is a gratuitous assumption! But his idea of God is too shadowy, his belief too theoretical, to secure his practical acknowledgement of a Supreme Being. To be rationally affected by the idea of God's existence, we must be impressed with the belief, that although impervious to our senses, He is intimately conversant with our thoughts; that He is not merely an upholding, animating, directing power; but an all-seeing witness—the Judge of all the earth, as well as its Creator. The moral grandeur of the Mosaic declaration consists in its unfolding at once, and with impressive authority, the relations which mankind sustain to a personal Creator; and a belief in the inspired record cannot fail to secure to God the place which He should occupy in our affections, the authority which He should exercise over our conduct, the tribute to which He is entitled from dependent and accountable beings.

But the Deistical system, from its very nature, as a theoretic speculation, can exert no efficient influence over the moral man, or retain an effective grasp on the mind. Let the naturalist look up to the heavens, or around on the earth. The scriptures of creation are written in characters too ill-defined to repress this sinful emotion, or arrest that wicked purpose. The God of nature is too retired and silent to be felt as the rebuker and avenger of crime; His glory is too much obscured by the shades and visions of ma-

* See Storr and Flatt's Theology—Book 11. Sec. 13. ill. 3, 4, and 7.

terialism to counteract the splendour of the world's attractions ; His vicegerent soon yields, unable by itself to bear up amid the floods of passion and the collision of selfish interests.

Hence it is, that God is not in all the thoughts of those who disbelieve the Bible. Overpowered by the pressing temptations of sense, they retain no consciousness of His immediate presence. Insensible to their high relations, they erect no altar to His praise, perform no action to His glory. Nay, let our naturalists have all they ask ;—if it be so, that the Being whose existence and attributes they so clearly perceive through his works, has not stooped from his high throne to communicate with his rational creatures, it is a resistless inference, that He no more claims our obedience and adoration, than an intelligent homage from the beasts that perish. The very principle for which they so strenuously contend, resolves the Almighty into the Deity of Epicurus, alike indifferent to all the actions and interests of his creatures.

"Who sees with equal eyes, as God of all,
A hero perish, or a sparrow fall ;
Atoms or systems into ruin hurl'd,
And now a bubble burst, and now a world."

Hence it is, also, from the vagueness and ineffectiveness of its principles, that Deism (as might be illustrated in the case of Hume, Voltaire, and others) tends by easy gradations to the abyss of Atheism. There is no practicable $\pi\lambda\sigma\omega$ between a belief in Revelation and the virtual dethronement of the Almighty. To shut out the God of the Bible from our hearts, is to preclude the operative, if not actual, sight of God in his creation. Hence, if Revelation were annihilated, what must be the inevitable consequence? Despite of its effulgent light and effective motives, how many love not, fear not, know not God! If its beams were *withdrawn*, the physical darkness of the earth, in the absence of its luminary, could but feebly image that moral night which would overspread the world of mankind. Oh! the horrors of such a night! Pride and hate, lust and violence, war, rapine, and carnage, have stalked from their hiding-places, for Atheism has tolled the knell of God's existence, and proclaimed to an affrighted world that death is an eternal sleep!

ART. II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

By REV. LEONARD WOODS, D. D.

NUMBER V.

How the affections are influenced by previous affections.

IN former numbers I endeavoured to show, what influence the will has upon the affections, and the affections upon the will. I shall now enquire, *what relation the affections have among themselves, or the manner in which our affections at any time are influenced by antecedent affections.* This enquiry will be found to be somewhat complex, and of course attended with difficulty. But a distinct and careful prosecution of it will, I think, conduct us to some important and satisfactory results.

It is indispensable to the right understanding of this subject, as well as of many other subjects in mental philosophy, to consider, that *the operations of the mind generally result, not from any one cause exclusively, but from various causes combined.* We are taught by experience, that a particular operation or state of mind follows a particular cause; and to this cause we are accustomed to refer it. And it may be, that this cause has not only a real and uniform influence, but a chief influence; and we may direct our attention at the time to this influence only; and so may be ready to conclude, that nothing else has any influence in causing the mental operation or state. Whereas, a farther consideration of the subject may show, that this operation or state results from a great variety of causes, some near and some remote. This principle will be more distinctly brought into view and applied, before we close this essay.

It seems hardly necessary to remark, that when we use the words *cause* and *effect*, and other words of similar import, in relation to the mind, we are to give them a meaning correspondent with the nature of the subject. It is perfectly according to common usage, to apply these words to the mind as well as to the material world, although not in precisely the same sense. And why should any one suppose, that it is not as admissible to make this use of the words *cause* and *effect*, as to take any words which were originally applied to body, and apply them to mind? Who would object to our using the word *move*, and its derivatives, to de-

note an influence exerted on the mind, because in their literal and original application, they denoted an influence on matter? An adherence to such a principle would lead to an entire revolution in our modes of speech, and would divest language of its greatest beauty and force. Be it so, that the use of words for which I now contend, is metaphorical. It is not, therefore, any the less just and suitable. The propriety of such a use of the words *cause* and *effect* appears in this, that there is as real and uniform a relation between cause and effect in *mental* science, as in *physical*. A *cause* is that from which an effect flows,—that which has an influence to produce an effect,—that by which another thing is brought into existence. An *effect* is that which flows from something else as its cause, or is produced by the influence of a cause. Now, that which we call a *mental* or *moral* cause, has an influence as real and certain as a physical cause. As to *certainty* and *uniformity*, the *relation* of cause and effect in the two cases is alike, although the *nature* of the cause and effect in the one case is exceedingly different from what it is in the other. Do you say, there is so wide a difference in the nature of what we denominate cause and effect in the two cases, as to expose men to mistake, if we employ the same words in both? The difference intended, I admit, is obvious and entire. And the very circumstance of its being so is sufficient to prevent all mistake. For if we have the requisite information and judgement, we shall always understand the words in a sense correspondent with the nature of the subject.

It ought not here to be overlooked, that we sometimes speak of cause and effect in a *mixed* sense,—a mental cause is sometimes connected with a bodily effect, and a bodily cause with a mental effect. Numberless phenomena of this kind are involved in the connexion of body and mind. It is a connexion of mutual influence. Thus, a volition, which is a mental act, causes a bodily act; and an affection of the body often causes a mental act.

We now proceed to consider the subject introduced above, namely, *the connexion existing among the affections, and the manner in which our present affections are influenced by those which occurred in past time.*

One way in which a previous affection has an influence upon present affections, is *by being distinctly recollected*. When brought by an act of memory before the mind as an object of contemplation, it becomes, like any other object of

attention, a means of exciting present affections. It is, however, *only one* of the means,—one of a variety of things which operate as causes of present affections. Those very emotions which arise in view of a past affection, may result in part, and even chiefly, from other causes. And those other causes may greatly modify the appropriate influence of the recollected affection; so that the emotion which that recollected affection produces, may be very different from what it would have been, had that been the only cause concerned.

Experience teaches, that *the affection which is excited by the recollection of a past affection frequently differs from it in point of character*. An apostate angel doubtless recollects the holy affection of which he was once the happy subject; but the recollection occasions an unholy emotion. And a Christian, in time of spiritual declension, often recollects the happy feelings which he had in former days, while no similar feelings are awakened by the recollection.

But experience teaches that, *in other cases, the recollection of a past affection is followed by an affection of a similar nature*. Thus, if past goodness is recollected by one who is holy, the recollection will excite a good affection, that is, a feeling of holy approbation and delight. If, however, the same person calls to mind a past *sinful* affection, he will still have a holy affection excited, that is, an affection totally unlike the one recollected.

In view of these facts, you may perhaps say, here are very different effects resulting from one and the same cause, that is, the recollection of past affections, and does not this disprove the truth of the position, so commonly admitted, that the same causes produce the same effects?

I answer, this would clearly be the case, if the recollection of past affection were the only cause concerned, and the different effects referred to resulted from this cause alone. But, in fact, the cause which operates in this case, is a *complex* cause, and the principal part of this complex cause is the state or habit of the mind. Indeed, the recollection of past affection is rather to be considered as the occasion of bringing out the affection which naturally results from *the state of the mind*; this being the prevailing internal cause. It is this which determines the particular influence which the external motive exerts. If an intelligent being has a

holy state of mind, it is the fixed law of his nature, that in all ordinary circumstances, outward objects will excite holy emotions; and that if he has an unholy state of mind, outward objects will excite unholy emotions. Take an illustration of this from the natural world. Heat will harden or soften, according to the *nature* of the substance on which it acts. That *some* effect is produced, is most directly to be attributed to the heat; but that the particular, *specific* effect is produced, rather than some other, is owing to the nature of the substance. Take another case. The same sun, and rain, and soil, produce different kinds of fruit, as oranges and lemons. The growth of fruit, as a general fact, is owing to these causes. The difference in the kinds of fruit results from the nature of the trees, and this results from the difference in the nature of the seed from which the trees sprung. Of the complex cause concerned in producing fruit, the *specific nature of the tree* is a chief part; and it is this which determines the nature of the effects. This general principle is as true in mental science as in physical; although the causes and effects in the one are, in their nature, so different from what they are in the other. The peculiar relation of our affections to the divine law, and our being worthy of praise or blame on account of them, does not by any means imply that they arise in the mind without appropriate moral causes. It results altogether from the *nature* of moral causes, and of the affections flowing from them.

It is not meant by any of the remarks above made, that the affections always flow on in an unbroken series, and that no cause whatever can interfere to prevent this: for, although the state of the mind and the outward objects commonly acting upon it naturally tend to this result, there may be extraordinary causes which will mingle their influence with these, so that the series of similar emotions will be broken, and those of a different kind excited. For example, a moral agent, under the influence of strong temptations, changes from holiness to sin; and a sinner, under the special influence of the Holy Spirit, becomes holy. But the occurrence of these changes under the operation of extraordinary causes does not prove, that a continuance of the same affection is not likely to result from the ordinary causes abovementioned, namely, the *state of the mind*, and *outward motives*. Nor does it prove that these ordinary causes may not, in due time, become so powerful, as absolutely to preclude any change in

the character of the affections. Unquestionably this will be the case both with the holy and the unholy in the future state.

Having thus shown how past affections exert an influence upon present affections *by being recollected*, and how this influence is modified by other causes, I proceed to show in the

Second place, that the affections we exercise have an influence in regard to subsequent affections, *by means of their influence on the state or habit of the mind*; or, which is the same thing, *upon the mind's aptitude to the exercise of particular affections*. This, which has already been hinted at, is the most important way in which any affections influence those which follow. That there is such an aptitude or tendency of the mind to put forth certain emotions rather than others, under the influence of the same external objects, is a fact well known, and commonly admitted. This aptitude, which exists in various degrees, shows its highest power when a particular object excites an affection more readily, or more frequently, or more strongly. Now it is manifest, that *the natural tendency of any affection which is exercised, is to increase the aptitude of the mind to the exercise of the same affection*. It is, indeed, true, that this tendency may be counteracted, or its effect varied, by other causes; as will appear in the sequel. But every exercise of mind, taken by itself, plainly has the tendency abovementioned. Thus benevolent emotions give the mind a greater aptitude to the same emotions. The consequence of every act of love to God, supposing us free from all opposite influences, is, that we shall be more *apt* to love him hereafter; in other words, we shall love him more readily, and in a higher degree. It is on this principle that Christians are advanced from one degree of piety to another. Every exercise of holy love has a good influence upon their character and state; and that, too, in proportion to the purity and strength of the exercise. A few holy exercises, in which all the intellectual and moral energies are roused to intense action, contribute more to the growth and confirmation of a holy principle and habit, than thousands of exercises which come from a divided or sluggish heart. The same is true of malevolent affections. The emotions of anger and revenge naturally tend to increase the aptitude of the mind to the same emotions; and this effect will be in proportion to the

strength and violence of the antecedent emotions. This is more commonly expressed by saying, that the malevolent passions are strengthened by exercise.

But *this natural tendency of our affections*, like that abovementioned, *is frequently modified by other causes*. A particular affection may be attended with such circumstances, that it will be followed by a less aptitude to the same affection than existed before. Let a man's compassion be strongly excited by the appearance of distress in beggars, and by the touching appeals they make to his heart; and let him find afterwards that this appearance is generally deceptive, and these appeals founded on falsehood; and the natural consequence will be a less degree of aptness to have his compassion excited by similar causes. The exercise of compassion, if left to produce its own natural effect, would certainly increase the mind's tendency to compassion; but in the case now supposed, the other causes which come in for an influence, that is, the discovery of imposture, and the painful emotions consequent on the exercise of compassion in such circumstances, go far towards suppressing the exercise, when cases of beggary again occur: and these counteracting causes may have an influence so great, as to deaden the heart to the exercise of pity in all other cases. It is on the same principle, we are to account for the influence which *fiction* and *theatrical exhibitions* have to deteriorate the moral and social character.

Similar remarks may be made as to the feeling of friendship and confidence. By itself, it tends to increase the mind's aptitude to the same feeling. But a man may so often find his friendship misplaced, and his confidence betrayed, that in the end no amiableness or worth of character can gain his heart.

This qualifying influence of circumstances appears also in regard to sinful affections. Thus strong emotions of anger, and the consequent utterance of violent, abusive language, if separate from other influences, would produce an increasing tendency to anger, and in the end a habit of indulging it in all its violence. But in certain cases, the occurrence of violent anger may prove a safeguard against a like occurrence for the time to come. This, however, is not to be attributed to the proper influence of anger, but to other circumstances connected with the operation of that passion, particularly to the regret, and shame, and self-re-

proach, and other evils, occasioned by it. The same is true of other depraved affections. The criminal disposition which David indulged in the matter of Uriah, and Peter in the judgment hall, were, through the influence of other causes, undoubtedly followed by a state of mind more strongly fortified than before, against the same dispositions. Through the grace of God, it is so with Christians generally. The sinful emotions which arise in their hearts, and which lead them to acts of disobedience, occasion the bitterness of sorrow, and that sorrow embitters the sin which occasioned it; while on the other hand, the new evidence which their own experience in such cases affords, of the immeasurable forbearance and goodness of God, increases their love and gratitude, and renders them more unwilling to offend him. Even in the history of men destitute of religion, instances are not wanting, in which the transgression of the divine law, especially a flagrant transgression, instead of producing its natural result, that is, *increasing sinfulness*, becomes the occasion of such reflections and emotions, as lead, by divine grace, to a saving change of character.

Here I cannot but notice a serious mistake sometimes made by good men, who represent it as an invariable fact, that sinners, while unrenewed, are continually growing more and more hardened and confirmed in sin; that they will certainly have less feeling on the subject of religion in future time, than they have now; and especially that those who pass through a season of special divine influence without being converted, will in every case become more stupid and bold in sin, than before. Now this is doubtless the case frequently, if not generally. But it is well known, that some sinners, though not savingly converted in a time of revival, retain an increased sensibility to divine truth, a greater dread of sin, a deeper feeling of the worth of the soul, and a more awakened attention to the means of religion. Instead of falling into greater thoughtlessness and insensibility, they are more disposed to consider their ways, and more alive to divine truth. And like things occur among sinners in other circumstances. These facts, however, by no means prove, that continuing in impenitence does not constantly increase *the amount of guilt*; nor do they prove that living in impenitence does not *naturally tend* to produce a growing strength of sinful affection, and a growing disregard to duty. They only prove, that there are other

causes which bear on the subject,—causes which oppose, and sometimes overcome, the direct, natural tendency of sinful affections. Sinners would be always acquiring greater and greater hardness of heart, as Pharaoh did, were they given over, as he was, to the unchecked influence of their impiety. This will unquestionably be the case with all sinners in that state of retribution, which will fully develop the evil nature and tendency of sin, and will show, with perfect clearness, how God regards it. But in this world, the tendency of sin to increase its own power in the mind, though generally and to an alarming degree manifest, is yet subject to many powerful checks. It is the merciful appointment of God, that other causes, both outward and inward, shall come in for a share of influence, and not unfrequently lead to a moral state, exceedingly different from that which would have resulted from the operation of sinful affection alone.

From this examination you will perceive, what every advance in the knowledge of mind renders more evident; that while we find that in one respect and another, a particular law exists and produces important effects in our intellectual and moral nature; it does not exist alone, but is combined with other laws or influences, which diminish and sometimes entirely prevent its proper effect; though at other times they greatly increase that effect. It is this combination of intellectual and moral laws and causes, which renders the philosophy of the mind so complex, and the acquisition of clear, definite notions so difficult.

This brief enquiry leads to conclusions of great practical moment. *A definite knowledge of the principles above disclosed, besides preserving us from many hurtful errors which prevail concerning the affections, must prove a powerful motive to guard against all sin, even the first and feeblest motions of it in the affections, and to cherish, with the utmost assiduity, every feeling that is pure and holy.* If it does indeed result from the constitution of our minds, that one good affection naturally leads on to others, and that a continued train of good affections are more likely to arise in the mind, and to arise in a higher degree of strength, in consequence of every good affection which is exercised; then surely a good affection must be regarded as of immensely greater value than if it existed *by itself*, without any influence upon the subsequent movements of the mind. A pure

and holy emotion, considered merely in itself, is of great worth. But how much greater must its worth appear, when we consider, that it has a tendency to perpetuate itself; that it exerts an influence which, instead of passing away with the moment, will naturally extend into all future time, and contribute to form a character permanently and unalterably holy:—a possession of greater value to a moral being than all the creation beside. Duly impressed with this view of the train of happy consequences likely to flow from right affections, we should crave them as the choicest of all blessings, and should open our hearts wide to give them room. We should guard most assiduously against every thing without us and within us, which would in any way hinder or diminish their happy influence; and we should, above all, continually look in fervent prayer to the Father of our spirits, the fountain of holiness, that he would fill us with all pure and heavenly affections.

Equally salutary must be the effect of our considering the influence of *sinful* affection upon our subsequent state. With what watchful care should we avoid every unholy emotion, if we remembered, that it is a disease of the soul, hard to be cured; that when admitted into the mind, it takes such hold of our moral nature, as will be likely to insure its continuance; and that every operation of this hateful distemper naturally increases its strength, and renders it more fatal.

We are here taught how to account for that low, earthly state of mind, that distance from God, that spiritual blindness and death, which we so often have occasion to deplore. This state is not to be considered separately, but in connection with its causes. It is in a great measure to be traced to what has been faulty in us in times past. Every sinful feeling which we have heretofore exercised, has left its stamp upon our hearts. That moral state which we lament, is to be regarded as resulting chiefly from the general current of our moral feelings in past time. Every vain thought, every proud, resentful, or unkind feeling, every corrupt desire, which has lodged within us, has had an influence not limited to the time when it took place, but reaching to all following time, and helping to constitute our permanent habit of mind. Thus our present condition may truly be regarded as a kind of index to the antecedent states of our mind,—the sum of the impressions made upon us by the af-

fections we exercised the previous moment, the previous hour, and day, and month, and year, and all previous time. How often have we learned by experience, that our feelings through the week have an effect upon us on the Sabbath, and our feelings on the Sabbath, through the week? How evident it is that the thoughts and feelings indulged in childhood and youth have an effect upon character, which is visible in manhood, and even in old age! The wrong states of mind of which we are at present conscious, and which may sometimes appear unaccountable, are, in many cases, to be traced back to what took place ten, twenty, or even fifty years ago. And it is not to be doubted, that the state in which the wicked will find themselves in the future world, will be the fair result of all their dispositions, thoughts, affections and desires, during the time of their probation. With what awe should we be inspired, when we contemplate this constitution, which God has given to our immortal minds! With what fear and trembling should we consider the fact, that an unholy affection, exercised in early childhood, yea, at the very commencement of our moral being, will certainly be followed by a sinful, impenitent life, and a sinful and miserable eternity, unless the sovereign grace of God interpose to turn things from their natural course.

Should we wake up to just apprehensions of this subject, how deeply should we be impressed with *the evil of sin*, not merely as it consists in a wrong state of mind, and as it is attended with unhappiness at the time of its occurrence; but *as tending, according to the moral constitution of man, to draw after it endless pollution and misery!* Considered in this light, every sinful emotion which rises in the heart is an evil of fearful magnitude, spreading a pestilential influence over the whole of our existence. Surely then, no degree of vigilance or resolution against sin can be too great. It is better to forego any present pleasure, or endure any extremity of suffering, and even to sacrifice life itself, than to take this deadly poison into our souls. Entertaining these views of the subject, with what amazement as well as grief should we look upon the multitude of rational beings around us, who live without concern, and with apparent satisfaction, in the midst of the most dreadful plague which ever seized on man, and who are so stricken with madness, that they often seem to be the more pleased, as they exhibit more visible and certain symptoms of eternal death!

Finally, This examination respecting the connexion which the affections have among themselves, has clearly shown, that mental philosophy, rightly understood, conducts us to conclusions perfectly coincident with the dictates of holy writ.

ART. III. INVARIABleness OF THE DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY AMIDST THE DIVERSITY OF ITS FORMS.

By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ, President of the Theological School at Geneva.

Translated by the EDITOR.

[NOTE.—The original discourse of which the following is a translation, was delivered at the commencement of the annual session of the Theological School at Geneva, 1st of May, 1834, and printed at the request of the Evangelical Society of that city. It is here inserted both on account of the intrinsic interest of the subject, and as an argument for that closer union, towards which the minds of many Christians are now turned. Such an outward union as is to be desired, must depend upon the inward agreement of Christians in the essential doctrines of our religion, as its first condition. If this agreement is found to exist in the great body of Christians, in all ages, (which it is the object of this discourse to show, and which might be inferred from the very nature of Christian piety,) then it would seem right that this agreement should be recognized in some general creed, and strengthened by some outward bond. Whatever importance may be attached to the speculative differences which have always existed among Christians, these differences cannot be allowed to justify the breaking of this bond, except so far as they affect the essential points of Christian doctrine. Of the various theories respecting Christianity, some are more true, and deserve accordingly to be earnestly contended for, in opposition to others which are less conformed to the nature of religion. These various theories result from the various intellectual habits, and the various outward circumstances of Christians, or from the various degrees of knowledge and piety to which they have attained; and are therefore always likely to exist. They furnish the appropriate exercise for the high virtues of forbearance, toleration, and charity, which otherwise would have no place. They ought not, indeed, to be regarded with indifference; on the contrary they should awaken the most lively interest, as matters both of philosophical enquiry, and of practical moment. But to make them the nucleus of separate ecclesiastical organizations, and the condition of Christian fellowship, is to sacrifice the great practical advantages resulting from the outward unity of the Church, in behalf of

a speculative uniformity of opinion on unessential points, which is of little importance, impossible to be realized, and perhaps hardly to be desired.

On this subject we would urge upon the candid attention of our readers the enquiries of Bishop Smith, in his communication on Christian Union, in our last Number. "Was it wise," he asks, "to attempt to add to the brief, general, comprehensive creeds, by which, down to the time of the Reformation, Christians were content to regulate their faith? Has any thing been gained by spinning out the standards of faith into all the more minute ramifications of metaphysical and polemic theology? May not the thousand-and-one splits amongst Protestant Christians, on points of doctrine, be mainly traced to this fundamental mistake? Agreement in essentials and freedom in unessentials, is a wise axiom. Has it been the leading axiom of doctrinal sects? The knife which divides the polypus cannot be more prolific, than that knife which has been so much in use, in cutting off every member from the Church who differed in any thought from some standard, by which the operator has been pleased to try his opinions. An unnatural effort to keep men's minds pared close, in order to conform to a particular creed, has led to more numerous and far wider departures from it, than could otherwise have taken place."

As to the translation here offered,—it was commenced before we were informed that a translation of the same discourse had been made for the last Number of the Quarterly Observer, and was partly in type before that Number reached us.

EDITOR.]

The Church dispersed throughout the world announces this faith; she teaches it, she transmits it, as if she had only one mouth; for although the modes of expression in different places are diverse, yet is the force of the truth which is delivered one, and always the same: even as the sun, that work of God, is one and the same throughout the universe.—Irenæus, Advers. Hæreses, L. I. c. 3.

How great is that activity,—how diverse the labours, the efforts, which men are exhibiting upon the earth! But time passes its level over the greater part of their works. Even should they attempt to raise a tower to the heavens, the summits are cast down, and after a few generations, mingled with the sands of the desert.

There is nothing here below which is stable, except Christianity. This alone is immutable, like its Author. It is that Rock of Ages against which still new waves have ever broken, and will always break, without having power to shake it.

If, then, there is any one who would give to his work on earth a character of stability and permanence, let him attach it to Christianity. His work will then receive from the eternal religion an impress of immortality.

These, however, are not truths which are universally received. On this subject there are two great errors among

men. Some pretend that there is nothing immutable, even in the essence of Christianity. "The Christian doctrine," say they, "is only a particular form of the religious sentiment. This form has taken the place of an antecedent form, and will itself be succeeded by another. The Religion of the Saviour," they add, "must necessarily have proceeded from the state in which mankind was found, at the time of the Cæsars," just as buds and blossoms spring naturally from a tree in spring-time. A strange error to which Rationalism is, indeed, obliged to resort, but which is most strikingly refuted by history. No! Christianity is not a mere human appearance! History, that infallible witness, exhibits it to us, not in accordance with, but in direct opposition, to the different directions of the human mind, at the time when it appeared. The wisdom of the world did not give it birth, but on the contrary sought to crush it. Christianity was not the child of that period, but at once its adversary and its regenerator. It was not from the dust of the earth that this precious fruit grew; it cannot then return to the dust. Heaven at that moment gave to the earth an incorruptible treasure, which successive generations are bound to transmit unimpaired from hand to hand; which we, in our turn, have received; which we now hold with fear and reverence in earthen vessels; which we shall soon deliver to our children, and which will abide unaltered among men, until heaven and earth shall flee away, and no place be found for them.

But while on one side we encounter the imaginations of the levellers of Christianity, we meet on the other the pretensions of an inflexible dogmatism, which would assign to the Christian system during the whole continuance of the Church, an *appearance* constantly uniform. Something there is in Christianity which does not change; that is, its essence: but there is in it, too, something which changes; which is, its appearance. And it is for want of properly discriminating between the appearance and the reality, that so many have misunderstood the invariable nature of the religion of Jesus Christ. A man changes in appearance through the different ages of his life. He is, however, always the same man.

At the moment when Christianity was given to us from on high, it became necessary that, like every thing else which enters into the sphere of humanity, it should be clothed with a human form. The exteriour circumstances of each epoch

may have exercised a decided influence upon the development of Christian truths. To one particular form another may have succeeded. These successive forms, too, may have been far from indifferent, and one may have been far better than another. But the same essential truth has always been found in all the forms which have passed away, as it always will be found in those which are to come.

The work in which we are here engaged is, indeed, feeble and insignificant; but this is its glory, that it attaches itself to the eternal work. Did we here propose to maintain any thing relating to one or another of the forms of Christianity, we should have no guarantee for the perpetuity of the cause which we defend. The first revolution in human society would sweep it to the tomb, with every thing which is merely incidental. But if we are attached in our work to the very essence of Christianity, then the holy cause to which we devote our labours, participates in the perpetuity of the work of God. We may fail; and ere long, following the way of all the earth, we shall fail. Our school may fail; but the cause to which it is devoted will not fail, either in Geneva, or in the world. According to an ancient oracle, it is to this that the assembling of the people shall be.

Yes, this is the foundation of our hopes, in the midst of difficulties and trials. It is this which, thanks to God, inspires us with courage. And it may be worth our while, to spend a few moments in exhibiting this characteristic phenomenon in the religion of Jesus Christ:—*the invariableness of the doctrines of Christianity, in the midst of the diversity of its forms,—the voice of the Church one and the same in all ages.*

If we search, in the different periods of history, for the various human forms which the immutable truth of God has successively assumed, we shall find a great number of them. It is necessary to bring them together, to unite them, and to form from them more extended masses. Thus we obtain, in the last synthesis, four periods or principal forms. The first is the primitive form, or that of *Life*; the second, the form of *Doctrine*; the third, the form of *the School*; the fourth, the form of *the Reformation*. The Church of Christ, according to a Scriptural comparison, is like an individual man. She has had her youth; she has had her maturity; she has had her old age; and then, though without dying, she has had, if we may so speak, a mighty resurrection. These are the four epochs,—the four ages of the Church of Jesus Christ.

We shall traverse rapidly these four forms, in appearance so diverse, I might almost say, opposed, in order to see whether we shall not discover, under each of them, the same immutable truth. We shall listen to the voice of the teachers. The declarations of a single man cannot, indeed, give us an adequate knowledge of the faith of the Church. But, if we consult the writings of teachers who have lived in countries remote from each other, and if we find, in the midst of a great diversity of views, doctrines in which all are agreed, may we not thence conclude, with reason, that they were the doctrines of the Church, then dispersed over the earth? What, then, are the particulars to which we should direct our researches?

All Christianity, as well as all religious philosophy, relates necessarily to three principal points. First, on one side there is GOD,—then, on the other, MAN; and then there is the relation between them,—the bond which God employs to unite man to himself,—REDEMPTION. Let us see, then, what the voice of the Church, in the different periods of Christianity, teaches us on these three points.

The Form of Life.

We exclude from the primitive period or form, the Apostolic age, which should be separately considered. This primitive form commences, according to our view, with the successors of the Apostles, and extends to Arius. The character by which it is distinguished is *Life*. The truths of Christianity were not yet set forth with all that precision, and in that systematic order, which will distinguish them at a later period. The *Christian life*, which results from faith in those truths, is the essential thing. In this period they live for the Lord in the midst of an idolatrous world; and die for the Lord in the arena or at the stake, without much discussion respecting his person or his work. Christianity is content to exist, to know and evince its existence, without enumerating and classifying the essential parts of which it is composed; just as man is, for a long time, content with possessing being and life, without investigating and explaining in order, that in which this being and life consist. Certain Rationalist teachers (those whom a too superficial knowledge has not undeceived) infer, strangely enough, from this peculiarity of the primitive form, that the truths of Christianity

did not then exist, and that there was no doctrine, because there was no philosophy of doctrines. But to conclude from this absence of precision in doctrine, that the truths of Christianity had no existence, is a mode of reasoning as strange and as false as would be that of the unskilled disputer, who should affirm, that, during the time before man had formed a distinct and rational notion of his being, its several parts did not exist.

It results from this character of the primitive form, that the controversies in that epoch seldom turn upon doctrines. There are different tendencies, rather than different doctrines. We meet with families which present different aspects, rather than with sects which maintain opposite opinions. Let us trace the order of these different families, before exhibiting the doctrines which the voice of the Church then proclaimed.

To the divine inspiration of the Apostles succeeds the Christianity of the Apostolic fathers. It would seem as if the natural order is here reversed, and that, for once, the ingenuousness and simplicity of infancy follow after the vigour and maturity of the full-grown man. The Church, under the conduct of Ignatius, Polycarp, and many other faithful disciples, lives in the presence of the great idea of the near return of Jesus Christ. Behold the summary of her faith: "a new creation must be effected in humanity, before the solemn hour shall arrive." "There are three constitutions, or economies, of the Lord," says Barnabas, one of those fathers, who was already inclining in another direction, "the *hope* of life (the Old Testament), the *commencement* of life (the New Testament), and the *consummation* of life (the kingdom of heaven)."

But, by little and little, this heaven ward motion seems to cease in the Church. There appears a generation not so deeply penetrated by the spirit of Jesus Christ. They gather curious traditions respecting the appearance of Christ on earth. Carnal Jews, who looked for a Messiah entirely human, retain their gross views under the Christian name. It seems as if the Church, exhausted by her upward flight, falls back to the earth. Let us not be surprised at this. After a great excitement there generally succeeds a season of drowsiness.

Then appears on the boundaries of Christianity, and almost without its limits, a tendency diametrically opposite. The oriental philosophy aspires to join itself to the religion

of Jesus of Nazareth. It strips Christianity of its practical character, and transforms it into systems which lose themselves in the clouds.—For the saving doctrine, Gnosticism substitutes a fantastic cosmogony, by means of which it attempts to explain what is inexplicable, and an enthusiastic theosophy, which pretends to procure for man on earth, the sublime contemplations of heaven.

The West shrinks back from these adventurous vagaries of the East. Tertullian, in proconsular Africa, and Irenæus, in Gaul, oppose to them a simple, positive, historical Christianity, and hold up to men that faith by the small and the great equally live. Regarding philosophy as the source of Gnosticism, they begin to look with a jealous eye upon the wisdom and scientific culture of the Greeks.

But this exclusive simplicity has its own dangers. Pagans of learning and refinement, failing to find in the Christianity which is presented to them, any thing answering to the wants of their minds, continue in the worship of false deities, or plunge into the bold system of Gnosticism. Many eminent minds are thus lost to the Gospel. Alexandria, seated on the banks of the Nile, between the oriental and occidental world, observes it. Alexandria, that great emporium of learning, where, as tradition declares, the Evangelist Mark carried the simple word of Christ, undertakes to become the mediatix between these two tendencies, and these two parts of the known world. Pantæus, Clemens, and Origen lay the foundation of a Christian science. In this respect they conform to the East. But they founded it upon the Scriptures; and in this they conform to the West. *Γνώσις ἀληθινή*—true knowledge—alas! it was not altogether such. Although these teachers did not abandon the fundamental principles of Christianity, philosophy deposited in their systems the perfidious germ of the two great heresies of the subsequent epoch, and indeed of all epochs.*

The Alexandrian school accomplishes the gradual disappearance of Gnosticism, and supplies its place. But then it calls up the opposition of the severe school of the West. A remarkable warfare between these two churches, or rather, these two schools, takes place in the third century. The two opposing tendencies serve mutually as counterpoises to each other, and thus contribute greatly to the prosperity

* Arianism and Pelagianism.

of Christianity. Alexandria originates a theological spirit in the church. She begins to elucidate and systematize the doctrines. She prevents a gross anthropomorphism from invading the heavenly religion of Jesus Christ. The West always resorts to the simple and literal sense of the written word. It insists that Christianity must be felt,—experienced in the heart, and manifested in the life. It prevents this positive and saving doctrine from being transformed into vain and fanciful speculations.

Such are the successive phases of the primitive form. In the midst of all these phases, a spirit of life animates the Church. It is the season of her youth. Christians of the primitive times, redeemed from the sins of Paganism, feel in their hearts, the transforming power of the Gospel, with an energy by so much the greater, as they are able to compare that which it has caused them to become with that which they had been until then. Their conflict with the world reminds them more constantly of their calling as soldiers of Jesus Christ. All is life and motion in the church. She has rapturous desires for heaven ; she has them also for the scaffold. And, although her golden age is reserved for the *new heavens* and the *new earth*, the Christian society, in those days of her youth and life, presents to us traits of a celestial beauty.

What now are the truths professed by the teachers and citizens of that new people which the breath of God has created in the midst of the world ?

They acknowledge one living God. In Him they worship, not only the Father, *the First Cause of all things*, but also the Son, *the Redeemer*, and the Spirit, *the Sanctifier of fallen humanity*. They believe that the same God who created man in righteousness, redeems him from sin, and does not cease to sanctify him until he attains to eternal life. They know nothing of those strange errors by which some aim to deprive God of the work and glory of redemption, to give it to a creature.

The idea of a holy Trinity in God is discovered from the earliest beginnings of the primitive period, and does not cease to be announced in a manner constantly more distinct. How does the voice of these first soldiers of Jesus Christ confound the impudent pretensions of our own days !

Clemens, a disciple of Paul, giving glory to Almighty God, says in Rome, "one God, one Christ, and one Spirit of

Grace.”* Polycarp, a disciple of John, when dying in the flames, ascribes the eternal glory of the age of ages “to the Father, with the Son, in the Holy Spirit.”†

Justin Martyr, the first of the teachers in whom the conjunction of the Christian faith, and of the philosophy of the Greeks is effected,—a converted sage, who sheds his blood for his master under the Antonines,—proclaims “Unity in Trinity.”‡ Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, about the same time, professes, in a manner still more distinct, the holy Trinity.§

Tertullian, an advocate in Africa, now become a simple shepherd of the flock of Jesus Christ, thus expresses himself shortly after: “There is one only divine being, in three persons intimately united.”¶ He proclaims “the Trinity of one only Divinity—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.”‡ And elsewhere, he says, “Let us guard the sacrament of our economy, which establishes Unity in Trinity, recognizing three, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but of one substance, of one state, of one power, because there is only one God.”** And with what power does the venerable Bishop of a city near our own, shaken at the time he lived, by the rage of the people against Jesus Christ, and in our own day by another kind of rage,—Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, who had forsaken the famous shores of Asia to carry the light of the Gospel to the Gauls—with what force does he defend the great doctrine of *God manifest in the flesh*: “Christ,” says he, “unites in himself God and man. If man had not conquered the enemy of man (the Devil), this enemy would not have been justly conquered. But on the other hand, if God had not given salvation, we should not have possessed it with assurance.”††

Thus far we have reached scarcely more than ten years after the death of the oldest apostle, and yet we find this

* Clem. Rom. 1 Cor.

† Euseb. Hist. Eccl. IV. 15.

‡ Justin. Expos. Fidei.

§ Theoph. Aut. Autol. II. 23.

¶ Una substantia in tribus coherentibus. Tertul.

‡ Trinitas unius divinitatis, Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus.

** Unitatem in trinitatem, Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, unius autem substantiæ, et unius status, et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus. Tertul. Adv. Praxeam.

†† Iren. Adv. Hæreses. Lib. III, Cap. 20.

doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, proclaimed by so many illustrious teachers,—a doctrine of which Christ designed to establish a perpetual monument in his universal Church, by instituting baptism. The greatest teachers of Christianity defend with zeal the consoling idea of God become man. The more we advance, the more multiplied are the testimonies rendered to this mystery, in the Churches of our Lord. We find the eternal divinity of the Son of God deeply graven, every where, in the inmost feelings, and in the devout exercises of Christian people. And even one of the wisest of the Pagans, writes to the greatest of their emperors “They sing hymns to Christ as God.”*

But if we enquire, *What did those Christians of the epoch of LIFE believe respecting MAN?* we shall not see them imagining, with the ancient pagans, or with many modern teachers, that evil results from the natural organization of man, and that this evil is not opposed to the holiness of God. The first man having, by disobedience, separated his own will from the divine will, human nature was abandoned to itself;—such is their doctrine.

Let us now approach the College of the Apostles, and interrogate those who were their companions or successors. Barnabas, the fellow-traveller of St. Paul (Acts XIII.), thus addresses us: “Before we believed in God, the abode of our hearts was full of corruption and sin. Our heart was filled with idolatry, and was the abode of demons.”†—Justin, who had vainly sought, in all the different systems of philosophy, for the key of man’s history, finds it, at length, in the fall of Adam, effected by the seductions of the devil, disguised in the form of a serpent.‡

In the view of the simple and practical Irenæus, the first man is like to one who, having become “a prisoner,” propagates his race in his prison.—Already does the profound genius of Tertullian style the corruption which has insinu-

* Plin. Epis. ad Traj. X. 96.

† Barnabas, C. 16.—Some teachers have called in question the authenticity of the letter of Barnabas. Their motives seem to me feeble. Rationalists themselves, Bretschneider in particular, believe it to be authentic. We name Bretschneider because his authority goes far with Rationalists and Unitarians. We do not know, however, that his testimony, distinguished though he may be, in many respects, is of much weight in a question of ecclesiastical history. He places, for instance, Tertullian *after* Origen, and makes him live at the end of the third, and the commencement of the fourth century; which is a century too late.

‡ Dial. cum Tryph. p. 306.

ated itself into human nature, "original sin," *vitium originis*. "The first man," he says, "has infected the human kind which have proceeded from him, and has made them partakers of his own condemnation."* Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, that great luminary of the Church, understands the origin of sin in the same way. "The new-born infant," he says, "has no sin, excepting that he is carnally born, according to Adam, and has, by his very birth, contracted the contagion of death."†

And if we are required to repair to the halls of the Alexandrian school, hoping that its philosophical theologians will utter words flattering to our pride, we will conduct you thither also, and you shall hear Origen, thus addressing you:—"Adam turned aside from the straight path of Paradise, to take the evil paths of mortal life. In consequence of this, all his descendants have also gone astray, and have become like him, unprofitable."‡—"Every man is corrupt in his father and mother. Jesus alone has entered pure into this race."§—"It is impossible for man, at the outset, to look to God; for it is necessary that man be, at first, subjected to sin."¶

Thus did Egypt, as well as Gaul, and proconsular Africa, as well as Asia, regard man only as a fallen and impure being.

But how was this polluted being to be united with a holy God? What did this primitive epoch believe as to the way in which God saves man? Let our enquiry be still directed to those who immediately encircle the Apostles. They will teach us the same holy doctrines of grace, which, at a later period, were more fully set forth. "The son of God has suffered," says the Apostolical Barnabas, "in order that his sufferings might give us life. He has offered as a sacrifice for our sins the tenement of his spirit (his body). Having learned to hope in the name of the Lord, and having received the remission of sins, we are become new men, and we have been created anew."¶ Hermas, (the person, perhaps of whom Paul speaks, Rom 16: 14,) says,—“Before

* Tertul. de testim. an.

† Cyprian, Epist. LXIV. ad Fid.

‡ Origen, Comm. in Epist. ad Rom. Lib. III.

§ Origen, Homil. XII. in Levit.

¶ Origen contra Celsum, Lib. III. 62.

¶ Barnabas. VII. 16.

man receives the name of son of God, he is destined to death. But when he receives this seal, he is delivered from death, and passes to life.*

"The law of God," says Justin, "pronounced a curse upon man, because man could not obey it, in all its extent (Deut. 27: 26). Christ has delivered us from this curse by bearing it for us."† And do we, at the present day, speak otherwise?

Irenæus regards circumcision as a type of the redeeming blood of Christ,—the tree of life, as a type of the cross of Christ. He teaches, in another place, that men ought not to attempt to purify themselves by sacrifices, but by the blood of Christ, and by his death. The paschal Lamb is to him a type of Christ, who saves believers by the sprinkling of his blood. The two bullocks, the one of which, according to the law of Moses, was sent into the desert, the other offered to God, are types of the two-fold advent of Christ, the first for death, the second for glory.‡ He contrasts the obedience of Christ, with the disobedience of Adam. "Christ," he says, "reconciles the Father with us, in replacing, by his perfect obedience, the disobedience of the first man." And following his comparison of man plunged by sin into prison, and the bondage of the devil, he declares, that "Christ has payed, by his sufferings, the ransom necessary to deliver man from this captivity."

In like manner, Origen recognizes, in the death of Christ, the power which delivers man from sin. The whole primitive Church beholds in the sufferings of the Lamb of God, the means by which the road which leads back to the Father, is opened again to humanity. It is faith which renders man a partaker of this deliverance, and at the same time communicates to him a life divine. "Called by the will of God," says Clement of Rome, a disciple of the Apostles, whose name, St. Paul declares, is written in the book of life, "we are justified, not by ourselves, not by our own understanding, nor by our own piety, nor by works which we have done in the purity of our hearts; but by faith, by which the Sovereign God has always justified men. Shall we, therefore, repose quietly and cease from well-doing? On the con-

* *Hermas pastor. Lib. III.*

† *Dial. cum Tryph. C. 30.*

‡ *Justin, Dial. cum Tryph. passim.*

trary, we must do good with joy, as God, who has called us to himself, acts without ceasing, and rejoices in his activity.”*

Behold then this holy Church of the primitive period. Hear how she addresses us from the depth of her distresses, and, so to speak, from the height of her scaffolds. She confesses her wretchedness, and embracing the knees of Jesus, she calls him, “her Saviour and her God.” How can we forget the deep and unaffected tone of her sincere piety ! And what a sad business is that of some teachers of our day, who seek to strip her of her white robe, and to clothe her with the miserable rags of their own unbelief ! This profane attempt is, indeed, an act of homage which they render to her. The first Unitarians had recourse to the same expedient. But such efforts are vain. To all who will lend an ear, the primitive Church will never cease to declare the immutable words of truth.

Form of Doctrine.

Although we have been able to gather only a few ears, here and there, from the immense harvest which was spread before us, yet have we enlarged upon the primitive period more than may comport with the limits of this discourse. We have done this, because it is the only spot on which the enemies of Christianity venture to expose themselves, and to hope for success from their ingenuity. They despair of other periods, or rather, they make the strong, common and public profession of faith which is found in them, and which is so opposed to themselves, the subject of reproach and virulent accusations. We shall put forth no great effort to secure a victory on a field of battle where our enemies have already proclaimed themselves vanquished ; and which they abandon to us.

Here opens upon us the era of great teachers, of great truths, and great heresies ;—a period when Christian theology, the elements of which were prepared during the period preceding, was carried, by distinguished men of God, to a great height ;—the time of Athanasius, Hilary, Gregory, Basil, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Chrysostom. It is the age of strong men,—the mature age of the church.

* Clem. Rom. 1 Cor. 6: 32.

The last pyre of the confessors of Christianity is extinguished. The memorable council of Nice assembles. The form of *life* is at an end ; the form of *doctrine* commences. Not that life has entirely departed from the Church. God forbid ! But doctrine has now become the predominating feature. The full-grown man loves to have distinct ideas, to give a reason for what he believes. So is it now with the Church. No longer compelled to struggle with enemies without, she can give more attention to the internal faith which she professes. The different tendencies of the primitive form now manifest themselves with more distinctness, and, by a remarkable transformation, are converted into opposing doctrines ; just as the dormant tendencies of youth are developed in manhood, and transformed into determined and distinct traits of character, into positive vices or virtues. Great heresies appear, conducted by Arius and Pelagius. But these very heresies become the means, in the hand of God, of establishing the Christian doctrines with more clearness and power. The truths of Christianity, being thus defined by the Church at that period, are faithfully transmitted to later times. They will be preserved in the midst of the abounding disorders and ignorance of succeeding ages. This dogmatic form will be, through divine grace, a cuirass to begirt those doctrines amidst great strifes and overturnings, or a hammer to effect an entrance for them into the hard and sensual heart of the rude and uncultivated. Still it must be acknowledged, that so great importance was even then attached to them, in their minor ramifications, that, for the sake of doctrinal forms, the very essence and life of Christianity were sometimes forgotten.

The East and the West still preserve their essential characters. The East continues the country of high speculations ; the West, of practical questions. The East contemplates God. The West employs itself with man. In the East, Arius and Athanasius appear. In the West, Pelagius and Augustine. But both in the East and in the West, the truth, though violently attacked, gains for itself universal and splendid triumphs. Having passed the season of its youth, the Christian doctrine, like the first man, must needs be put to trial. But there needs not to be a second fall. It resisted the temptation, and remained firm.

The doctrine respecting *God* was the first which was displayed, during this period, with majestic brightness, because

it was the first against which man dared to lift a threatening hand. Athanasius of Alexandria, a distinguished teacher, perceived, in the profound mystery of Redemption, the necessity of the eternal divinity of the Redeemer. Earth had no Saviour, if its Saviour was not God. If Athanasius devoted his whole life, and endured so many exiles, to defend the identity of substance between the Father and the Son, it was not because he attached a great value to a dialectic subtilty. No, it was for the very essence of Christianity and the salvation of souls that he contended. The end of Christianity is to restore man to communion with God. For this there must needs be a Mediator. "But if the Son of God," says Athanasius, "differs from God in essence, there must be a new mediation, by which he himself may be united to Him. He alone, who has no need of such mediation in order to become one with God,—who *himself* partakes of the divine essence, can establish a real communication between God and the creature. Now, the Son of God is this person. Were he a mere creature, however excellent, instead of uniting God and man by placing himself between them, he would only separate them from each other."^{*}

But let us hear the whole Church, speaking in the symbols of her faith. "This," she says, "is the universal Faith,—that we adore one God in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, without confusion of persons, or division of substance. For the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son is another, the person of the Holy Spirit is another. Yet the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have one and the same divinity, an equal glory, a co-eternal majesty. Such as is the Father, such also is the Son, and such the Holy Spirit. The Father is uncreated, the Son is uncreated, the Spirit is uncreated. The Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God; and yet, there are not three Gods, but one God. . . . This is the true faith, that we believe and confess one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, to be both God and man. As God, he is of the substance of the Father, begotten from eternity; as man, he is of the nature of his mother, and born in time;—perfect God and perfect man;—equal to the Father, in his divinity; inferior to the Father, in his humanity."[†]

A contest of more than sixty years, (from A. D. 320, to A. D. 381,) was necessary to determine, expound, and de-

* Athan. Oratio contra Arian.

fend the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. New contests now commence for the purpose of settling another doctrine. Soon after Athanasius and the theologians who followed his movement, we see a teacher appear in the Church, who seems to have been commissioned by God, to develope and defend the Scripture doctrine respecting *man*;—a teacher not less distinguished for the depth of his genius, than for the lustre of his piety. It is Augustine.

Other teachers preceding him, had shown, by their confessions, the unchangeableness of Christian doctrines. "In the sin of Adam," says Hilary of Poitiers, "the whole human race have sinned."*—"We have all sinned in the first man,"—is the testimony of Ambrose of Milan; "in him human nature has sinned."† But it was when the great teacher of the West, under whose influence all those were formed, who, for ages after, had a clear view of the truth, it was when Augustine appeared, that all the depths of human impotency were disclosed.

He first abandons Manichæism, and then Platonism, finding in neither, that internal peace which he needs amidst the tempests of life. He seizes with eagerness upon the Gospel, which dissipates his doubts, consoles his heart, and sheds new light upon all his ways. In the midst of his contests with sin and philosophy, he has learned in himself the whole corruption of the human heart. This is the chord which is to vibrate in all his instructions. Pursued at once by a sublime ideal of holiness, and by all the seductions of sense, he sees, amidst the shock of these conflicting elements, the depths of his heart opened to his view, as the tempests of the ocean disclose the depths of the abyss. He finds himself in presence of a man, who, destitute of an ideal of holiness, and living in easy and common circumstances, has only a superficial view of human nature, and adopts most fanciful ideas respecting the moral power of man. Augustine joins issue with Pelagius. The strife is not that of two men merely, but of two principles, of two great tendencies of which the human mind is susceptible, and which are discernible in all times. Augustine sees the first man alienate himself from God. From that alienation results his sin. From that sin proceeds the moral disorder which has pervaded

* Hilary. in *Matth. C. 18*† *Apol. Davidis Cap. 2.*

human nature. Mankind he considers as "a ruined mass."* The consequence, to his descendants, of the fall of the first man, (which was also its punishment,) was "obligation to sinning."† Man has lost his freedom, and the power of doing any thing truly good.‡ He can have no more than God gives him. If some men attain to the faith of the Gospel, the reason must not be sought for in man himself, since all are equally incapable of any good. It can be found only in a special agency of God, in a secret counsel of the Deity, in an election of grace.§ After a contest of nearly thirty years, in Africa, Italy, and central Gaul, Truth triumphs, and the doctrine of the entire impotence of man remains in the Church.

In like manner, (and this brings us to the third point which we have to examine,) the doctrine of *grace* was at this time developed by these teachers. The excellent Hilary had already declared: "Redemption is bestowed gratuitously, not according to the merit of works, but according to the pleasure of the Giver, according to the election of the Redeemer."|| "In this," says Augustine, "consists the grace of God through Jesus Christ, that He justifies us, not by *our* righteousness, but by *his own*."¶ But he insists particularly, that the idea of grace excludes all merit, and all natural disposition in man to receive salvation. God is the Alpha of salvation, as well as the Omega. "What God begins by producing, He perfects by co-operation. In beginning, He operates that we may will; in perfecting, He co-operates with those who have had the will."** *He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord.*

Thus it is, that in this period of doctrines, Christian science makes great advances. The doctrines respecting God, man, and salvation, which the teachers of the first period had found in the Scriptures, were more deeply sounded, and more fully unfolded, by those of the second. Theology advances under the influence of the Spirit of God; for there is a progression in theology. What, then, shall we say of those,

* Massa perditionis. Pecc. Orig. 21.

† Obligatio peccati. C. D. XIV. 1.

‡ Prædest. S. S. 3.

§ Quæst. ad Simpl.

|| Hilary in Psalm.

¶ Suâ, non nostrâ justitiâ.—De gratiâ Dei, 52.

** August. De gratiâ et lib. arb. § 33.

in our day, who would induce us to abandon these advanced degrees of sacred science, not merely with the view of carrying us back to the elements, but that they may force upon us grievous errors, which the Church has long since refuted and banished from her bosom? Leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on to perfection; not laying again the foundation.

Form of the School.

A new form succeeds to that which had itself displaced the primitive form. After a season of darkness, you see, about the middle of the eleventh century, a great intellectual movement working in the West. It was this movement which gave birth to Scholasticism. The School (*schola*) seeks to separate itself from the Church, which had hitherto held supreme and single sway. It wishes to secure to itself an authority and action independent of the hierarchy. Certain men of liberal minds, who, at first, were not generally ecclesiastics, nor monks, attempt to form free schools, entirely distinct from those which had hitherto existed. From these schools, the university of Paris, that mother of Scholasticism, soon springs up. The spirit of the School (we should say *now*, the spirit of the university), may be discerned from the general character of Scholasticism. Its object is to apply philosophy to Christianity, to reduce doctrines to system, to show their connexion and their internal evidence, to gain over to them not only the heart, but the understanding also. So that, if the first period was the period of *Life*, and the second the period of *Doctrine*, the third may be considered as the period of *System*. There is still life in many parts of the Church, there are doctrines in every part; but *system* is the predominating feature. *Now*, every teacher publishes his system, or *Summary of Theology*.* It is the old age of the Church, which, in the course of nature, succeeds the first two periods of youth and manhood. Old age loves to arrange truths which have been before collected. It is the season of meditation. It has little power of impulsion, but more of reflection. Although there were men of strength in the middle ages, the proneness to systematize was the distinguishing feature of those times.

* *Summa theologiæ* of Alexander Hales, Venice, 1576; of Albert the Great, Bâle, 1507; of Thomas Aquinas, Paris, 1675, etc. etc.

The study of History received then no attention. Scarcely more importance was attached to exegetical studies. Yet the European mind was effectually roused from its protracted lethargy. It needed a guide to direct its movements. That guide was *Dialectics*. And as Theology was the science of the age, it was also the field upon which the human mind ventured under the auspices of this guide. This trait of the school tended to Rationalism and Infidelity. Yet the earliest teachers of that period sheltered sacred theology from their attacks. "The Christian," says Anselm, the father of Scholasticism, "must arrive at understanding, through faith. I seek not to understand that I may believe, but I believe that I may understand. And, indeed, I believe, because, if I did not, I could not understand."* Soon, however, Abelard and his school possess themselves of the principle of Scholasticism, and become the defenders of free enquiry. They wish, first, to *learn*, and then to *believe*. "Faith," say they, "confirmed by investigation, is far more sure. We must attack the enemies of the Gospel on their own ground. If we must abstain from discussion, we shall find it necessary to believe every thing, falsehood as well as truth."† Yet, notwithstanding this tendency to Rationalism, notwithstanding the anathemas of the Church against them, these Rationalist theologians cannot be reproached for the abandonment of any doctrine of faith.

But we will not entirely absolve Scholasticism from reproof. It often disfigures Christian truth. Its tendency, and the state of the Church at that time, necessarily led to this result. Human reason can never venture with safety upon those great truths which pass all understanding. The School of the middle ages, like the Alexandrian School in former times, disturbed some doctrines, in its anxiety to strengthen the Christian system. Still it is true, that Scholasticism produced not a few distinguished minds. I do not hesitate to say, although it may occasion surprise, that, under its influence, the Church made some progress; I speak not of progress in spiritual religion, but of progress in theological science. The teachers who were the light of those ages, communicated much sound doctrine to the crowds that filled their schools, and followed them by thousands, even to the deserts, wherever they saw them plant the chair of instruction.

* Anselmi Epist. XLI. Prologion, C. 1.

† Abelardi Introd. ad Theol. C. 3.

Orthodox Christianity is considered by a class of people of all others the most incredulous, as an invention of the middle ages. This vulgar accusation of the wise men of the eighteenth century, surely does great honour to those times; far greater, I think, than they deserve. It might, however, free us from the necessity of proving that Christianity existed *then*. Nevertheless we will interrogate some of those teachers to whom we have already alluded.

What, then, is the exposition of the doctrine of salvation given by Anselm of Canterbury, the most influential, perhaps, of the philosophical theologians of those times,—the second Augustine of the Latin Church,—a man of great power, who knew how to unite the labours of philosophy with purity of faith? The Scripture system of Redemption is developed and presented by him in such a manner as to obviate objections, and to satisfy, at once, the understanding and the heart.—“All rational beings,” he says, “are bound to submit their own will to the Divine will. This law was violated in the sin of the first man. Thus the harmony of the moral order of the world was destroyed. The law of eternal justice requires, either that mankind be punished, or that the lost harmony be restored by a satisfaction made by man. Without this, it would not be consistent with the moral order of the universe, that impure man should be admitted to the communion of blessed spirits. Man could not of himself accomplish this satisfaction. As by one, human nature had become corrupt, so by one must satisfaction be made. But he who would effect it, must have something to bestow above what belongs to any created being. He must, then, be God himself. And, at the same time, in order that the satisfaction may be available by man, he must be human. He could, then, be no other than God-man. This God-man offered himself voluntarily to death; for he was not subject to it. He maintained the most perfect obedience amidst the deepest afflictions. God, therefore, was under obligation to reward him. But since Christ, as God, was self-sufficient, he needed no reward. He could, therefore, transfer his own merits to the world, and demand, as a recompense, the salvation of believers.” Such are the words of Anselm, in his work, entitled, *Cur Deus homo?*

But, what is very remarkable, considering their common reputation, the Schoolmen insisted particularly upon the sanctifying influence of faith.—“The sufferings of Christ deliver

us from sin," says Peter Lombard, the illustrious *Master of Sentences*, who for centuries ruled in the Schools; "for this immense sacrifice of Divine charity brings us within the embrace of God's love, and this love sanctifies us."*—"The just who live by faith," says Robert Pulleyn, "are already sanctified within; and receive good works as a sign of their faith and holiness. Faith first produces holiness of heart, and holiness of heart produces good works."†—"Man, in his original state," says Alexander Hales, the *Irrefragable Doctor*, "was not opposed to God. Then he had need only of *formative* grace. But now he has something within him which is in opposition to God, and which can be removed only by the power of God. In his present condition, therefore, he has need of *transforming* grace."‡

There existed, it is true, differences and controversies among the scholastic teachers; but their very controversies prove, that they were established upon the common ground of the great truths of salvation. For example, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas (the *Angelic Doctor*), and others, contended, that the sacrifice of Christ effects the redemption of man, in virtue of its own intrinsic value (*ex insito valore*;) whilst many other Schoolmen, especially Duns Scot, the *Subtil Doctor*, maintained, that this Redemption was only a consequence of the counsel or design of God, who had valued the redemption of man at this price. Behold, then, in what they differ. But all agree in this: "Lost man is saved by the death of the God-man."

Form of the Reformation.

Such was the testimony of the School, and of the Church, in those ages, to say nothing of the numerous witnesses for the truth, Wickliffe, Waldo, and others, who were the precursors of the mighty movement which was about to take place in the world. The Church had passed her season of youth, buoyant with life,—her mature age, full of power and clearness,—and her old age of system and reflection. But, with Scholasticism, the exercise of reason also had departed. The hierarchy wished to bring within its close embrace, life, doctrines, system, all, and to place the funereal stone upon all

* Sententiarum, Lib. IV.

† Sententiarum, Lib. VIII.

‡ Gratia reformans. Summa.

the noble tendencies of the Church. It wished to reign alone. Vain presumption ! The Church bursts asunder the bonds of death. The stone is rolled away. The sepulchre opens. She comes forth, like a man restored to life ;—and we greet the fourth period—the *form of the Reformation*.

If the three successive forms, which we have surveyed, have appeared to us distinguished as the form of *life*, of *doctrine*, and of *system*, what character shall we assign to this ?

A Reformation is a restoration of ancient forms. But this restoration was not effected at the expense of any one of those forms. The Reformation re-established and united the three successive forms, which had before existed in the Church of God, apart from each other, and composed them into a beautiful triad. Such was the character of the fourth period. The Reformation took the form of *system*, and carried it back upon the form of *doctrine*. Then it carried back these two forms united, upon the form of *life*. Or rather, it proceeded in an inverted order. It started with *life*, led it forward into *doctrine*, and crowned the whole with *system*. The Reformation united the three sorts of culture which preceded it.

It began with *life*. Luther experienced in his own heart, by divine grace, the vivifying influence of Religion, as, perhaps, no teacher of the Church had ever experienced it before. The Reformation went forth in full vigour from the heart of the reformer, where God had planted it. The era which was under the exclusive influence of the teacher of Wittemberg, was, if we may so speak, instinct with life. This is so true, that the excellent work which Melancthon, the theologian of the Reformation, published at that time (we speak of the first edition of his *Loci Communes*), passes over the doctrines concerning *the essence of God*, the *Trinity*, not because they appeared to him of no importance (on the contrary, they form the basis of his system), but because, as he himself said, it is better to revere these mysteries, than to sound them.

But, at the same time, beneath this *life* you will discover the well-appointed members of Christian *doctrine*, and soon after, in the second period of the Reformation (which commenced with the Confession of Augsburg, drawn up by Melancthon himself), these doctrines were defined, and presented in all their power. The Trinity, the entire corruption of man, and, above all, the doctrine of grace, and of justification by faith, were developed with a clearness and depth

scarcely equalled in the era of doctrine. Already, too, you may discover *system*, in the harmonious distribution of those different members of the body of Christian doctrine. But system manifested itself most distinctly during the third period of the Reformation, under the influence of two great theologians,—Melancthon in Germany, and Calvin at Geneva. The Institutes of Christianity will ever remain one of the most beautiful monuments of the Christian system.

How strong were the voices which, at that time, proclaimed the immutable truths of the Gospel! Listen to the teacher of Wittenberg, the great Luther, concerning the divinity of Jesus Christ.—“If Christ does not abide the true and essential God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and Creator of all created things, we are lost. For what would the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ avail us, if he were a mere man, like you and me? He could not have vanquished Satan, sin, and death. We need a Saviour who is truly God, and raised above sin, death, the devil, and hell. It matters little that the Arians exclaim:—‘Christ is the noblest, the most exalted of creatures.’ They think, in this way, to recommend their shameful error, so that the people may not detect it. But if they strike at the faith, though in the least thing, it is all over with us. If they rob Christ of his divinity, we are past all deliverance from the judgement and wrath of God.”*

And what did the Reformation declare concerning *man*? It ground to powder the various subtleties of the School, and set forth the true doctrine with admirable clearness and simplicity. Even before the publication of his famous theses on indulgences, Luther published others on *man*. Listen to some of those truths, which, in this morning of the bright day of the Reformation, this great teacher declared himself ready to maintain in the Church.

“It is true that man who is become an evil tree, can will or do only that which is evil.”

“On the side of man, there is nothing which precedes grace, unless it be impotency and rebellion.”

“There is no moral virtue without pride or sorrow, that is to say, without sin.”

“He who is destitute of the grace of God, sins continually, although he neither kills, steals, nor commits adultery.”

Or shall we entertain you with the homage which the Re-

* Interpretation of the first chapter of St. John's Gospel, T. IX.

formation rendered to the doctrine of *grace*? It was by this doctrine that it overthrew the bulwarks of Rome. The Reformers did not desire that man should place his confidence, or rest his salvation, upon any thing which he might do, in or of himself. Christ was the only foundation. Faith in his name was the only method of *grace*. Every other doctrine must lead either to pride or despair.

Listen to Luther writing to his friend Sponlein: "Art thou, at length, weary of thine own righteousness? Dost thou rejoice in, and trust thyself to, the righteousness of Christ? Learn, my dear brother, to know Christ, and him crucified. Learn to despair of thyself, and to sing to the Lord this song: 'Lord Jesus! Thou art my righteousness, but I am thy sin. Thou hast taken what was mine; thou hast given me what was thine own. Thou hast become what thou wast not, that I might become what I was not!'"* "Works," said he at another time, "are not taken into consideration, where justification is concerned. True faith can no more fail to produce them, than the sun can fail to emit rays. But it is not works which induces God to justify us."†

"Without doubt, the renewal of the heart must follow faith," said Melancthon; "but, where justification is concerned, turn off thine eyes from this renewal, and fix them only on the promises, on Christ, knowing that we are justified only for the sake of Christ's love, and not on account of our renewal. Faith justifies us, not, as thou writest, because it is in us as the root of a good tree, but because it lays hold on Jesus Christ, through whose love we are rendered acceptable."‡ "We offer nothing to God," said Calvin, "but we are prevented by his pure grace, without any regard to our works."§

All the reformers, though they differed in some respects, are one on this point. In Germany, Switzerland, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, and even Spain, they announced justification by faith, and declared—"If this article stand, the Church stands. If this article fall, the Church falls." But why is it necessary to insist upon these things? Have we not in our hands their Confessions of faith? And do not the enemies of this faith, as well as its friends, acknowledge, with one consent, that this was, indeed, the doctrine of the Reformation?

* Luth. Epist. T. I.

† Melancth. ad Brentium, opp.

‡ Luther ad Melancth. opp.

§ Calv. in Epist. ad Titum.

A fifth period, a fifth form, has now commence din the Church, mysterious, unknown, whose peculiar characteristics it is not yet given to us to discern. But there is one thing which the history of past forms teaches us. The fundamental truths which we have passed in review, will also constitute the essence and glory of the future form. That saving doctrine which we have every where found, will never leave the helm of the Church. It will never abandon that precious bark to the treacherous, though momentary gale of the heresies of a Theodotius, an Arius, a Pelagius, or a Socinus. What has been, will be.

Nor this alone. The history of past forms assures us, that the future form will unite all which was excellent in them. God suffers nothing to be lost in his Church. And this shows us clearly the error of some pious and well-disposed Christians, who speak only of returning to the primitive form, forgetting all that lies upon the route thither. The Church can no more divest itself of the influence of the successive forms through which she has passed, than a tree can divest itself of the layers which every spring adds to it; or the body of a full-grown man, of its annual increments. As for us, we do not turn away our eyes from the future; but neither do we forget the past. The past will live again in the future. Life, doctrine, system—all will be found united in the new form.

But will there not be something to give it a peculiar character, and thus to distinguish it from the form of the Reformation? Doubtless there will; but this something is yet to come—and who shall describe it? Nevertheless, I will hazard a conjecture. Will not the peculiar feature of the new form be a universal activity in extending to every race of man, and to every man of every race, what the preceding forms have produced? Has not the period of the Reformation united all the isolated excellencies of the first three, that the new period may lay its hand upon them, and spread them abroad among mankind? Must not Life, Doctrine, System, or rather Christian Science, become the property of our race as they have never been hitherto? I am silent on these things, which are still concealed from our view by a dark veil.

But there is one thing which we ought to know. We are at the entrance of a new period, and of a new form, for Christian science as well as for the Church; and it is the present generation, which will be the instrument of God, in

giving to this period its first impulse. Here is an immense labour to be performed, and but very few labourers. In this hour, at least, my voice shall call to you whose ears it does or may reach. Train yourselves, Scribes and Teachers! destined, under God, to open the new path of knowledge and piety. Learn that the hand of a mighty faith and mighty knowledge are necessary to vanquish a mighty unbelief. Enrich yourselves from the past, in order that you may be prepared for the future. Young men! who are preparing to serve the Churches of Him who laid down his life for his sheep, or who have already the care of his flock, learn what sound theology demands from you. Profit by the lessons of history. Let her lead you beyond that narrow sphere where the prejudices which surround you, have, perhaps, shut you in. Let her compel you to forsake that cheerless track, where none but sordid spirits can drag themselves along. Live, not with the passing moment, but with the ages that are gone. History calls up the ages past, and brings them around you. She makes you hear their solemn testimony. Will you reject the faith of the whole Church, the voice of Jesus Christ himself, for that of a single teacher? Disdaining the glory which comes from God, will you seek that of the world? Continue, rather, that admirable chain, whose first link is the Lord; and which, being formed throughout by the great teachers of Christianity, has, at last, come down to you. Separate not yourselves to the service of some obscure heresy. Though you should be alone amidst your fellow-disciples, alone in the Church, alone in the world, to confess God manifest in the flesh, comfort yourselves with the thought, that you are associated with those illustrious witnesses of so many different periods, whose voice we have now recalled to your hearing. History shows us, that Christianity has never ceased to act with power upon the thoughts and lives of men; but she shows us, also, that this renovating influence has always been exerted by means of the same doctrines. The orthodox doctrines of Christianity alone possess the power of renewing individuals and nations. Every other doctrine serves only to amuse souls, or to destroy them. Never will you see *life*, where *truth* is not found. Would you run the career of an orator, who diverts people by words of mighty sound; or would you be benefactors of man—saving him by the wisdom of God? Link yourselves to that which is saving, to that which is immutable, to that

which is eternal. Move forward like a sacred cohort ! What new and mighty efforts are making in Switzerland, France, Germany, Holland, Great Britain and America, to restore sound theology to the world, and to establish the throne of truth !

And Thou, thrice holy God ! in whose light we see light, illumine us, and open to us the gates of that knowledge, whose immense treasures are all hid in Jesus Christ.

ART. IV. COLTON'S FOUR YEARS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

Four Years in Great Britain, 1831—1835. By Calvin Colton. In two Volumes. New-York : Published by Harper & Brothers. 1835.

NOTWITHSTANDING this work, at the period of its publication, shared largely in the commendatory notices of some of our daily prints (for who could be so uncivil as to censure a work with which he had been gratuitously favoured?)—yet were we impatient for an opportunity of glancing at its pages : not because it might be regarded as a “new thing under the sun ;” or that there was any urgent demand for a book of travels in Great Britain, now that intercourse with her shores is quite as frequent and almost as rapid as between the extreme ports of our own land. They are deserving of no small degree of credit, who have returned home, from scenes now so familiar, content with the health to which they have been restored, and the colloquial materials which they have gathered for the instructive gratification of their friends ; instead of expending time and strength in the composition of a book, which, however graphic, impartial, and accurate, can at best, do little more than revive our knowledge, and secure for its author only an ephemeral celebrity. Indeed, it is surprising that men of mind should covet the distinction of publishing their travels in England, when recent travellers in America, have forever set the question at rest,—whether a

popular work may not be written, with but a modicum of sense.

An account of regions but *seldom visited* or *little known*, may not sink in comparison with scientific discoveries. He who thus enlarges the field of useful knowledge, or contributes to the gratification of cultured taste, is not to be undervalued, though others may have conferred greater benefits, or won greener laurels. But to mock our expectation by a sounding title; to disparage our judgements by distorted statements; to deface the scenes which genius has immortalized; to relate as wonderful, what we daily see, or as new, that which has been familiar to us from childhood; to exhaust our patience with unnecessary detail when we are seeking for causes, or amuse us with gilded things and trifling incidents,—the puppet-shows at which children stare and gape,—when we need to hear of man as formed under other models of government;—*away with* such an authorship! Stewart, the graphic delineator of the Sandwich Islands, shall be remembered; but Stewart the *visitant* of England must be forgotten.

Had the work which we propose to notice, borne the name of a stranger, or the title of a six month's tourist, we should have experienced similar emotions with Mr. Colton, when in company with his friend he entered the English garden at the Petit Frainon,* and probably have laid it aside with a corresponding exclamation,—“This is nothing but a book of travels in *Great Britain!*” But our esteem for its author, and solicitude to ascertain the result of *four years'* observation, have quite overcome our repugnance to travels in England, and almost imparted novelty to the subject.

For an American to write dispassionately respecting England, we conceive to be no easy task. Three thousand miles of ocean intervene; and when, after a protracted confinement to the monotony of a ship, after having escaped all the real or imaginary dangers of a transatlantic voyage, we find ourselves actually on the solid ground of our mother country, we are almost transported beyond the consciousness of personal identity—we tread on magic ground—we breathe an exhilarating atmosphere. If the American, who for the first time touches that soil, be an educated man, it is to him classic ground: if a clergyman, the ground on which he

stands, is hallowed by the blood of martyrs to the cause of religious liberty ;—he is encompassed by the shades of Christian heroes. So strange is that delusion* which has been induced on the mind by having compassed the wide waste of waters, he almost imagines that he shall witness the stern conflicts of Protestantism, and mingle in converse with those mighty spirits which secured liberty to the Church—the Bible to the world. Or, if the emotions of a republican be strongest in his bosom, he reflects that it is the land from which the lovers of freedom were driven to breast the terrors of the ocean, and the savages of the wilderness. Here ruled the men who aimed, through tyranny, to rivet around his country the chains of slavery. Nay, if his mind has been conversant with only the works of fiction, a thousand images start up before him into life. He cannot enter a time-worn mansion, or mark, in the distance, a frowning tower, or lose himself amid the intricacy of winding lanes, without the thronging associations of romance. Perhaps he will unconsciously identify himself with the hero of a Fielding or a Scott, and feel himself struggling with imaginary difficulties,—befriended by an unknown hand,—loved and honoured by some noble fair one.

Besides, there cannot well be a greater transition than from New to Old England. It can scarcely be imaged by the disparity in form and feature which obtains between the mother and child. We have passed from a land of republican simplicity, to one which is characterized by all the pomp and circumstance of monarchy ;—from a Church which sustains itself in total disconnexion with civil power, to one which is wholly dependent on the State ;—from the midst of a scattered population, to a land where human beings throng as the locusts of Egypt ;—from a country scarcely reclaimed from the wildness of nature, to one which, from its hill-tops to its marshes, has long known the hand of cultivation, —where rural beauty appears in every form to enchant the eye, and every opening through the shade of venerable trees but serves to unfold yet another ivy-covered temple, or seat of lavish wealth and imposing magnificence.

First impressions respecting England, cannot be otherwise than erroneous. The proper state of mind for the just observation of any foreign land, is that in which we hold the

* Three thousand miles are as three thousand years.—*Franklin*.

judgement in suspense. No one should write concerning a foreign land, till his emotions, of whatever kind, have subsided, and time is given to observe with accuracy, and remark with candour. The mind of a traveller may be either a common-place-book, or a philosophical treatise, according as he simply collects and arranges things, or duly and dispassionately weighs them.

Mr. Colton has enjoyed an advantage over previous journalists. He need not tell us what he felt at first, but what he thought at last. He need not "hasten to an end," to meet an unfortunate engagement with his publisher; nor depend on *on dits*, when ample time remains for personal observation; nor resort to gossip and caricaturing,—the expedient of impoverished minds as well as bodies, to secure a ready sale. From the abundance of his leisure, his observations should not be superficial. From the recurrence of opportunities, we may reasonably expect that he can in few instances be deceived by appearances.

But in some respects a foreign sojourn of four years, may be disadvantageous to a writer. During such an interval, his judgement is liable to be unduly influenced by the partialities of personal friendship; or various circumstances may repeatedly occur to disturb his equanimity. We can readily imagine, too, how the love of our far distant home might operate to the disparagement of all that is attractive abroad; or how the propensity of our nature to detect faults, might meet with numberless temptations. On protracted converse with an individual, we naturally begin to scrutinize. We doubt the traits which were once acknowledged, and at last discover faults in him, of whom, at first, our praise was unequivocal. Happy, indeed, if we do not "exaggerate, and set down aught in malice." Thus time may disclose a thousand blots on the lineaments of a nation which, at first, imposed on us by its greatness, and dazzled by its splendour.

However piercing our scrutiny of another's character, nothing is more common than to be blind to our own defects. In like manner, may it not be possible to forget America* in

* "How outrageous," said an American gentleman to us on a certain occasion, "that the booksellers in Westminster will have no connexion with a work which is in any wise opposed to the Established Church. I have searched every store, and at last was informed that if I wished a book so favourable to the cause of dissent as that, I must apply at the other end of the city." We were not a little amused; and could not resist the temptation of reminding our friend, that in the state from which he came, it would be quite as difficult to procure a work unfavourable to the cause of negro slavery.

our critical observation of England? Besides, our character as a people is not fully established. There are strange elements from time to time evolved, of which, but a little while since, we hardly dreamed. The republicans of to-day, we had almost said, may not present the same aspects on the morrow. He who shall spend many years abroad, may find, on his return, that his country is greatly in advance of his knowledge. He bears with him (ex. gr.) his impressions of the state of things in 1830; but his comparisons may not answer to the social, civil, or religious aspects of his country in 1835; so active the habits, so restless the elements of a republican community!

But aside from these considerations, we very much doubt, whether it be possible to write a dispassionate work respecting any foreign nation. What is an Englishman's account of France; or the reverse? Can an Englishman write with candour on the subject of the American Revolution? Even Botta, notwithstanding our expectations, has betrayed unaccountable prejudices in more than one instance. Will the British public anticipate impartiality from the hand of a republican writer? Or can *we*, without ignorance of our relations to England, or rather of human nature?

Mr. Colton sets out with the determination not to be partial in favour of England. He complains of "Americans who allow themselves to be dined and toasted out of their characters." But may not his fear of seduction have screwed up the virtue of republicanism to an unamiable austerity? May not his determination to be true to his own principles and relations, have placed him in an unfavourable attitude for rectifying or enlarging his views? Perhaps, from his clerical character, he was not particularly exposed to the captivating influence of rich dinners, or the witchery of high life; and may not this circumstance have imparted an unconscious bias to his feelings. Perhaps, also, he was a more attentive observer abroad, than he had been at home. We could wish that he had merged the American, in the character of an independent observer; but this, it may be, were impossible. Certain it is, that he has not, in any instance, proved traitor to his republicanism. He carries it with him wherever he goes. We see its features developed through the medium of varying circumstances, in every possible expression, reminding us of his most amusing *view of himself* on entering Ossian's Hall.*

* Vol. 2, p. 51.

We are happy to state, however, that he has not forgotten his clerical profession. This is a circumstance by no means unworthy passing note. Scarce a packet leaves this port without numbering among its passengers some reverend gentleman. Indeed, no pastor can now become strengthless through abundant labours, without being gravely advised to visit Europe. If such a step would ensure mental sanity, or a stock of ideas, it might not be unadvisable for *exhausted preachers*, to avail themselves of the invalid pastor's privilege. But whatever the motive for a transatlantic voyage, no clergyman should lose sight, for a moment, of his high engagements. There is an imperious necessity for consistency of deportment, not only as regards the evidence of personal piety, but on account of the religious interests of those with whom he is brought in contact. Impaired health can be no excuse for the neglect of personal and relative duties. The gratification of curiosity, is rather a poor reason why the soul should not be satisfied. We are at liberty to gain a knowledge of the world, but not at the expense of self-denial and spirituality of mind. What good might not be instrumentally accomplished on ship-board, and in a foreign land, if every clerical traveller should exemplify our holy religion! British Christians are solicitous to ascertain the character of our piety, as influenced by our civil circumstances and ecclesiastical organization. Let the deportment, the conversation, the discourses of our Clergy, be such as to cheer their hearts, if not to inform their minds. Let it be the grand object of every disciple to convince all within his sphere of influence, that as Christianity is not a creature of the state, so personal piety is not a thing of circumstances.

It will not be thought that we have unnecessarily digressed, when it is considered, that the appropriate black dress has of late, in more than one instance, been figuratively laid aside. It would seem as if some ministered at the shrine of local deities, (not of the one only living and true God,)—so changed has been their "walk and conversation" when abroad,—so conformed were they by turns to all manners and all men. Foreign travel is no ordinary test of the religious character. In England, but more particularly in France, there is every temptation to do as we would not in our own land. How many have availed themselves of the *incognito* to visit the theatre, as if example were the only reason why a Christian should not cross its polluted

and polluting threshold! The principle of acting in a place according to one's relative character, as a stranger or resident, is virtually founded on the supposition, that there is no reality in moral distinctions; while if generally adopted, it would, in all our large cities, whether at home or abroad, fill to overflowing, and perpetually support, every edifice of vicious amusement. Many have unconsciously acted on the same principle in relation to the Sabbath. Considering the dissipation of mind, and the exuberance of animal spirits which every visiter of the old country, to a greater or less degree, experiences, it may not be surprising, that, in not unfrequent instances, the claims of the Sabbath should be made to yield to the solicitations of worldly pleasure.* But the Bible recognizes no apology for known sin. Mr. Colton has afforded us in his work a striking illustration of the *necessity* of a Sabbath: Let his example teach us all, when abroad, of the necessity and moral beauty of clerical consistency, in relation to the observance of the Sabbath.

The general strain of remark in these volumes is grave, and their tendency salutary to the cause of truth and virtue. The pages of our author cannot be perused without leading us to think and feel. He is not always satisfactory, but he may be generally instructive. He does not often cause us to smile, but he will, at times, elicit our sympathies. The sentiments with which he inspires us, in view of some advantages in our lot, are those of gratitude, rather than of exultation. We should hardly be induced to remove to England, if, on any account, we were dissatisfied to remain at home.

The picture which these volumes unfold of the Church of England, is a work of no ordinary merit. We thought ourselves prepared for a statement respecting the enormous wealth of the establishment; yet the developement was astounding. Possibly, some inaccuracies may be detected in his

* The temptation to profane the Sabbath is stronger in France. There, no Sabbath is recognized. The most attractive galleries, cabinets, and gardens in Paris, are thrown open on that day. The water-works at Versailles (the greatest curiosity of art in all Europe), are put into operation only on the Sabbath, and that at an interval of months. We cannot but pity the weakness of poor human nature, but often are we more amused at its expedients to quiet conscience. A distinguished American clergyman justified himself in visiting these works on the Sabbath, as we have understood, by remarking, "that any achievement which enlarged his conceptions of the human mind, led him to adore the uncreated mind more profoundly." Another Reverend gentleman, while the water-works were the topic of conversation among some acquaintances at Paris, very opportunely enquired,—“whether there were no places of Protestant worship at Versailles?”

statistics; but we must accede to Mr. C. the palm of having taken all pains to attain a just conclusion. He was not ignorant of the difficulties attending this subject. He has furnished us with the modes of estimating the expense; and, with the scrutiny of a Bentham, he has compared the wealth of the English Church with the revenues of France, Spain, and Rome, and calculated the comparative expense of Christianity in different countries. It is his opinion that the Church of England has been aggrandized by a separation from Rome; but, whether it be so or not, his remarks must command attention.

Nor will the reader, however inclined he may be at other sections of this work, to profit by the device of its author while walking in the "valley of desolation," and to inscribe on the page, "*tired and gone back*,"* pause at the close of this weighty exposition.† He will be interested to ascertain the mode in which the revenues of the Church are distributed among the different orders of clergy; his blood will curdle at the "Slaughter of Rathcormac;" his indignation will kindle into a flame in view of the "Tithe Oppression;" nor will his sympathies fail to mingle with the Dissenters as he ponders their disabilities; or, in illustration of their grievances, reads the case of the "Sick Widow,"—the "Rector imposing Tithes, or a Dissenting Clergyman's Garden,"—the "Indelicate Application;"—and though last, and seemingly insignificant, by no means least, the "Dying Wish of a Poor Woman."

Should any one be forward to doubt these statements, ample testimony to their truth might readily be procured. Many facts (according to the recollection of the writer of this Review), equally if not more harrowing to the feelings, were adduced in the House of Commons in the August of 1834. We cannot repress our apprehensions, however, that Mr. C. may have, unconsciously, far from aided the dissenters, by virtually identifying their cause with that of the radicals.

Some may possibly object to his entire disclosures; but, certainly, no discriminative or candid mind. Christianity cannot be injured by any just expose of its corruptions; though, despite of our author's introductory "protest," it may not be assumed with certainty, that any alliance of Church and State is necessarily, a corruption of Christianity. Surely Heaven will

not frown in anger on the king of Great Britain, should his government energetically subserve the high moral and religious interests of his subjects.

Nor can such disclosures tend to the detriment of the Episcopal Church in America. She is disowned by the Church of England, and disconnected from the state. Mr. C. speaks of the English establishment simply as a political institution.* It is the hierarchy, as wedded to the throne, which he describes; and his account† of her functions is no less striking than true.

But it is not to be expected that a writer on this subject should secure the approbation of all, so widely different are the views which are entertained among us of the Church of England. By some it is identified with the works of the mighty dead; by others with the intolerance of archbishops and the intrigues of statesmen. One regards it as a political engine of portentous power; another as the grandest instrument in the conversion of the world. With many it is the indispensable agent in securing the unity of the faith; with more it is the parent of infidelity and heresy. Speak of the clergy of the establishment, and you recall to the minds of not a few, an anecdote of some fox-hunting rector; while others will pleasurably descant on the virtues of a Martyn or a Richmond. Mr. C., in our opinion, betrays neither scantiness of knowledge, nor narrowness of view. Dark as is the picture which he has drawn, it is not unrelieved by a gleam of light. Notwithstanding the exceptionable characters of political clergyman, the "established Church is blessed with a numerous class of *evangelical*, faithful, pungent preachers." He has brought this fact, of which we have the most ample assurance from the accounts of more recent observers, prominently forth as a redeeming feature in the Church. His remarks respecting the superiour popularity of evangelical preachers, are such as might have been anticipated. His views forcibly remind us of Robert Hall's Review of a Clergyman of the establishment, who called on his brethren to "join in pathetic lamentations over the prostrate state of religion, upon no better ground, than the neglect of places of worship, where the Gospel was *not* preached, and where there was little to attract attention, beside the privilege of hearing *fine music*, and seeing *fine ministers*, for nothing."

* Vol. II. p. 101.

† Vol. I. p. 243.

Even Bulwer, in his "England and the English," did not deem it irrelevant to his purpose to glance at the inconsistency and folly of what was understood by *dignified* preaching. Indeed, the secret of attraction in the desk, is preaching the Gospel without fear or feebleness;—plainly, faithfully, feelingly. The conscience which has been implanted in man's nature, bears involuntary testimony to the truth that the Christian ministry was designed to be a remedial function, and may not with impunity, even to ambitious views, be prostituted to an office for mere delectation to worldly minds.

If the work under review, may be allowed to speak for its author, the Church, in his opinion, must be at once and forever separated from the State. Such, in reality, is the general and almost universal sentiment of our country. But it admits of no shadowy doubt, whether the prostration of the established Church would subserve the greater interests of Christianity. It is a fair question, whether the same, if not greater evils would not result from the separation of Church and State in England, than would attend the union of any ecclesiastical polity with the government of the United States. Certainly an attempt to abolish the English establishment must be attended with hardly less difficulty than to rear an ecclesiastical establishment in America. That which would be a curse to us, in the existing state of religious parties in our country, may be a blessing in the very different circumstances which designate the English people.

We are inclined to think, that the author of "Spiritual Despotism," is far from being erroneous, in his main positions respecting the English alliance of Church and State, though our republican pride and hereditary prejudices would repress the acknowledgement. He is ignorant of our civil relations who imagines that an ecclesiastical establishment is necessary for us; and we may betray still less acquaintance with the government and condition of England by the presumption, that no establishment is necessary to her welfare. We can readily perceive, with this Junius of the Church, the necessity of reform in respect to the system "of pluralities, the sale of advowsons, episcopal translations, and those ecclesiastical customs of every sort which have one simple motive—the love of money;" but can we know, whether the establishment be wrong in itself, before all the proposed reforms have been fairly brought to the test? We cannot but think,

notwithstanding the evils which have so long attended Church establishments, that the abstract question respecting the propriety and utility of the perpetuated existence of the established Church in England, must be viewed apart from its imperfections or abuses. But even if the system be bad in *principle*, sure are we that radicalism is worse in *practice*. If the alliance of the Church and State be unscriptural, unnatural,—at war with the well-being of the social system, the evil is not to be remedied by a ruthless hand. "It is in the moral world as in the human frame;" remarked an acute writer—"dislocations which have been of long standing and to which the neighbouring parts of the system have accommodated themselves cannot be brought back to their proper state, without time, patience and gentleness."

The question, whether there should be an establishment in England, resolves itself, we apprehend, into a previous one;—whether the civil government of England should be subverted? Episcopacy is a component part of the British constitution. The Church is strictly a political organization. It is a branch of the government, and like the monarchy itself, it must be supported; though like any form of civil polity, it may not with impunity oppress the obscurest subject. In our view the establishment could not be thrown down without destruction to the monarchy; and if such would be the consequence, let the Church remain forever in connexion with the state. What necessity (always excepting the gratification of our national prejudices) can there be, for changing a government which has advanced England to a height of prosperity from which she may look down on all the nations of the earth? The British Constitution is the sublime result of all the experience and wisdom of ages,—the perfection of limited monarchy. "A subject of any of the monarchies of Europe, on visiting England, will not unlikely be amazed," says Mr. C., "that a monarchy can be so mild, and the subjects of it enjoy so much liberty, as in England. There he will find the utmost liberty of speech and of the press; security of person and property against the encroachments of arbitrary power; a right to do what a man pleases, if he does not violate the rights of his neighbour, as fixed and defined by law for common good." * * "The king of Great Britain has not at this moment so much power as the president of the United States." Republicans in general, may not be forward to ad-

mit the truth of these statements. But the recent course of events in our land, has fastened on not a few intelligent minds, the painful conviction, that there is more freedom of discussion, more respect for the constitution, more regard for law and justice, more security to life and property from lawless aggression in England than here. Our government can be justly viewed as hardly more than a political experiment. From its very nature, past success can be no infallible criterion of future prosperity. *Esto perpetua*, is our prayer; *videre, ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet*, shall be our object; but the sources of our danger are no longer imaginary; and we are unable to repress our apprehensions that coming events have cast their portentous shadows over the length and breadth of the land. Fifty years hence (and then we shall no more than have survived our political boyhood in comparison with "Old England,") will be time enough before we presume to exalt ourselves as an example to the world. As yet, we are only a spectacle. Shall England, then, forego the solid benefits of her monarchy for the problematical advantages attendant on the subversion of the Established Church? What is Christianity to gain by involving the "United Kingdoms" in a fierce and long conflict for the chimeras of radicalism? It is in vain to think that England or France can become permanent republics. Let monarchy be levelled with the dust,—republicanism must soon give place to democracy.—Then will anarchy follow on with appalling strides, until despotism, armed with all her terrors, shall rise to conclude the bloody drama of radicalism. So speaks the oracle of history. Well for America, were she less sanguine of the future, and more studious of the past! Our constitution is a shadow which must speedily pass away, if it cannot oppose an impregnable barrier to the smallest encroachment of the popular will.

In this connexion it may not be improper to notice the reprehensible manner in which Mr. C. speaks of what he conceives to be the general sentiment of the English people.—"No one is afraid of the king—not even the poorest—*any more than of his donkey*." This remark might possibly be excused had it been uttered in the privileged looseness of familiar conversation; but in print, it is too undignified to escape censure. If it be true that no one is *afraid* of the king, why adopt an illustration so strikingly vulgar? What

its author's feelings are, need not be enquired; but it implies that the people at large have even no *respect* for their most gracious sovereign.

Mr. C. animadverts at large, on the *peculiar* corruptions of courts. What fountains of iniquity! we wonder he could have refrained from discoursing to the people on the moral purity of a republican cabinet. Surely Dr. Hurd* must have been blinded by the prejudices of an unsuccessful partizan, or we might shrewdly suspect that there was no little truth in the representations of some of our political prints. "The outside indeed was fair; but to me, who had an opportunity of looking it through, nothing could be more deformed and hateful. All was ambition, intrigue and falsehood. Every one intent on his own schemes, frequently wicked, always base and selfish." Ah, we can give the ingenious prelate no credit for candour or charity. Had he lived in our day and land, very possibly he might have conjured materials for a similar picture.

Whatever the form of government, it will necessarily exert an influence, whether beneficial or not, on the cause of public morals. "Bad influences from high quarters" are not confined to England. "What originates in a court and is tolerated there, though it be a scandal, is too apt to be tolerated in general society;"—as if the same grave remark might not be made respecting whatever "originates" in republican high places! In like manner, we might in this connexion, remind our author, that if the "metropolis be the centre and soul of the nation," so is a city the centre and soul of a republican state; that if "the sons of the noble and the wealthy are exposed to peculiar temptations by some grand defects in English society," almost as sad defects may be detected here; that if the "manners and customs of the higher ranks in England descend," so do they throughout our land! But the reader will not think that we compliment his powers of discernment, any more than Mr. C. the intelligence of his readers, whom he so kindly assists to the meaning of the proverb, "high life below stairs,"—by an explanatory note!

Our author has rendered a most beautiful tribute to the "order of a well-regulated English family in the higher ranks." He regards it as presenting one of the fairest

specimens of the social state which this world can furnish." We cannot, however, entirely accord with his views respecting the aristocracy. We prefer the aristocracy of England, to that which is affected in America. Aristocratic feelings are quite as common here, as there; though not so acknowledged. A multitude of facts might be adduced in support of our opinion. And it occurs to us, that instead of being the legitimate result of any form of government, they grow out of the necessary inequalities in human condition. Republican equality is an abstraction. Despite of the main position of our declaration, there are the greatest inequalities in relative circumstances. Hence, the man of wealth, looks down on the poor; the fashionist, contemns the vulgar; and the first circle guards itself with jealous pride against all rude encroachments. The objection against associations or matrimonial alliances on the score of rank, though more common in England, is not unfrequent here. All the advantages of academical education and literary accomplishments are sometimes insufficient to counteract the misfortune of a "low origin." Nothing but wealth can make amends for the want of "respectability" in domestic connexions; and why? because wealth, in these instances, is the republican substitute for "noble blood"—it secures the gratification of aristocratic feelings. In many places in our own country the line between the first and second classes is as definitely drawn, if not as pertinaciously observed on the part of the former, as in England between the nobles and commoners. The lowly republican, too, is not unfrequently as elated by his title, though it may be only that of *major*, as if he had been *knighted*. We can as easily distinguish persons in the higher walks of life by their easy bearing and open manners, as Mr. C., the "nobility." It may be as truly said of many families, as of the "nobility," that "the privileges" of their lot in life "make them noble in manners." The levee of the president; the saloon of Congress Hall; the occasional *grand balls* which are given by some families in our large cities "exhibit this difference" as really, though not so gorgeously, as the "queen's drawing-room." "As a republican, nay, as a man, as a Christian," Mr. C. "protests against the propriety or justice of maintaining those distinctions which make these differences in character and society in England." Christianity does not sanction pride. It should render us humble under the most tempting

circumstances of our standing in society; but he might with equal propriety "protest" against the constitution of Providence which necessitates inequalities in human condition. *Owenism* is an absurdity. The man who would confound distinctions and reduce all ranks and classes to a level, is fighting against an ordinance of Heaven. The well being of any community is essentially dependent on the pecuniary inequalities and various grades of its members. "Society can be stationary" only where these essential elements of social improvement are not allowed to operate.

That the English, in their respective orders, should virtually "conspire, to keep down those who are below them," is not surprising. It is the necessary consequence of a dense population. "Let every one know, and keep his own place," (which is the first grand fault of the English, according to Mr. C.'s observations) is the sentiment of our own land, in all places where violent competition has been induced. It is a sentiment which naturally springs from a desire for self-exaltation or aggrandizement. "Society," cannot remain "stationary" where it obtains. The greater the effort to confine the human mind to a certain sphere, the stronger its vindictive desire to break through its enclosure. Its energies are developed in proportion to the obstacles which it may be doomed to encounter. Let men be free and enjoy the means of knowledge, and it matters not what distinctions obtain in rank and fortune. They will rise in the scale of mental and moral greatness. Their success, too, will be more in accordance with their real abilities. If they cannot be nobles, they will be men indeed. If they cannot assume the insignia of royalty, they will be royal in their art and profession. If they "must keep their own place" they will be pre-eminent in their sphere; and it is for none but the *outward* observer, to deny to even the servant, the praise, to which he is as truly entitled for superiority in his menial office, as the lord in his proud relations. The state of society in England contradicts our author's reasoning.* Where is there more general activity of mind than there? Where have the arts and sciences been advanced to so great perfection as there? Where shall we find such numbers of well-trained servants, skilful artificers, or greater, better men? Despite of the civil disa-

* Vol. 2. pp. 238—41.

bilities of dissenters, (for which we offer no apology,) how many among their ranks, have from the lowest origin risen to a greatness which shames the pride of rank, and eclipses the splendour of royalty? "Any one in America may lawfully aspire to the highest civil offices."—"Tis a proud reflection. But it may be doubted, from an observation of human nature, whether facility of elevation be the greater spur to mental exertion; and from the general character of successful aspirants, whether the structure of our civil society be not more favourable to the gratification of avaricious ambition, than the merited exaltation of intellectual and moral worth? We have yet to discover, whether the state of society in our own land, be not more favourable to *pretensions* than to *true merit*.

As to the "other fault" of the English, which Mr. C. specifies, it is surely a *grievous* one! We fear the rich and pleasure-loving gentry of our own land have gone too far to be admonished, since it is no uncommon circumstance at the present day for hundreds of dollars to be lavished on dogs, and thousands on horses. We hope no English traveller will revenge himself on our author by visiting our semi-annual races, or taking a census of the dogs, at least, in some of our towns in the interior. We are convinced, however, that English gentlemen are at fault, if the ladies are doomed to lavish their affections *on dogs*. Republican gentlemen are wont to spare our ladies the necessity of wasting their delicate sensibilities in a manner so unworthy; though alas! in some instances they might better for their own happiness have "led about a dog."

Perhaps the "English are not more remarkable for loving the brute creation" than some of our agriculturists whose barns are ten-fold larger than their houses, or whose fields display the finest breeds. "The excessive love which the English have for the horse and dog," is the natural result of their taste for rural sports. The lady's fondness for her "pet," betrays the influence of fashion, or the affectation of romance. As it may be regarded as one instrument of her vanity, by which she designs to impress on others her superiority to the drudgery of life, so the gentleman's regard for horses and hounds is the natural expression of his pride, which leads him to appropriate to himself the achievements of his animals. But whatever the cause, this excessive fondness is undoubtedly, as Mr. C. observes, a perversion of the

affections of the heart. It should be reprobated, and the more so, as "there are a thousand objects of human kind needing benevolence." But if men are not Christians, they are lovers of the creature in some form; and for our part, we are as willing persons should expend their money and affections "on horses and dogs," as see them perverting "the noblest ends of society, and man's existence," by "the excessive love" of *hoarded dust*.

In his chapter on the "extortions of menials" our author remarks, "take it all in all, the tax of satisfying the various orders of servants, porters and guides in England, if a stranger would go wherever it is desirable, is enormous." But in proportion to our population and the degree of travelling, is not extortion quite as frequent here? Might not similar incidents, be "put down to the credit," of some of our stage, steam and railway offices, as that which Mr. C. has formally recorded against "Brotherton's Coach offices."

In another place, he charges the Roman Catholics in London, with always exacting money of strangers. He says it is unlawful to take money for admission to places of public worship. It may have "been so decided by a London magistrate;" but the writer of this Review distinctly recollects having seen within the vestibule of one of the established churches in the vicinity of the "New Palace," the following notice: "Strangers are respectfully informed that by the payment of a fee to the sexton they will be conducted to a seat."

Mr. Colton's remarks on the service at the Chapel Royal are not the inappropriate or the invidious observations of a stern republican. All the distinctions of society, should be laid aside in the house of God. It is a redeeming feature in the Roman Churches, (more particularly observable in France;) that the rich and poor, the high and low meet together, and sit or stand promiscuously on a level.

The King with his "marking strings" was probably an object of little "dread" to the American visitant; but we cannot think that he had no respect for this august personage, since he has so carefully informed us, that on another occasion, he *actually stood "within two feet or eighteen inches"* of his Majesty! We apprehended from this interview, no little danger to his republicanism; but our mind was soon relieved. It is easy to perceive that he does not sink the dignity of an American. It was necessity which

compelled him to stand opposite the King for about ten minutes, "with only space" he observes, "for one person to pass between *me* and him." The reader, however, will follow our traveller with no ordinary interest through the gorgeous scenes of the King's levee, and Queen's drawing room. But if his attention had been previously directed to England, he will be surprised that Mr. C. should so often have descended from the character of an author to the capacity of a guide. His work has certainly encroached, in some respects, on the appropriate department of an inferior mind. Still the dulness of "things familiar," is relieved at times by a striking incident, or graphic account:—Such (ex. gr.) as Mispah—Dr. Raffle's funeral sermon—the tongues—scenes in Newgate—the murderer and suicide—the funeral of Clementi—the Welch, with the story of the brother and sister, and the martyr dog.

In the place of the "composition of the houses of parliament," or the "manner of public debates," we should have been more indebted to him, for a comparison between the forensic eloquence of the parliament and the capitol. His portraits of "four British statesmen," are well drawn; and we cannot but regret, that he who has interested us so deeply in the striking delineation of Grey, Brougham, O'Connell, and Macauley, should not have favoured the American Church with an occasional sketch of some distinguished preacher, or benevolent man.

Mr. Colton's descriptions, though in some instances happy, will not, in general, endure the test of criticism. He is wont to combine too many particulars, to employ too many words, and these not always of the most classical usage. His descriptions of natural scenery lead us (and that not rapidly) from object to object, rather than unfold to us, at once, as from a distant eminence, the glowing *tout ensemble*. Were it not for some occasional strokes, we should term them statements, rather than sketches. He gives us the dimensions of a scene, when we are expecting to behold the graceful blending of light and shade. He arranges *marking strings* for our imagination (if we may draw a figure from his allusion to the office which was performed for the royal worshippers), instead of simply affording "room and verge enough" for the play of the reader's mind. We might advert to the "meditation" in which he was interrupted by the conscience-stricken young man;—to the "funeral at sea" (not overlooking, *en*

passant, his profound speculation on the fate of the body);—to the “still day;”—“the ramble;”—or more particularly, to the description of the marble cenotaph in Windsor Castle, but his strained and incongruous description, of the “lightning cloud,” was of itself sufficient to induce the apprehension that Mr. C.’s was not exactly the pen for delineating scenes which the Waverly Novels have rendered sacred to the genius of Scott. Accordingly, almost the first sentence which met our eye on opening the second volume, was this: “Scotland would be venerable in her naked majesty, in the eye of a seraph spirit, who on wings should make survey of her face, spread out to the heavens, even in desolate loneliness, if that spirit might be supposed to have any thing of a taste akin to man for the beauties of nature.”

But we can pardon a failure in this respect. Travelling in Great Britain is a *sensation*. There is every thing in vision and association to kindle the dormant emotions of the soul. We are delighted—ravished! In the overflowings of our enjoyment, we wish to impart a portion to our distant friends. But before concluding to write a book, is it not advisable for a man to ascertain the peculiar structure of his own mind? The man whom the prince of Abyssinia employed to effect his escape from the “happy valley,” was a good mechanist, but nature had not designed him to soar in the air. He was confident, however, that “he should have vultures and eagles behind him. He waved his pinions awhile, to gather air, then leaped from his stand, and in an instant dropped into the lake.” It is no disparagement to Mr. C. to presume that on examining, he would find that imagination is not the faculty of his mind most happily developed. Dr. Johnson was a nervous prose writer, but his attempt at poetry,—

When observation, with extended view,
Surveys mankind, from China to Peru,—

was tautology worse tautologized. Thus, our author is better at matters of fact, than sketches of fancy. He is a close observer, a ready calculator, an admirable reporter of meetings and occurrences, but no vivid portrayer of natural scenes or moral sentiments.

Mr. C. was “exceedingly jealous of *walking* society,” when visiting Abbeys and ruins. But if he had been accompanied in all his excursions, though his readers might have

been favoured with fewer sentimental reflections, his own fears had not been so strangely excited when he was left for a moment by his guide, or accosted by a beggar. Perhaps we are mistaken. He is not unfrequently nervous and apprehensive. Look at his account of a "narrow escape" from drowning; of the dreaded Brompton crescent; of a surprise on Waterloo bridge—his subsequent allusion to the villain and long process of reasoning to render probable the assailant's purpose; or the list of his suppositions on "a train of cars;" or that "horrible whisper" which he heard at the entrance of the "Tunnel." All this, for aught we know, may be what the French term *naivete*, but there was something of the same disposition, if we recollect aright, in the sage who confessed to Imlac,—*"I am like a man habitually afraid of spectres, who is set at ease by a lamp."*

We might advert to some of our author's similes,—such as the "head of an English vessel rising from the water like the circle of a pumpkin,"—the boat's filling "as quick as one could fill a tea-cup in a tub of water,"—the wheels of the car "going round as fast as a woman's spinning-wheel,"—"most all the mountains of Scotland being as bald as a man's hand,"—or Brougham in his movements "being not unlike a baboon." We might also allude to other peculiarities of style,—such as "drinking deeply of a vision,"—"the king takes his station in the throne-room *on his feet and uncovered*,"—"there lay evidently on the table a corpse,"—"it was tremendous; it was awful; it was overpowering; my whole nervous system was shaken,"—"Mr. Croker began, as well he might, as he could not help, as was most befitting;" and so on. But upon the whole, if we are bound to recommend his style, it must be for the same reason, that Dr. Bell thought that medical students might learn more from an unskilful, than an expert operation.

We should not, however, have alluded so particularly to the defects of Mr. Colton's style, had he not enjoyed the advantage of four years;—were he not about to issue another volume;—and did it not fall within the object of a literary Review. The high order of English literature may be traced in part to the severe censorship of their critical journals. Even personal antipathies, sectarian prejudices, and party animosities, pervading the "Edinburgh" and "Quarterly," have thus indirectly subserved its cause; and if the literature of our country shall ever rival, in general, that of England

and Scotland, the style of our writers must be the subject of review, equally with their sentiments. Our critics must do their part towards rendering every traveller an Irving in manner, as well as a Colton in matter. There is too great a disposition among our writers to be satisfied with themselves, if they have only conveyed, what our eastern neighbours call the *idea*, no matter how provincial the expression, how uncouth the language, how vulgar the simile. Hence it is, that we are so obnoxious to the biting sarcasm of English critics. Nay, some are not backward to intimate that they *despise style*. It is, indeed, a cheap way of showing the superiour order of our minds, to undervalue or condemn that which we do not possess. But a man might as well inform us that he is destitute of taste and classical accomplishments,—of genius; and then expect that we shall look on him with the more profound respect!

But, though Mr. Colton's volumes have subjected the reviewer to critical toil, they will amply repay the perusal of general readers; nor do we, notwithstanding the remarks which "Four years in Great Britain" have elicited from our pen, look with less interest for the appearance of "London." We hope it will be characterized by philosophical views and moral reflections. The secret of writing not only for present interest, but *future study*, may be found, we apprehend, in Johnson's Tour through the Hebrides; or of writing for permanent fame, in Brougham's advice* to Macauley. But with "London," whatever its character, as with "Four Years," we must be content; not only, as Mr. Colton remarks, "it is easier to tell what a book should be than to make it," but because "in all sublunary things there is something to be wished which we must wish in vain."

* Vol. II. p. 218.

ART. V. SAVIGNY* ON THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

Translated from the German,

By BARON DE ROENNE, Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, near the government of the United States.

To the Editor of the Literary and Theological Review.

SIR—In the pamphlet recently published by the Council of the University of this city, relative to the organization of a Law Faculty in that institution, you will have observed a communication addressed to me, by the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, Baron de Roenne; and in a note on page 8, you will also have seen the following statement of the circumstances which led to that communication, and of my obligations to its author.

"Being desirous to obtain the most accurate information within my reach, in regard to the Prussian Law Schools, I recently availed myself of an interview with Baron de Roenne, Chargé d'Affaires from the Government of Prussia, near that of the United States, to solicit from him some account of their present state. This gentleman, who was bred to the Law under the tuition of the celebrated Savigny, and who is himself an accomplished jurist, cheerfully complied with this request, and communicated to me numerous particulars on the subject of my inquiries. His statements were so interesting and instructive, that I subsequently took the liberty of requesting him to commit the substance of them to paper, with a view to their publication, in connection with this letter. It will be seen from his communication, which will be found in the Appendix, that he not only complied with this application, but even exceeded it, by preparing for my use a translation of a recent paper of Professor Savigny, giving a general view of the German Universities. I am very sure that my professional brethren will concur with me, in awarding to this enlightened foreigner, their best thanks for the information contained in his letter; and I trust that the lively interest displayed by him in the cause of intellectual improvement in the United States, will secure for him the respect and regard of other American readers. The essay of Professor Savigny has no particular reference to the faculties of law; but as it embraces an instructive view of the German Universities, and contains many profound reflections on the subject of education, I shall take some fit mode to bring it before the public."

* Frederic Charles von Savigny is professor of Civil Law in the University at Berlin, and one of the most eminent jurists of his nation. He belongs to what is there called the *historical* school of lawyers, in opposition to the philosophical school. In accordance with the principles of that school, his writings are pervaded with love for ancient laws and institutions, by veneration for the past and the distant. His numerous works on law are distinguished rather for profound learning and elegance of style, than for depth of philosophical investigation. The following Essay on the German Universities, was originally published in the "*Politisches Journal*," Hamburg, July, 1833.—EDITOR.

In compliance with the promise contained in the above extract, I beg leave to place at your disposal the translation referred to. As it was prepared by a foreigner, and was moreover intended to be quite literal, its language is not always perfectly agreeable to the English idiom. Your acquaintance with the German will enable you to correct it in this respect, without injury to its general fidelity; and for this purpose I also hand you the journal in which it originally appeared.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

NEW-YORK, Oct. 15, 1835.

B. F. BUTLER.

So much has always contributed to divide the Germans, that it may be deemed necessary to cast a glance now and then at those common advantages which are still left to the whole nation. This will help us both to enjoy their possession, which warrants us the continuation of the fresh life of the people, and to understand the means of their preservation. Amongst the most peculiar and the most valuable of these common possessions, *our universities* have at all times been numbered, and they have accordingly often found zealous friends and panegyrists. But the most certain evidence of their value has always been and is still to be found, in the love and gratitude of those who have spent part of their youth in these institutions; for, however far they may now be removed by age, rank, or profession from the university life, they will almost always not only remember it with pleasure, but gratefully acknowledge, that the beneficial influence it had upon their education, could not have been fully supplied by any other means.

It is indeed true, that they have had powerful enemies, especially for a few years past. The most moderate of these opponents have been of opinion, that the universities had survived themselves, and that the constant progress of our literature, rendered them, to a great degree, unnecessary. Others deem them dangerous to the peace of the States, or to the welfare and the morals of our youth. Both of these classes wish, if not the subversion, yet such a reform of the universities, as would be almost equal to their subversion.

Perhaps an enquiry into the real condition of these institutions, might contribute to reconcile these conflicting opinions. It would do so, could it be shown that whatever, in these institutions their friends love, is approved of by such of their antagonists as are well-disposed; and that what the latter condemn, is not only foreign from, but directly opposed to their nature.

Ever since the middle ages, it has been the custom in the greater part of Europe to establish schools, in which the foundation might be laid by oral instruction, for the most important branches of a public calling. However the form and use of these schools may have varied, according to different ages and countries, the conviction has been general and prevailing, that the proper road to public life, and especially to the service of the Church and State, leads through them. This common object may, therefore, be regarded as constituting the nature of the *European universities*.

Before the art of printing was invented, such schools were, of course, deemed indispensable; since there were no external means, apart from oral instruction, by which the knowledge requisite for the object abovenamed, could have been adequately communicated. The art of printing has removed that external necessity. Not only does there exist already a sufficient number of books for self-instruction in all the sciences, but it would be easy to cause to be written a connected series of preparatory text-books for every public calling. In this way all that is absolutely necessary for the attainment of this external object would be provided for, and this, too, in a manner more cheap and more convenient for all, than is done at present by the universities. If, then, these institutions are still to be continued, it can only be because some important and peculiar advantages are secured by them, which would be lost by a mere study of books. Such now is exactly the case; and in order to make it obvious in what these advantages consist, it is necessary that the characteristics of all the different methods of conveying instruction, should be apprehended and exhibited.

Our first enquiry will naturally be, in what respect the task of a scientific *author*, differs from that of a *teacher* in the university. The author addresses himself to all who are interested in his object,—to those contemporary with himself, and to those of a future period, without any regard to the differences of their mental cultivation. The generality and indefiniteness in which this public stands before the mind of the author, must unavoidably give a general cast to what he writes. His work is so far valuable, as it contributes to establish or develop the science of which it treats. But it can be considered only as a single fact in the history of this science; and the author himself is only, as it were, an organ of the ideal spirit, by which this science is progres-

sively improved. Thus every thing conspires to remove the *personality* of the author, and the peculiar manner of his individual development, from the eye of the reader.

Not so with the teacher in the university. There stands before him a certain number of individuals, all personally known by him,—all very much in the same stage of mental cultivation,—generally unacquainted with the science which he teaches, but in the fresh and unexhausted strength of their youth. Now to these students, this science, so far as it has hitherto advanced, will naturally appear, as it were, *personified* in their teacher. He will have incorporated so vitally into himself, what had been for a long time gradually and slowly forming, that the same impression will be made on them, as if his science had been now at once engendered in his mind. Whilst the teacher thus gives a vivid representation of the genesis of scientific thought, the kindred spiritual power is awakened in the student, and excited to re-production. He will not only learn and understand, but also vitally re-produce, what he has seen so vividly presented before him, in its living realization.

Even in studying books, we have often found that views and facts come before our eyes, nay, become clear and convincing to our minds, without making a lasting impression; whilst the same thoughts, at other times, in a more favourable state of the mind, are seized by its productive powers, incorporated into our being, and made our own. Now what, in this case, is mostly the effect of circumstances merely subjective or accidental, (perhaps the merit of the author's spirited style,) the same can and ought to be the uniform fruit of personal instruction, when properly applied.

Though it is true that personal instruction has, under all circumstances, the greater efficacy now ascribed to it, yet it is its being united with the student's first entrance upon study, in the freshness of his youth, and with the reciprocal effect of the many who at the same time experience the same impression, which gives to the universities a high value, which cannot be supplied by any thing else. Thus might be applied to them, what a great master has said, though in a different connexion:—"To write is an abuse of language; to read silently for one's self, is a miserable surrogate for discourse. *All the influence of men over one another is exer-*

* Goethe's Life, Vol. II. p. 570.

cised by their personality ; the strongest influence is that exercised by youth upon youth,—an influence which gives rise to the purest effects ; and it is these effects which vivify the world, and do not allow it to die, either physically or morally."

The fact that the distinction between these two kinds of scientific instruction is often obscured in actual life, by their being interchanged, cannot affect the reality of this distinction. Many books approximate, by their liveliness and individuality, to the oral kind of discourse ; and many lectures, both in their excellencies and in their deficiencies, resemble a printed book. But the pure form of the book, and the pure form of oral discourse, always remain the same, although he who has chosen one of them may at times pass over into the sphere of the other.

These advantages of the universities have been often, though indistinctly recognized by their friends. By neglecting to reduce them to distinct notions, they have fallen into important errors respecting their true nature, which did not remain without influence upon the judgements they formed of individual teachers. These wrong judgements deserve to be mentioned. Thus it is erroneous to judge of the merits of a teacher by any discoveries which he himself may have made in his particular branch of science, and which he is accustomed to communicate in his lectures. It is indeed true, that by the novelty of the information thus conveyed, a deeper interest in the lectures might be excited, both in the teacher himself, and in the students, and that thus the great object of instruction might be promoted. But this novelty is, in itself, foreign to this object ; and just as an excellent teacher can be imagined, who had never enriched his branch of science by new discoveries, so can science be highly indebted to one, who has little success as a teacher.

It is equally erroneous, though very common, to estimate the merit of a teacher by the excellence of his manner of delivery. The facility with which an oral teacher expresses his thoughts with correctness and taste, cannot indeed but be conducive to the great object ; and many teachers pay too little attention to it, since much more might be done in this respect by determined effort than people generally believe. Still amongst the attributes which characterize the superiour teacher, only an inferior place can be assigned to this ; and it is generally overrated. There have at all times been teachers, who

though having a good, perhaps a brilliant mode of delivery, have yet accomplished but little: whilst others, who were hardly able to deliver a single sentence correctly and without faltering, have yet awakened in their pupils the *spirit* of science. And the reason of this is, that the former with all their fluency of speech, have possessed nothing worthy of communication; while in the case of the latter, the powerful workings of their minds could not remain concealed by their stammering discourse from the view of the intelligent student. But it is impossible to say how often the true merit of a teacher is mistaken in this way, especially from the partiality of students, and to their great injury.

Nearly related to this mistake is another, viz. judging of the merit of a teacher exclusively from the degree of excitement which he imparts to his auditors. One who is not at all able to excite others, is indeed unfit for teaching; but on the other hand, excitement is only valuable when it is the means of eliciting good faculties and tendencies. He therefore who elevates the scientific standard in the view of his pupils, who makes every, even the slightest progress towards the attainment of it, appear to them a worthy aim of their most intense efforts, and who thus incites them to such unremitting inquiry and to such rigorous demands on themselves, as will put an end to all their self-conceit,—he is the true teacher. But one who leads them to be satisfied with superficial effort and empty show, and to decide peremptorily and proudly when truth can only be attained by an honest exertion of the whole power of the mind,—he may indeed excite his pupils, but to their ruin, however much, in their foolish delusion, they may praise him.

It is also erroneous to place the merit of the universities in that personal contact, which enables the teacher to exert an influence upon his pupils by seriousness and love, by advice, encouragement and admonition. Such an intimacy is, indeed, important, and any one who has experienced its beneficial effects will gratefully remember it. And no teacher who is truly and from choice devoted to his profession, will regard it with indifference, or withdraw himself from it. But this personal intercourse depends so much upon accident, and, at large universities, can be realized to so limited an extent, that it cannot be regarded as the great merit of an university education.

If we thus make deduction of such things as are partly

accidental and partly subordinate, we shall feel disposed to acknowledge the truth of the account above given of the advantage of the universities. The true ground of the advantage of an university consists, *in the excitement to scientific thought which it furnishes, by presenting a similiar process of mental activity already gone through with by the mind of the teacher.* And that teacher will be best able to realize this advantage to his pupils, in whom the power of forming scientific notions is most conspicuously developed. In this respect young teachers have a natural advantage, which however may be supplied and outweighed by those more advanced in years, if they succeed in preserving youthfulness of mind in connexion with their riper knowledge and experience.

It has been admitted above, that there is no longer that external necessity for universities, which once existed; and, that therefore their importance might be thought diminished. But on the other hand, it is from this very progress of the age, that a new reason has arisen to enhance their value. It cannot be denied, that the mechanical facilities for the diffusion and even for the progress of science, have been greatly increased by the constant agency of book-printing; but it is obvious, that, at the same time, every thing now produced in the scientific world, is less and less *personal*. *To prevent such a change, founded in the very course of historic events, is impossible;—to regret it, is useless; but is it possible and salutary, to awaken and foster opposite powers, by which that which would be injurious only by being partial or extreme, may be converted into a means of enrichment and animation to our whole intellectual condition.* Thus the universities may acquire a new importance, by affording an asylum to what is personal, as it were, in science, and by continuing in their narrower circle, what in ancient times, and until the discovery of the art of printing, was the only mode of scientific communication,—times in which this communication was more scanty in its external means, but warmer and more humane in its influence upon individuals.

All that has hitherto been said on the state and merits of universities is equally applicable to all the nations which possess such institutions. It still remains to indicate the peculiar attributes by which the *German universities* are distinguished from those of other nations. This common cha-

racter consists, in the first place, in the fact, that each of them embraces all the sciences, instead of being limited to a single science, like the special schools of many other countries. The advantage of our system, in this respect, has been so often and so thoroughly explained by others, that it may here be passed over; since it is our design to draw the attention of the reader to such features of the subject as are less known. Besides, this circumstance can only, to a very limited extent, be regarded as a peculiarity of the German universities. For after the very first universities (those of Paris, Bologna and Salerno) had been established in the middle ages, as *special* schools, they were soon converted into general schools, and the numerous universities formed after them immediately assumed the same general character; so that after a short time, but few exceptions were to be found: as, for example, that of Salerno, which has always remained a medical school; and that of Paris, where the Roman law was excluded from the circle of instruction by an express prohibition. We mention this general character here, amongst the peculiarities of the German universities, only because it is in contradistinction to the system of special schools, which has recently been introduced into many other countries.

A second peculiarity of our universities is intimately connected with the scientific state of our nation. There is no other nation, where so important a part of the scientific activity is assigned to the public teacher. At all times, our first-rate literary men have taken a pride in acting as professors, even in small universities. That this circumstance contributes very much to promote the general object of the universities, is obvious. For a teacher, who at the same time takes an active part in cultivating the science he teaches, (though the two functions are different in themselves,) may generally be expected to possess that living vigour of scientific thought, by which alone he can succeed as a teacher: and on the other hand, the susceptibility of the pupil to become thoroughly imbued with the principles taught him, will be enhanced by the well-founded reputation which his teacher enjoys as an author. Thus the general superiority, which must necessarily attend the office of teaching, becomes ennobled by esteem for the particular teacher; and the higher authority which he thus obtains cannot but be conducive to his success. And so inversely,

when the teacher cheerfully performs his duty, it must have a favourable influence on his investigations as an author. Many a thought has been struck out in literary conversation with a friend, which never would have occurred to the scholar, in his solitary labour. And so a teacher who is connected with intelligent pupils, will find thoughts suggested to his mind, or quickened to new interest, by some appropriate expression, which would never have occurred to the mere author beyond the excitement of personal contact.*

It is evident that the above mentioned peculiarity of our universities, does not depend upon any prescribed system, but upon the habit and disposition of our learned men. Still it depends indirectly, upon an important fact, without which it could not exist, and this is, that kind of liberty in teaching which we enjoy.

Our teachers enjoy an almost unlimited liberty as to the choice of their topics of instruction, and the arrangement of their lectures; and the students are equally at liberty as to the choice of teachers and lectures. This liberty renders the relation of teacher honourable, and excites an emulation by which every improvement of science, either as to form or substance, is brought to bear immediately upon the business of instruction at the university. The opposite of this liberty may exist in different degrees, and is actually found in many countries. Liberty is entirely excluded where not only the object of the lectures, but also their form and arrangement, is strictly prescribed to the teacher, and when the pupil is directed from what teachers, and by what lectures he is at any time to receive instruction. *In such cases the plan of the Lancaster schools is, at it were, transferred to a sphere, where it cannot but operate ruinously.* Nothing is here left of the peculiar advantage of oral instruction, except the merely accidental benefit which may arise from the personal relations between teacher and pupil. If we except this accidental advantage, the object of such an institution might be equally as well, nay, more surely and more perfectly attained by a series of text-books, without any oral instruction.

A much lower degree of the limitation of liberty consists in prescribing to the pupil a considerable number of lectures, which he must, at some time, have attended to, leaving him

* This is very feelingly acknowledged by Niebuhr in his Roman history (Vol. I. p. 12 of the preface, 3d edition), as suggested by his own happy experience.

at liberty, as to the selection of his teacher, and as to the sequence and connexion of the lectures. Though the best part of liberty is thus left untouched, yet this system has been found by experience to be useless, and, indeed, injurious. It is founded upon the intention, commendable in itself, of raising the student to the highest point of thorough and liberal education by obliging him to attend to a great variety of lectures; but wherever this must be enforced, contrary to inclination, nothing is gained by it, unless it be, that the students are put to the ignoble game of collecting certificates for show's sake, and to comply with a formal rule. *So little can the business of instruction prosper, when under any external constraint.*

But what justifies us in ascribing peculiar merits to our German universities, in preference to the institutions of other countries? It is neither that the learning of our teachers, is already become complete, nor that our students are in the way of becoming eminently accomplished, which distinguish our universities from the schools of other nations. For if we should pretend that all our institutions are thus distinguished, a mortifying spectacle might not unfrequently be held up before us. But this is their glory, that they have received a form in which every distinguished talent for instruction can be developed, and every lively susceptibility on the part of the pupil be satisfied;—a form by which every degree of progress in science is provided with easy and rapid access, especially into the most congenial minds;—a form which renders it easy to discover the higher vocation of distinguished men, *and by which even to the poorer life of narrow-minded students an enhanced feeling of existence is communicated.* We dare be proud of that form; and all who know any thing of our universities will agree, that this praise is literally true, and not at all exaggerated.

But this very lively susceptibility, in which we place their merit, is that which has led to the principal objection against them. As they are accessible to truth, so it is pretended, they are equally accessible to error and evil; and to prevent this danger, all liberty and individuality must be banished from instruction. Such considerations have given rise, in many countries, to the opposite forms above mentioned. The full investigation of this important point, is beyond the limits of the present subject, connected as it is with other and more difficult inquiries. A few words will suffice for the present

purpose. Whenever there are false or evil tendencies in any age, they are allotted to it by God as a special trial, which it has unavoidably to undergo. *To destroy or to weaken in such a case, the mental powers themselves, because they might desert to the enemy during the contest, is unnatural and ruinous.* All that can be done by external authority, in time of such contests, is, to bring together, to encourage, and to support those who are disposed to strive for truth. In addition to these general observations, there are other reasons, relating particularly to the universities, which render the propriety of this liberty of instruction, as far as they are concerned, still less doubtful. For every thing which is done in them, is done by a certain number of teachers, who are well known, who do not appoint themselves, and can be easily superintended. In such a relation, personal confidence can render every degree of liberty safe, and indeed desirable.

To obviate any misunderstanding, it remains to enquire, with what right we ascribe the attribute now explained to *German* universities. When the first universities were founded in the middle ages, it generally happened that the most learned men were made teachers, and that the greatest liberty of instruction prevailed. These circumstances depended so entirely on external relations, that they could hardly have been otherwise; so that no individual can claim the honour of having devised so beneficial a scheme. Similar relations have been subsequently preserved or formed anew in different countries, whenever the universities have attained a considerable reputation. Such was the case in the sixteenth century in France—such in Italy in quite different times. But in looking upon the fact as it now lies before us, however it may be accounted for, such universities have become peculiar to Germany. And we may justly regard them as *common* to our nation; so that it is false and wrong, to call such universities as have been described, *Protestant* or *North-German*. Predilection for one's country, be it ever so small, is praiseworthy; but it becomes false and dangerous when it degenerates into a haughty misconception in regard to any part of our native land. *Germans have indeed little cause to multiply, by vain pretensions, the divisions already existing in our nation, in consequence of its peculiar fate!* But it is a different thing, and perfectly proper, to acknowledge the provincial peculiarities which exist

among us, and which may be expected to appear in the universities, enabling each of them to keep up its peculiar genius and character. Equally proper is that noble emulation which incites us really to excel others, and which is not incompatible with mutual love and esteem. But if there are considerable parts of our country, where universities of the nature above described, are not to be found, it is not because the susceptibility of the people, and their mental wants are different; but because in such parts, other views on public instruction than those here expressed, are prevalent.

Our universities have come to us as a noble inheritance of former times; and it is a matter of honour for us to transmit them, if possible augmented, at least unimpaired, to the generations to come. What we have probably to expect in this respect, deserves serious reflection; but more, what we are bound to do. Here again it is necessary, above all things, to distinguish what is accidental, that we may not be perplexed and misled in considering what is essential. Thus the older universities in Germany have enjoyed a good deal of independence as corporations, by voting in the representative councils, by exercising an extensive jurisdiction, and by administering themselves their large landed property. Many of them are entirely or partly deprived of these rights, and the universities that have been erected of late, have not obtained them at all. All these circumstances had then relative value, and have been useful in many respects; but they were foreign to the great object of the universities—indeed often detrimental to it. Much nearer related to that object, are the splendid scientific collections and institutes, with which many of our universities are richly endowed. And how is it possible not to acknowledge gratefully the high value of such advantages for literary investigations, and the noble feelings that produced them? Nevertheless, the nature of these advantages is often misunderstood, for they rather belong to an academy, than to an university; and it should never be forgotten, that some universities with very indifferent endowments of this kind, have recently excited an animated intellectual life; while the richest endowments cannot secure instruction from sinking into complete lifelessness. It would be an unfortunate error if governments, which are not rich enough to place their universities on an equal footing with some others in respect to these incidental endowments, should cease, on this account, to keep them at

elevated points, in which they were formerly the pride of many of our smaller states ; or if the opinion should become prevalent, that a university without a first rate apparatus, can be considered only as a second rate school.

Turning away our looks from all these accidental circumstances to the essentials of our universities, and asking, *what ought to be done to preserve them, and to elevate them to a still higher rank*, we must be convinced, that their welfare or their ruin depend upon three different causes, since an influence is exerted upon them from three different sides—the *governments, the teachers, and the students*.

When we ask what the *governments* ought to do for the benefit of our universities, we are fortunate in being able to confine ourselves to a mere account of what has always been done by them, and what they are still doing, wherever the universities are found in a truly thriving condition. Those who have been entrusted with these affairs have been well aware, that it was not their province to create the intellectual powers on which the prosperity of their institutions depends, but that it was their task to find out, to acknowledge, and to foster these powers. In appointing and promoting teachers, they have not been improperly influenced by the notoriety which a learned man might have acquired, nor even by the single circumstance of his having deserved well of his department of science as an author ; they have had chief regard to that which alone constitutes the calling of the teacher, his power of awakening and cultivating in his pupils a taste for science. They have not forgotten, that in order to the attainment of this highest object of a school, the moral worth and deportment of the teacher are equally important and indispensable with knowledge and talents. Whenever a controversy has arisen among the cultivators of a science, the guardians of the school have refrained from embracing either party, and have continued to regulate their measures only by the general and sure marks of the merit of a teacher, *unconcerned as to the party to which he might belong*. Ignorant persons, looking upon these things from without, and imagining themselves to be in the case of the trustees, may indeed be of opinion, that the whole propagation of science is entrusted to their hands ; that the teachers called by them are only their organs, and that it is part of their duty to direct and controul these teachers in the performance of their duty. Such may be the *opinion* of those who

know nothing of the matter. The trustees themselves know very well that it is not so. They understand that it is one thing to possess that moral and literary tact, which enables one to judge correctly of the general worth and excellence of a learned man, and to make a good election; and quite another thing for one to possess that superiority which alone could justify his claim to set up an advanced standard in science. By acknowledging this natural distinction, and abiding by it, they find no difficulty in maintaining the high dignity of their own station, without prejudice to the internal independence of the office of teaching, by which alone there can be an harmonious co-operation for the promotion of their great common object.

What the teachers ought to do, in order to render the universities prosperous, is so evident, that it hardly needs to be told. After having formed a clear idea of the nature of their office, it is only to be desired that they should hold it in very high esteem, and devote to it their best efforts. There are many things to disturb them in the discharge of their duty, and to withdraw them from it. In the first place, there is the business of *authorship*, which, we have already said, may sometimes exert a favourable influence upon the business of teaching. But it can also have an injurious effect, by becoming so prominent as to oblige the teacher to neglect his appropriate duty, and by exhausting his best and freshest powers. This fault may be owing to the opinion (not to mention less noble motives), that the sphere of an author is much more extensive than that of a teacher. But it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that an able teacher, in his narrower compass, may exert a more certain and deep-going influence, and that thus the want of the extension, may be more than made up by the intensity, of his influence.

A second and more important interference with the appropriate business of teachers, is their frequent dealing in practical employments. If this practice were properly restricted, it might, perhaps, be useful in counteracting the limitation of a learned profession, and produce a most happy reaction upon the business of the teacher, by enlarging his horizon, and by enlivening the dry study of books. The inducement to such practical activity, appears in quite a new aspect where newly formed representative institutions promote a more general participation in public affairs. Every unprejudiced mind will allow, that the lively and varie in-

terest in these affairs, forms a peculiar advantage of our times; and what can be more natural, than for the learned professions to bring the last results of their private studies, to bear upon the real world? There are, however, two things to be considered on this subject, from our present point of view. In the first place, the business of ruling and legislating, upon which members of the representative councils, as well as political authors, exercise so much influence by their judgement and advice, is so difficult and responsible, that it is to be desired that every one who feels an inclination to it, should possess, as a first condition of his fitness for it, a deep distrust of his own powers, so as not to adopt any resolution without the most rigorous examination. There are, in our days, a great many well-disposed men, who bring to the contemplation of public affairs, a youthful cheerfulness of view, and hopes destitute of solid foundation. These are generally satisfied with some prevailing ideas and maxims, which resound in all quarters, and lie sufficiently on the surface to be seized by the mass of the people, and to be worn by them, and liked, as a common badge. Having become very familiar with these ideas, and finding themselves associated by them in a circle rather numerous than select, they have no doubt of their vocation to public life. Did they look deeper, they would regard these very things as a reason why they should doubly suspect themselves.—In the second place, it may be that a teacher's engagement in public life will claim so much of his time and strength, and especially draw so deeply upon his feelings, that it cannot but produce a neglect of his appropriate duty, which he will come to look upon as a subordinate object. This is altogether reprehensible;—for, however strong one's vocation to public life may be, the business of teaching is too serious and too dignified to be conducted otherwise than with all the soul and strength; and one who views the subject honestly and conscientiously, will rather prefer to give up the business of teaching, than to degrade it by neglect.

In relation to the duty of teachers also, we must here again mention the different condition of our universities, already alluded to. Many of them have of late been far more richly endowed than others;—many have been erected in large capitals. Through the influence of these causes, their nature and powers have received a more full development, which must be regarded as a great advantage. On the

other hand, the universities in smaller towns, offer peculiar advantages, which must necessarily be wanting in the former; so that it is only in the contrast of the two kinds, that the true merit and nature of our universities can be fully understood. It ought, therefore, to be deplored as a great loss, if universities of this second, but more numerous class, should—not cease to exist, for that, indeed, is not to be feared, but—be less esteemed, on account of their wanting the advantages belonging to the former, and if they should enjoy less than formerly the warm interest and the powerful support of their governments. There are means enough to maintain them in that elevated station to which they have reached. These are exactly the places where an affectionate personal regard for each of the students,—attention to all their employments,—the discovery and encouragement of their respective merits,—are not only practicable, but of certain utility. Many will deem this an improper way of governing a great institution, because these effects are produced by other means than by statutes and rescripts, and because other results than such as are recorded in tabular statements are looked for. But the truth is, a vital progress can be promoted and sustained only by a vital influence. It affords a special facility for the support of universities of the kind now considered, *that in many small German States a cordial attachment to this particular State has been happily preserved; by which all that is done in the university of that State has a peculiar interest, which will make up for many other advantages.*

But what boots the noblest patronage of the government, what the brightest talent of the teacher, if not seconded by the corresponding exertions of the *students*? For them alone are all these institutions provided, and they are all useless, unless they rightly apprehend them. Fortunately, they enter the university at an age, when false tendencies cannot have become so deeply rooted in their minds, as to prevent the influence of good teachers. It is true, that they encounter at the university itself many degrading tendencies and customs, or such as are adapted at least to estrange them from their true object. Most of these dangerous tendencies are such as have long existed, and need not to be mentioned here; but there are others, which have arisen in our own times. We refer especially to the false and superficial political interest, recently sprung up. We cannot indeed blame the young men, most of

whom are destined to take an active part in public life, for beginning to feel a deep interest in its affairs, even while at the university. But if they truly love their country, they ought to evince this love, by a thorough and earnest preparation for public life. And nothing can more disturb this preparation, than the foolish vanity of assuming to pronounce their own opinion, in matters where they are not yet entitled to a judgement; or than that party-spirit, which, wherever it appears, distorts the free and noble view of life and science. Many persons have received from nature but little capacity to engage in public affairs: *and after they have wasted that little in stale and false enthusiasm, nothing is left for their active manhood but cold selfishness, and perhaps the obstinacy of established prejudices.* To check such a false tendency, by earnest and affectionate admonition, is especially the duty of the teacher. Many teachers, it would seem prefer to foster this tendency, by flattering the pride and arrogance of their pupils, instead of bringing them down. Whether they do so from a selfish desire for favour and applause, or with a view of gaining friends for the party, by which they imagine the general welfare will be promoted;—whether they do so with the most honest intention;—even if their political doctrine should contain not a little truth; a heavy responsibility still rests upon them; for even on the most favourable of these suppositions, they have led the students in a path, which will do them as little good, as it will the community. Even of the best amongst them we can only say: *they know not what they do.* But how can these and other similar abuses, be checked? Laws and police regulations are good and necessary to prevent the gross out-breakings of evil; but they do not reach farther. The personal influence of the teacher, by advice and admonition, is salutary, but of a very limited nature, and much less important than the continually operative influence of the good morals and dispositions, which the student may have brought with him from his paternal home. *Such false tendencies can, in general, be successfully opposed, only by giving an increased impetus to the right tendency.* If, through the exertions and talents of a circle of able teachers, the interest of the student can be enchained, there will be comparatively few who will fall into any false tendency.

What may be considered as most wanting at present, is a more varied excitement of the diligence of the student, a

stronger calling out of his own activity, and a superintendence of the same. This subject is indeed of so delicate a nature, that we might almost be afraid to touch it. For any thing introduced here as a general form, and with external constraint, must soon prove fruitless, if not injurious. What is done in behalf of this object, can prove successful only when it originates in the peculiar method and tendency of each teacher, and so is capable of being greatly modified according to persons and periods. It is doubtless here to be taken for granted, that there is an affectionate interest on the part of the trustees of the universities in the operations and success of all the teachers, and a mutual confidence subsisting between both parties. Arrangements for this object might be facilitated at large universities, by introducing a class of persons between the teachers and students. These might be partly young teachers, and partly older and more distinguished students, who should be employed in directing the studies of the younger. Small associations for literary improvement, are already frequently formed spontaneously amongst zealous students, and only need to be made more general, and brought into close connection with some one of their teachers. But all this ought to be done without any external constraint, so as to make it a matter of propriety and honour, and only encouraged by the example of distinguished individuals. This arrangement would have the additional advantage, that after the expiration of the term of study, a much better judgement respecting the ability of individual students might be formed, than could be gained from the customary examinations.

In comparing the students who collect at the same university, we perceive a great difference as to talent and previous cultivation; and the question hence arises, *to which class of his auditors the teacher shall address his lectures?* Many are for putting the standard as high as possible. They want the teacher to make the most distinguished students their standard—those who are called by nature to be themselves the promoters of science; leaving the rest to learn as much from this instruction as they can. This opinion is wrong, not only because it would be unjust to provide for the benefit of the few, neglecting the wants of the many; but for quite a different reason. God has immediately provided for those few, and they do not need the help of our institutions. They would succeed even without universities;

and they may easily find a soil at every institution where they can strike their roots, and find nourishment; even if nothing should be provided expressly for them.

Others on the contrary, place the standard of instruction as low as possible. Many students are without the least susceptibility for instruction of a genial and vital kind, owing both to their want of talents and the meanness of their character. But such persons, it is said, are not wholly unable to commit to memory mechanically some trivial extract, and in the same mechanical way apply it again to any profession. According to the above opinion, these inferior wants ought to be chiefly provided for by the universities; because this miserable food might, at the same time, be partaken of by the more gifted, and thus none would go away empty. But for such students, the university is too good a place; and so is any literary profession; so that it would be desirable to discourage them entirely from pursuing a literary course, and let them choose some mechanical business more adapted to their capacities and dispositions.

Having thus justly excluded these extremes, as aside from the true destination of the universities, there is left, as the proper object of their charge, the numerous and respectable middle class—those that often need, and generally are susceptible of a higher incitement, and the direction of whose minds is for that very reason, most important and beneficial. Every teacher should regard it as a matter of honour to provide for such with all his power; he should offer them the best he possesses; he should encourage them to encounter difficulties, though he should not disdain to strive for their sake, to gain a truly popular and easy style of instruction. Some may view this effort in the light of a condescension; they may even regard this popular expression as a thing of very equivocal merit, while, in fact, it consists, in many instances, only in the more perfect development of the thoughts themselves. Universities are similar, in this respect, to states. In these too, great heroes and statesmen, learned men and great artists, particular classes distinguished for great influence and wealth, may contribute very much to render the condition of the whole more glorious. But the stability of the state does not depend upon them. Much less does it depend upon servants and day-labourers, or upon strolling and houseless vagabonds. It depends, on the contrary, upon the numerous middle

classes, partly devoted to mental occupations, partly to agriculture and trade of every description and to every degree, and upon the sound sense and just sentiments prevailing among these classes.

In what condition the German universities *are*, has now been shown. Whether they shall remain such,—whether they shall rise or fall, is left with us to decide, with those of the present generation. *The judgement of posterity will hold us accountable.*

ART. VI. CHAPIN'S ESSAY ON SACRAMENTAL USE OF WINE.

By REV. DANIEL DANA, D. D., Newburyport, Mass.

THE DUTY OF THE CHURCH.—*A Prize Essay by Rev. Calvin Chapin, D. D. on the question, What is the duty of the churches, in regard to the use of fermented, i. e. alcoholic wine, in celebrating the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper?*

THERE have been periods in the Christian Church, in which authority and prescription were every thing; and argument—we might almost say, Scripture itself—comparatively nothing. There have been periods in which a few splendid and imposing names gave laws to the community at large; and even extorted an unnatural homage from the most vigorous and gifted minds.

But those times are gone by. Let them pass. And if it be the will of a wise and sovereign Providence, let them never return.

Evils of this kind, however, enormous as they confessedly are, are not the only obstructions to the progress of truth and piety. What has been remarked of the individual mind, is not less true of the mind of the community. It is a *pendulum*, never resting in the centre, but ever vibrating from one extreme to its opposite. If there is an attachment to antiquity, which is excessive, may there not be a passion for

novelty, equally excessive? Is there no medium between a slavish submission to authority, and a supercilious contempt for the accumulated wisdom of ages? Is there no middle path between bigotry and scepticism?—between blind faith and downright infidelity? In turning our back on prescription and authority, shall we take leave, too, of reason, of common sense, and the Bible itself?

We tremble for our country. We almost tremble for the Church of God. Indeed, we have long been convinced, that apart from the numberless enemies which encompass the Church from without, it harbours in its own bosom, evils which are amply sufficient for its destruction; evils which, had it not an Almighty Guardian, would have actually destroyed it, ages since.

The order of the day is innovation. The spirit of the age is innovation; innovation restless and reckless; innovation which, while it professedly aims to improve and perfect Christianity itself, disfigures its beautiful structure, mars its fair proportions, undermines its very foundations, and threatens to leave nothing of this divine system, but its name.

We have seen the first principles of Christianity assailed. We have seen some of its most important doctrines explained away. Yet we confess we were not prepared to witness a direct attempt to change one of its most sacred ordinances. Nor will we dissemble the surprise, or the pain we have felt at the appearance of the Essay which is announced in the present article.

Toward its author, we cherish no sentiments but those of esteem and veneration. His long course of unquestioned piety, and active devotion to his Master's cause, forbid every suspicion that his motives and intentions, in the present case, are other than pure. If, in his attempt to banish the use of wine from the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, Dr. Chapin has materially erred, the error originated, we doubt not, in a deep and almost overwhelming sense of the mischiefs of intemperance, especially its ravages within the Church; and an ardent desire to see these appalling evils removed.

With these views of the character and motives of Dr. C., we can be under no temptation to treat him with any personal disrespect. We would studiously avoid every approach to it. Still, truth has its paramount claims. In the ques-

tion he has discussed, are involved the vital interests, the peace, and the purity of the Church of God. We are, then, not only permitted, but bound, to speak with freedom; to detect whatever of fallacy may exist in the arguments of our venerable friend, and to point out the bearings and the consequences of the scheme which, with something of plausibility, and still more of sincerity and earnestness, he has broached and defended.

To the question, *What is the duty of the churches in regard to the use of fermented, i. e. alcoholic wine, in celebrating the sacrament of the Lord's Supper?*—Dr. C. replies promptly and decisively; **SUCH WINE SHOULD BE DEVOUTLY AND THOROUGHLY REJECTED.** He adds, This is the only satisfactory answer which a careful investigation of the subject presents.

In support of this decision, Dr. C. suggests the evils of alcohol, and of the artificial excitement it occasions; and the impossibility that Christ should have "authorized his disciples to remember him by drinking that which can make drunkards." He admits that the pure, unfermented juice of the grape may be lawfully employed. But having stated that this must be inaccessible to the inhabitants of many regions of the earth (indeed to the greater part of Christendom), while yet the sacramental Supper is designed to be a universal ordinance in the Church, he comes to the conclusion that wine ought to be banished, and **WATER** adopted as its substitute. For this change, he offers a variety of reasons; the production of water by the pure act of the Creator—its universal diffusion—its salutary effects on the human frame and mind—its religious uses under the ancient dispensation—its resemblance to the blessings of the Gospel—its typical import, &c. &c.

To Christians at large, this train of remark will afford little satisfaction. They will perceive in it a departure from first principles, and a path opened to the most dangerous results. Who sees not that in regard to positive divine institutions, our duty is equally plain and imperious; the duty of unqualified, implicit submission? Here, all *a priori* reasonings are out of place; all objections are palpably fallacious; and every plan, and every thought, of change, or modification, ought to be resisted with horror.

The positive institutions of Heaven are emphatically trials, both of our faith, and our obedience. They bring

home the question, whether we will submit our understandings to the divine guidance, as well as our wills to the divine pleasure. To oppose them, is to dispute infinite authority. To attempt their improvement, is to prefer our ignorance to the wisdom of Heaven. To dispense with them, or with any part of them, is to repeal the laws of the sovereign of the universe.

And are we in no danger of treating a divine ordinance with disrespect, if we press it into the service of a preconceived hypothesis, and force it to speak a favourite language of our own?—The wide-spread and fatal evils of *intemperance*, none can deny. As Christians, we are bound to wage against this giant sin, a war even of extermination. But let us look well to our weapons, and our mode of warfare. Should we, in aiming a blow at the enemy, wound Christianity itself, by corrupting, or mutilating one of its sacred institutions, our zeal would be sadly misdirected and unblest. And while religion would suffer, is it possible that the cause of temperance would be benefited?

In the Essay before us, much labour is expended to prove that the wine employed by the Saviour, in the institution of the eucharist, was *unfermented*; and hence an argument is drawn, that all wine which is fermented, must be forever banished from the celebration of the sacrament. How directly such a conclusion would have followed from such premises, had they been incontrovertibly established, we need not now enquire; for we are constrained to consider the attempt to establish them, a complete failure. That the divine interdict of *leaven*, during the celebration of the Jewish Passover, should be thought by the author to bear on the point, affects us with nothing but surprise. And what conclusion shall we draw from the Saviour's address to his disciples; *I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom*? Does it intimate that the wine they were *then* drinking, was new? Or does it not intimate, if any thing at all, the very reverse?

But let us look at the subject more directly. The vintage occurred in Palestine, in the month of June or July. Between this period, and the institution of the sacrament, there was an interval of eight or nine months. Is it not, then, highly probable that the wine employed was fermented wine? True; the Essay asserts that during this interval,

"the juice of the grapes *might doubtless* be preserved *without* fermentation." And having remarked that "it would of course be, as was most desirable, perfectly destitute of alcohol;" it adds, "The *strongest possible presumption* is therefore warranted, that *unfermented* and *spiritless* liquor was used in the institution." But we must protest against this inference. The *possibility* of a thing does not imply its *probability*; and certainly does not warrant the *strongest possible presumption* of its actual occurrence. Yet we are told afterwards; "Of the same character, *no doubt*, was the wine which, by miracle," the Saviour "created at the marriage in Cana." And here, again, we are compelled to enter our protest. We sincerely believe that the probability is strong on the contrary side; especially when we find that the wine thus miraculously furnished at the close of the feast, was declared preferable to all that preceded it; and moreover recollect the Saviour's own declaration of the *general* preference given to old wine, when compared with that which was new.

But we take our leave of these nice investigations. Their value and importance, we apprehend, are somewhat less than is often imagined. Not that we would speak disparagingly of the labour and learning which have been recently employed in interrogating the Holy Oracle on these subjects. They have their use. And what is the point to which they have conducted us? What is the lesson they teach? We think it is this; that the Scriptures, entirely explicit as they are, on all the great articles of truth and duty, have left many minor points unascertained; perhaps unascertainable. In regard to these points, our duty and wisdom obviously lie, not in boldly deciding, nor in warmly disputing, but in calmly enquiring, in judging with caution, and candidly regarding those who may think differently from ourselves. As to the question at which we have glanced, no enlightened student of the Bible will pretend to any *demonstrative* evidence that the Saviour, in instituting the sacramental Supper, employed *fermented* wine, or that he employed that which was *unfermented*. In the absence of such evidence, if we admit *only the possibility* that fermented wine was employed by Christ, it is obviously wrong to assume any ground which will necessarily involve guilt in its use. But when it is considered, how strong the *probability* is, that fermented wine was actually used by Christ, this assumption

appears truly appalling. How much is it to be regretted, then, that intelligent and pious men should, in their zeal, undertake to settle the point beyond dispute or doubt; and then proceed to erect on this imaginary basis, a system which confidently lays claim to the submission of the Church universal.

Much stress is laid, in the Essay before us, on the *impurity* of the liquid styled wine, which, at the present day, is generally used in the administration of the sacramental Supper. If, originally, the real juice of the grape, it is contaminated by an infusion of ardent spirit. In other cases, it is principally made up of the basest, perhaps the most noxious ingredients. These things, so far as they are facts, claim the serious attention and care of the churches. Surely, the death of the Saviour should be commemorated with something which has more than the mere *name* of wine; something which will not destroy, but promote the health, even, of the material frame. But we can see no force in the argument, as designed to prove the necessity, or the lawfulness of a *change* of the appointed element. In regard to this element, we admit the desirableness of as near an approach to entire purity, as is practicable. Still, if it be a fact, that to preserve it from acidity, a portion of spirit is absolutely necessary, we do not conceive that such a slight infusion can be viewed as a *disqualifying* circumstance. If, as it seems to be alleged, this would bring it under the ban of the *temperance pledge*, we are yet to learn that such an objection ought to prevail. We have no conception that any Christian, in adopting the pledge of temperance, meant to incur an obligation incompatible with his previous and paramount obligations to his Saviour. Or, could such a strange and fearful act be conceived possible, it would be a *nullity* in its very performance; and should be regarded only with the bitterness of penitential sorrow.

The Essay suggests another difficulty, arising from the case of those communicants who have been reformed from a course of intemperance, and who, by the smallest portion of alcohol, in the sacramental cup, must be, as is intimated, imminently exposed to a relapse. And distinct, and somewhat pathetic allusion is made to some awful instances of this kind, as having actually occurred. We will not deny that in the bare possibility of such an occurrence, there is something inexpressibly painful. But ought such a possi-

bility to repeal an ordinance of Christ; or materially to modify and change it? Did not the Saviour, when he first instituted it, perfectly know all its aspects and bearings, and all the infirmities and dangers of his professed followers? Are we permitted, in view of any startling calculations, or startling facts, to turn aside from his express command? Is there any path of safety for his people, but the path of duty? Can the professor whose self-denial, and whose fidelity to his Saviour, would yield to the temptation now supposed, be any thing more than a mere professor? Can the faith which would fail in such circumstances, be the faith which conquers the powers of earth and hell? We grant that for the reformed inebriate to incur, spontaneously and uncalled, the slightest temptation to a relapse, is unwise and sinful. But may he not safely follow where his Saviour leads?—May he not, in the path of duty, confidently expect divine protection?

But the most exceptionable and dangerous portion of the Essay has received, as yet, no explicit notice. It is that in which the author seems to propound the vital principle of his theory. And here, to preclude the possibility of mistake, we will quote distinctly, and somewhat largely, his own words. They are those which follow.

"The cup, [in the sacrament] of whatever it may consist, is only a *symbol*. *It need not be wine*. It need not be any liquid having the *name* of wine." "Wine—whether in reality such, or in name only—cannot be essential to the *right, edifying and acceptable* celebration of the Lord's Supper." "*Christ does not require his churches to use precisely the same kind of material substance in commemoration of his death, which he used when he instituted the commemoration.*" He "has left the *externals*—the emblems—the *symbols*—to be regulated by his people, as their circumstances and ability are found to dictate. These circumstances, he foresaw, would teach them to procure and use such articles of necessity and convenience, as their respective situations on the globe would require." "Christ gives you full liberty to make the sacramental bread of such substances, and to furnish the sacramental cup with such drink—excluding effectually and always, every kind of liquor that is capable of producing intoxication—as you, wherever situated, but moved by the love of duty, do find most conducive to your own growth in heavenly piety."

After the surprise and pain which these declarations must excite in most Christian readers shall have somewhat subsided, they will naturally enquire, How are they supported? What are the rational arguments, or the Scripture texts, on which they rest? Surely it might be expected, that the venerable writer, thus taking a stand in opposition to the sentiment and practice of the Christian world from the earliest ages to the present time, would fortify his position well. It might be expected, that while urging on the churches a procedure entirely new, and in the most sacred and affecting of all ordinances, he would plainly indicate their *warrant* for the change. Nor let it be forgotten, that this warrant must rest on something different from probability, or mere expediency, or plausible reasoning. It must be enstamped with Divine authority, or it is worthless. It must be sustained by the Holy Oracles, or it must fall.

Every such expectation, we are constrained to say, is disappointed. With deep and painful reluctance, but on full conviction, we declare that scarcely the semblance of Scripture authority, or even of sound argument, is brought to bear on this most *vital* point of the case.

On the other hand, the great and simple principles on which the Church, from the earliest ages, has rested her faith and her practice, remain perfectly unshaken, and in full force. To the intelligent Christian, these principles are familiar. Still, a moment may not be unprofitably employed in bringing them distinctly to view.

The ordinances of the gospel are the appointments of Christ. The materials or emblems which they embrace, are of his selection, and of his prescription. As they bear the stamp, not less of his wisdom, than of his authority, they have a peculiar and pre-eminent adaptation to the ends designed; and were doubtless selected and prescribed for that reason. They are therefore fixed and unalterable. These observations apply, in all their force, to the water in the sacrament of Baptism; and with equal force, to the bread and the wine, in the Lord's Supper. The particular species of bread, or of wine is not prescribed; and, of course, is not essential. But bread and wine are both enjoined, and equally enjoined. They are therefore both, and equally, essential to the regular and approved celebration of the ordinance.

We are aware of the suggestion which has been repeatedly offered, that our Saviour, in instituting the Supper,

simply availed himself of the materials which were at hand; that no selection or preference was implied in the case; and that he might have prescribed other materials and modes of celebrating his death, equally impressive and affecting. These are conjectures sufficiently adventurous. Of their probability or improbability, let the intelligent and tender-hearted Christian judge. It is a relief, and a pleasure, to state, that some by whom they have been favoured, have, on reflection, ingenuously abandoned them.

Many good men, and many great divines, have believed that the sacramental bread and wine were designed to speak to the Christian's heart of his Saviour; and of the life-giving, strengthening, and refreshing virtues of his dying love. A pious imagination may have sometimes wandered too far in this delightful field. But is this a sufficient reason why it should never be entered? If it be probable, if it be barely possible, that such designs as those we have mentioned, are attached to the sacramental emblems, must not this thought unspeakably endear them to every pious mind? Is it possible that any Christian, viewing them in this light, could ever consent to part with them, or with either of them?

But we have more than conjectures and probabilities. We have certainty. We know that both in the New Testament, and the Old, the blessings of salvation are exhibited under the emblem of bread; and Christ is that heavenly bread. Hence, partaking of the bread in the sacramental Supper, Christians derive spiritual life, support, and nourishment, from their crucified Saviour. We know that in the language of prophecy, *wine* is employed to represent the blessings of the gospel. And in the Supper, wine is the appointed and appropriate emblem of the blood of Christ, that precious, exhaustless fountain of all spiritual and immortal blessings. "This cup," said the Redeemer to his disciples, "is my blood of the new testament—is the new testament in my blood. Drink ye all of it." After this, shall Christians be perplexed and chilled with the intimation that wine is no essential ingredient of the sacred feast; and that something else may be equally significant and useful? Shall they turn away from the appointment of their Saviour, to an invention of their own? Has the Most High sanctioned one species of observance by his *authority*, and when that is neglected or abandoned, will he sanction a different one by his *blessing*?

On the whole, we cannot but think that the point is settled, so far as the Scripture can settle any point. THE USE OF WINE IN THE LORD'S SUPPER IS EXPRESSLY ENJOINED BY CHRIST, AND MAY NOT BE ABANDONED BY CHRISTIANS. Having arrived at this conclusion, we can scarcely think it incumbent on us to specify and refute every objection which may be thought to lie against it. Sad indeed would be the condition of the Christian world, if no article of truth or duty could be considered as ascertained and fixed, until completely divested of all difficulty. Of what value, of what conceivable weight, are the most plausible objections of human ingenuity, or even of mistaken piety, on the one side, if we see, on the other, a distinct expression of the authority and will of God?

Still, in the present case, we would be perfectly willing, did time and space permit, to consider and discuss the principal objections which have been raised. Nor will we, confined as we are, refuse them a passing notice. We are confident that their force is rather imaginary than real.

Is it, for instance, objected, that on the same ground on which we insist on following the first disciples in the use of wine, at the first Supper, we must extend the imitation to the very kind of wine employed; to their recumbent posture; to the very hour of their celebration; and even to the "large upper room" in which they were assembled? The reply is obvious. If the particulars mentioned are embraced in the Saviour's command relative to the ordinance, the objection is pertinent and valid. But the fact is precisely the reverse. Respecting these particulars, there is not the shadow of an injunction. But the command to "eat of this bread," and "drink of this cup," ("the fruit of the vine,") is explicit and conclusive. It follows that the former were the mere *circumstances* of the celebration. The latter relates, so far as externals are concerned, to its *essence*.

It is objected, that the gospel and its ordinances are designed for all nations, and will be speedily extended to them all; but that the celebration of the Lord's Supper in the use of *wine* must be, to many of the human family, an absolute impossibility. But extreme cases of this kind, we apprehend, will rarely be perceived to exist. Ordinarily, where Christian missionaries find their way, ships, commerce, and the productions of various climes, are likewise found. Through the modern improvements in science and art, and the won-

derfully increased facilities of communication, almost every part of the globe comes into contact with almost every other part; and the interchange of commodities between the various nations becomes practicable and easy. We believe the era is approaching, when every spot of our globe will be illuminated with the heavenly light of the gospel; nor can we easily doubt that the favoured inhabitants will possess the appropriate means of celebrating its ordinances.

In the Essay before us, the author points us to the intemperance of multitudes in Christian nations, as a grand impediment to the conversion of Mahometans and Pagans. Doubtless there is too much truth in the representation. Nor can the fact be sufficiently lamented. It calls aloud on the Christian world to purify itself from this dire abomination. But upon what principle it should require or permit the Christian *church* to change an ordinance prescribed by its Redeemer and its Head, it is difficult to discover. In the heathen cities, generally, where the gospel was originally planted, and Christian churches were erected, there was an awful prevalence of vice; especially the vice of intemperance. Yet, surrounded as they were with scenes of riot, and the devotees of Bacchus, these churches celebrated their Redeemer's death by eating bread and drinking wine. Nor did it occur to them, nor to the Apostles under whose direction they acted, that they were laying snares for the souls of men, or obstructing the conversion of the heathen. In one of these churches, the ordinance was awfully prostituted; and the sacred wine itself became an occasion of riot and excess. These signal abuses excited the indignation of the apostle Paul, and drew from him the sharpest reproofs of the guilty offenders. But it does not appear, that this distinguished man sought the remedy for the evil in the banishment of wine from the communion table. Let us not assume to be wiser than he. Rather let us not assume to be wiser than the Redeemer himself, who, perfectly knowing the nature of man, and the nature and tendencies of things, has, in the wisest and best manner, adapted his gospel and his ordinances to the promotion of the holiness of his church, and the conversion and salvation of the world.

The only remaining objection at which we shall glance, is that which pervades the whole Essay, and is drawn from the *pernicious effects* of the use of fermented wine in the sacramental Supper. The fact assumed is, that such use,

in whatever proportion, tends to an excitement which is at once the *counterfeit* of religious affection, and its *opposite*; and absolutely incompatible with all spiritual edification and enjoyment. From many expressions, one would conclude it to be the author's opinion, that this is the grand evil in the Christian church; the source of delusion and ruin to multitudes of professors; the scandal and stumbling-block of an ungodly world. In the fervour of his zeal, he seems to brand every cup thus furnished, as the "cup of devils," and worthy only to be indignantly rejected. These representations will be grievous to many Christians, and gratifying to many infidels and scorners. While we doubt not the sincerity with which they were uttered, we cannot but consider them as overstrained and erroneous. Can it be that the Christians of this and other lands are placed in so awful a dilemma, that they must either dishonour their Saviour by abandoning his table, or sin against him in attending it? Have they, in what they have thought their holiest duties, and nearest approaches to God, been insensibly accumulating offence and provocation? Have their best frames been mere hallucinations—the result of animal excitement? Has a little impurity in the sacramental cup polluted their services, and brought a curse upon their souls?—For our part, we cannot but avow very different apprehensions of things. We cannot but suspect that the evils alleged have been greatly multiplied and aggravated, if they have not been absolutely created, by the excited imaginations of our worthy brethren. We have no idea that a little alcohol, finding its way, and often by absolute necessity, into the sacramental wine, has converted it into a moral poison. We cannot believe that a little taste of such wine once in one, two, or three months, has turned our professors into inebriates, or is likely to do it. Nor can we believe that the *fates of the Church* depend on a revolution in this point. We see in the churches other evils, truly great and portentous—sad declensions from the truth—fatal conformities to the spirit and maxims of the world—awful irregularities of life; and we are grieved that that pious zeal should be needlessly and fruitlessly expended elsewhere, all whose energies are imperiously demanded here.

We have thus recorded our views of the main points embraced in the Essay, with an explicitness and freedom

which are demanded by the nature and importance of the subject ; and, we trust, not without the deference and tenderness which are due to the character of the author, and his high standing in the Christian church. Could we believe that in our discussion, there is a single word calculated to affect injuriously the feelings or the reputation of our venerable friend, we would wish that word blotted from our pages, and blotted from the memories of our readers. We readily admit that some points have been laboured at greater length, and perhaps with more earnestness, than would have been thought needful, had we been engaged with a writer of inferior consideration.

In closing our remarks, we must repeat the expression of our deep regret that this subject should, at this time, be agitating our American churches. That an ordinance calculated to awaken the tenderest sensibilities of the Christian heart, to dispel every element of discord, and to diffuse through the Church universal, the tranquillity and peace of heaven, should become a source of bitterness, and an instrument of angry debate, is inexpressibly deplorable. Surely, the previously existing condition of our religious community was not such as to present an imperious demand for a new topic of contention. And where is this ominous contest to find its termination ? Shall it be permitted to convulse the Church to its centre ? Shall religion herself bleed with a thousand wounds, inflicted in her own temple, and by the hands of her professed friends ?

These collisions in the Church exert a most inauspicious influence on the general mind. All reflecting men, whose religious principles began to be formed and fixed, find themselves shaken from their faith, and cast on an ocean of doubt and universal scepticism. Others, inclined to infidelity before, have these fatal tendencies strengthened, and thrown to an immeasurable distance from all sober and sound belief. Multitudes in the community, observing the ever varying principles, and ever varying practices of professed Christians, conclude that there is nothing definite, nothing ascertained, in Christianity itself. In short, if the public mind is obviously unhinged ; if every principle in religion, and in morals, is boldly questioned, or boldly denied ; if infidelity and practical licentiousness sweep over the land like a flood, and threaten to destroy all that is precious and sacred in our

country, is there not a *cause*? And may not that cause be found in the vacillations, the disputes and divisions within the Church?

The recent attempts to banish wine from the sacramental Supper are professedly grounded in attachment to the temperance reformation, and are part of a plan for securing to that reformation a complete and universal triumph. Will this plan, pursued by such instrumentalities, be successful? We think not. Will the great body of Christians in our country *wish* it success? We think not. They will entreat their brethren whom they see lending their aid, with upright intentions, to such a cause—meekly, but earnestly and unweariedly entreat them—to desist. As to all beside, who, under whatever pretext, are corrupting or mutilating an ordinance of God, they may very justly be addressed in the warning furnished by the great Roman poet—

Procul O, procul este profani.

ART. VII. REVIEW OF FINNEY'S LECTURES.

Lectures on Revivals of Religion. By Charles G. Finney. New-York: Leavitt, Lord & Co. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 18mo. pp. 438.

THE author of these Lectures, upon the merits of which we have undertaken to give an opinion, performed, for many years, the arduous work of an evangelist. With a reputation for eloquence, and a popularity which would have exerted a ruinous influence on many minds, he has nevertheless maintained an unblemished character. Possessed of a comprehensive and vigorous intellect, and being kept in contact, by his work, with the popular mind at all points, he often reasons forcibly, and just so as to bring conviction to the common understanding. A humane, and we would hope, truly benevolent desire to save sinners, has taught him, though without a regular education, and without models, that true eloquence which aims to convince and persuade. Indeed, he has formed himself upon nature, on which the first and best models themselves were formed. We see here

no ambitious display of ornament, no unnatural attempts to excite the feelings, no ill-timed appeals to the imagination. He speaks like a man in earnest on important business,—and so far like a true orator. An important subject deeply felt, communicates no small degree of eloquence even to the most phlegmatic: what then shall we expect from the Christian, by whom things eternal are almost realized through faith? what of the Christian minister, who has made himself accountable for souls, invested himself with a responsibility which no reason can measure? Is not want of eloquence in him at once a defect of piety, of sensibility, and even of sincerity? By a cold, inanimate manner, does he not tell more plainly than words or reasoning could declare it, either that his subject is unimportant, or he himself in jest? We cannot but be of opinion that eloquence, in the minister of the gospel, is a moral, rather than a literary qualification;—that the gaudy, tumid, frothy eloquence too common, offends against more sacred rules than those of a just rhetoric;—that a simple, direct, and affecting style of address, is that which a pious heart, not less than a correct taste, would dictate.

The author of these Lectures reasons much; but his reasoning is mostly addressed to the conscience and the heart; he is seldom purely instructive; he ever aims at the persuasive. He rarely attempts to discuss abstract propositions in mental philosophy, or metaphysical theology. For such discussions neither his education nor his habits have qualified him. And such reasoning belongs not to the sacred desk. Where it conveys any idea, it is as often misapprehended as understood. Mr. Finney reasons to establish the most interesting and important positions, to show the sinner the unreasonableness of his objections, the madness of his delays, the folly and wickedness of his excuses,—to drive him from every refuge, and lead him to resolve upon an immediate reformation of his life.

This work claims to be little more than a full skeleton of the author's lectures; it will not, however, suffer much by a comparison with his other discourses, which have just issued from the press: it makes no pretensions, indeed, to literary merit, but contains many passages of very forcible popular eloquence. We make some quotations from his Lecture on "Means to be used with Sinners," which we esteem by far the most happy of his productions. Speaking

of the testimony which Christians owe to the truth of the gospel, he says :

"They should live in their daily walk and conversation as if they believed the soul to be immortal, and as if they believed that death was not the termination of their existence, but the entrance into an unchanging state. They ought to live so as to make this impression fall upon all around them. It is easy to see, that precept without example, on this point, will do no good. All the arguments in the world will not convince men that you really believe this, unless you live as if you believed it. Your reasoning may be unanswerable, but if you do not live accordingly, your practice will defeat your arguments. They will say you are an ingenious sophist or an acute reasoner, and perhaps admit that they cannot answer you ; but then they will say, it is evident that your reasoning is all false, and that you know it to be false, because your life contradicts your theory. Or that if it is true, you don't believe it, at any rate. And so all the influence of your testimony goes to the other side." "You are to bear testimony to the vanity and unsatisfying nature of the things of this world. You are to testify this by your life. The failure in this, is the great stumbling-block in the way of mankind. Here the testimony of God's children is needed more than any where else. Men are so struck with the objects of sense, and so constantly occupied with them, that they are very apt to shut out eternity from their minds. A small object that is held close to the eye may shut out the distant ocean. So the things of the world, that are near, magnify so in their minds, that they overlook every thing else. One important design in keeping Christians in the world, is to teach people on this point, practically, not to labour for the meat that perisheth. But suppose professors of religion teach the vanity of earthly things by precept, and contradict it in practice. Suppose the women are just as fond of dress, and just as particular in observing all the fashions, and the men as eager to have fine houses and equipage as the people of the world. Who does not see that it would be quite ridiculous for them to testify, with their lips, that this world is all vanity, and its joys unsatisfactory and empty. People feel this absurdity, and it is this that shuts up the lips of Christians. We see why it is that preaching does so little good. If the church were to live only one week as if they believed the Bible, sinners would melt down before them. Suppose I were a lawyer, and should go into court and spread out my client's case, the issue is joined, and I make my statements, and tell what I expect to prove, and then call in my witnesses. The first witness takes his oath, and then rises up, and contradicts me to my face. What good will all my pleading do ? Just so it is with a minister, who is preaching in the midst of a cold, stupid, and God-dishonouring church. In vain does he hold up to view, the great truths of religion, when every member of the church is ready to swear he lies."

Cicero has told us, that it is the opinions of the common people, and not of the learned, the refined, or philosophical, that are to be regarded in forming our estimate of the public speaker. It is the popular mind that he addresses : he endeavours to move and mould it to his will ; and his power is best known and estimated, by those on whom it is exerted. These Lectures contain many striking thoughts, many valuable observations, the result of good sense and a long acquaintance with mankind ; but it is the perspicuous, nervous, and simple style, the warm and earnest manner, less removed, indeed, from colloquial familiarity, than didactic stiffness, which, in our estimation, constitutes their principal value. The speaker always addresses himself directly to

his audience : he reasons, indeed, sometimes forcibly, sometimes plausibly, sometimes sophistically ; but it is *with his hearers* : he always aims at producing some effect, and never rests satisfied till it is accomplished.

This work gives us a far higher opinion of Mr. Finney's skill as an orator, than of his ability as a writer. We have observed, that Cicero makes the influence of the speaker over the popular mind, a test of his power. These Lectures, regarded only as possessing a tendency to produce the immediate effects on a promiscuous assembly at which the speaker aimed, must hold a very different rank from what they would, viewed merely as a literary work. The practical orator, especially the demagogue, accustomed by long habit to play on the popular mind, and call forth what notes he pleases, acquires a habit—a tact which enables him instantly to adapt means to an end, as if by a delicate instinct, and to gain a point by sophistry or artifice, which others would lose by sound argument.

But while we heartily commend the higher points of Mr. Finney's style, we regret to see the very frequent appearance of a studied vulgarity, which really sinks his subject, counteracts the impressions it should make, and is alike unbecoming in the orator, and indecent in the preacher. However this might serve the temporary aims of the demagogue, it must destroy, or seriously impair, the influence of a preacher on an audience possessing any considerable degree of moral or intellectual culture. To elegance of language, we did not expect him to be partial ; but we are sorry to see him give his sanction to the opinion, that affected coarseness will give cogency to argument, or that it is innocent to gratify the passions of those who delight to see truth degraded by the meanness of the dress in which she is presented. Our remarks may be illustrated by a few quotations. Speaking of long prayers, he says, "and no doubt God wishes they would leave off, too." "God won't believe it." The following, with the coarseness contains too much of the artifice of the demagogue. While he puts the excuse into the mouth of an anxious enquirer, he endeavours also to put the absurdity it contains, into the mouths of his opponents. "I was distressed because I thought God required ME to repent, but if HE will do it, *I can wait*." He was afraid "the devil would drive him away from his people, and by undertaking to satisfy the devil, he offended God." He undertook "to

go between God and the devil, and God spewed him out." It seems to be a part of his system, that Christians are always asleep except in revivals, and very often then ; that the natural and habitual state of the church has always been that of sleep. Speaking of the millenium, he says, "the church will not sleep the greater part of the time, and once in a great while wake up, and rub their eyes, and bluster about, and vociferate a little while, and then go to sleep again." We do not feel bound to reconcile such language with the rules of good composition, or with that reverence which the Christian ever aims to cherish, while thinking or speaking on such solemn subjects, especially where the Supreme Being is mentioned. We are sure such language would shock every mind, which retains even a common respect for religion. We cannot think that language which is banished from the parlour, and is not tolerated in good society, can forward the legitimate aims of the pulpit. After all, we think that the literary merit, which this work disclaims, is almost the only one that is justly due to it.

In examining this work theologically, we wish we could pass as high encomiums on the matter of the work, as we are persuaded, are justly due to the genius of its author. He will pardon us, we hope, if we are constrained to express a far higher opinion of his talents, than of his discoveries. While his eloquence, his character, his reputation, acquired by unwearied labours, and great apparent success, are lending their influence to give admission and currency to views of religious institutions, doctrine, and practice, at once unscriptural, dangerous, and licentious, we feel it our duty to put the public on their guard against what comes so strongly recommended and ably supported.

The contempt for the wisdom, the opinions, and the institutions of past ages, so prevalent and so fashionable in the present, is no argument, either of its learning, its sagacity, or modesty. This has been styled emphatically *the age of improvement* ; it is certainly an age of *change*. If such be the constitution of the human mind, that heretofore it has originated only error ;—if human wisdom has planned only institutions foolish, impolitic, and unjust ;—if it has been reserved for this age to convict all the preceding of folly, error, and ignorance ; we wish only that they may have a fair trial, and we are prepared to acquiesce in their condemnation. We shall hail, with enthusiasm, those glorious

truths, which are to take the place of ancient errors. But as to that spirit which considers it as a sufficient objection to an opinion, that it is ancient, that is, that it has endured the scrutiny, and received the approbation of the wise and good of all ages;—that spirit which rejects a doctrine merely because it is said to be the growth of dark and barbarous times, that is, that it had not, like ourselves, the good fortune to be brought forth in an era of light; that spirit which condemns received opinions and established usages unheard, and leaves their place unsupplied; that spirit whose great object is to demolish;—we have no hesitation in predicting, that as it originates in a reckless pride, it will terminate in a licentious scepticism.

Many seem to suppose, because the present age has demolished some false theories by experimental facts, that it can overturn the most settled opinions, the clearest results of reason, by a bold denial; that because it has extended the boundaries of some of the sciences by its discoveries, it can overstep the fixed limits of common sense, by its moral improvements. We regret to see many of the unsuspecting lending their aid to those who are deliberately and recklessly endeavouring to unsettle human opinion, on the most important subjects. If the human mind has hitherto been unable to discriminate truth from falsehood, what better hope remains for the future? Has the present age also added new powers to the intellect? If not, does it not follow that it is more rational to distrust our faculties than our opinions?

The insidious methods by which many are attempting to overthrow established opinions, agree very well with the spirit which dictates the attack. An artful, insidious, and specious eloquence, which consults the tastes, the inclinations and opinions of the community, is too much cultivated. Error is not pushed forward in a bold and shameless manner; naked, it would be sure to be known and detested. No. It is most modestly veiled and disguised. It is introduced as having a close connexion with important truth. Truth itself is made to introduce error, and they are so artfully blended, that ordinary minds know not where to make the separation. Indeed, one would suspect that by long practice in mixing truth and falsehood, these writers had at last hit upon some proportions at which they combine.

But, if the great mass of human opinions which have received the sanction of past ages, are yet to be examined, and may prove errors;—if, until this age have brought in its verdict, an individual must either himself undertake to revise the decisions of former centuries, or settle down into a gloomy scepticism; there is one class of truths,—the decisions of an omniscient and immutable God, which are above suspicion. Those doctrines, upon which depend our well-being here and hereafter, can be questioned or suspected, only by dishonesty and impiety. If the Bible be the word of God, its doctrines must be immutable as their Author. It is folly to expect that any new light, long latent, is yet to spring from Revelation;—absurdity to suppose that Revelation will contradict itself. Are we to be told, that the great evangelical doctrines of the fall of man, the atonement of Christ, the corruption of human nature, its renovation and sanctification by grace,—that these truths, in which the church has always been almost unanimous, are still to be questioned? Are we to suppose that the Bible still contains truths more important concealed in its pages; above all, that it may contradict these? If it be a book so obscurely written, that the great body of honest readers have always misunderstood it, or drawn from it the greatest possible errors, it is not only a falsehood, but a contradiction, to call it a Divine Revelation. If it be true, that the truths of the gospel can expect no new light from Revelation, much less should any be wished or expected from the efforts of human reason. Revelation was given as a remedy for the ignorance, the darkness, the errors, and the weakness of human reason; and it can hardly be expected, that reason is to remedy any fancied defects of Revelation. While reason is instructed by the Author of reason, the Source of all intelligence, it is her duty to be silent;—to listen, but be silent. God has imparted all the light which his infinite wisdom saw necessary, and we display only folly, in our attempts to be wise above what is written.

Whenever philosophy has presumed to meddle with the truths of Revelation, it has either distorted, perverted, corrupted, or denied them. Particularly have we reason to dread that science, lately dignified with the title of *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, and which has been supposed to have a very close connexion with Theology. It is with regret that we see Theology condescend to borrow assistance

from a science inaccurate in its definitions, unsatisfactory in its reasonings, contradictory in its conclusions, licentious in its influence, and of all others the most arrogant in its pretensions. We cannot but look with some suspicion on a science which has absurdly attacked almost every ultimate truth which must be the foundation even of her own conclusions,—which has attempted to bring into suspicion those axioms from which reason must make all her deductions,—and which has denied the existence both of the material world, and of that very mind which is the object of her inquiries.

We are disposed to concede to her, what we believe is the highest praise her warmest advocates have claimed for her: she has *retracted* the errors she herself had advanced,—*disprove* them she could not. They were *absurdities*, incapable alike of *proof* or *refutation*. We wish she could as readily repair her *mischiefs*, as *recant her errors*. When God had revealed himself in his Word with such evidence as to leave incredulity without excuse; when civilized man had questioned nature in ten thousand ways, and she had returned an unvarying answer, "there is a God of infinite goodness, wisdom, and power," Philosophy dared to lift an impious voice both against nature, and nature's God. That philosophy, whose only business is to *state in words*, what the *most vulgar mind* constantly *feels*, dared to set aside the evidence which had commanded the assent of all ages,—of evidence which might, at all times, be tested by the senses, or confirmed by the rigorous conclusions of a science which rests solely on demonstration. The pretensions of this science, the fame of its supporters, aided by the general corruption of manners, spread atheism through the most polished nation of Europe; led civilized, refined, and enlightened society, to cast off the restraints of conscience, and placed them in a state of warfare against both Revelation and the moral principles of their own nature. Now, in a science where the grossest and most licentious errors have been introduced by the greatest geniuses, the most elegant and even accurate reasoners that the world has ever seen; where exactness of definition is scarcely attainable, and then intelligible only by long habits of abstraction; where error is almost sure to escape detection; where a whole life has been spent in refuting propositions, at which the most illiterate would laugh, could he understand them;—

we think the conclusions are deserving of much suspicion. Let its authority be established in its own province before it ventures to invade the territories of Theology. Its worst errors have arisen from quitting its proper sphere; from presumptuously attempting to pass those bounds which Infinite Wisdom, by limiting the powers, has been pleased to prescribe to the researches of reason. Nothing is more certain, than that it has no right to revise the truths which have emanated from Truth itself. The word of an unchangeable God is certainly a sufficient warrant for belief; and he who receives His truths simply because they are approved by reason, is still an infidel. Can this philosophy add evidence or authority to the declarations of God? Can it add perspicuity to that system of truth, which comes from the pen of inspiration, and is proposed, not to be the subject of speculation, but simply to command our belief and controul our practice?

The peculiarities of a system of divinity, long popular in New England, were built on that scheme of philosophy, which makes the mind a series of perceptions and emotions, leaving no room for personal identity or accountability. A very bold philosophy is still applied to the subject of moral agency. We feel ashamed to see Christianity descend to borrow aid from a philosophy which has waged a persevering warfare against common sense. It is at once *presumption* and *rebellion* to attempt to pass the bounds which a merciful God has prescribed both to *reason* and *Revelation*: above all, it is folly to suppose that the most dark and uncertain of all sciences is to throw additional light on the pages of Inspiration. Philosophy, it seems, must throw light on the subject of moral agency! that is, it yet remains to be proved that man is an accountable being! The testimony of conscience is to be set aside, as insufficient. The Bible has told us, that the law of God is still in full force; and those who will not believe either *conscience* or the *Bible*, may be expected to pay but little regard to *philosophy*. No reasoning, however, can prove, what conscience alone can teach, that we are accountable beings! Let the law of God be explained and enforced in all the spirituality and extent of its demands, and conscience, though obscured by the fall, darkened by the sophistry of a corrupt heart, and blunted by sin, will still acknowledge most of its claims;—enlightened by the Holy Spirit, the whole.

The author of these Lectures, in a late series of sermons, has advanced a novel doctrine, the influence of which is manifested throughout the work before us, and really gives to it its distinguishing character. We shall therefore take some notice of the discovery, drawing it from the first sermon of the series, where it is fully stated and defended. Mr. Finney tells us, that "for many centuries but little of the real gospel has been preached;" he accuses those great doctrines, in which the Fathers, the Reformers, and the whole church have been almost unanimous, of "leading down colonies to hell;" "delaying the conversion of the world;" "making God an infinite tyrant," "and destroying man's accountability." He does not seriously attempt to prove that these doctrines are *unscriptural*, but only *unphilosophical*. The Reformers and Fathers, it seems, had erroneous views of mental philosophy, and a light has now beamed forth from the *science of the mind*, which is to change the face of the world.

It seems *almost a contradiction*, that the whole Christian church, for many centuries, has been guilty of heresy; and *surprising*, that they should be convicted, by a single individual, in whom at last orthodoxy reappears. We were a little surprised, that this grand Reformer did not avail himself of the authority of Scripture, to convict the church of her errors; but mental philosophy, it seems, was sufficient. We are surprised, that he has not accounted for the ambiguity of Scripture, which has misled the lovers of truth and holiness, in all past ages. Their fundamental error, from which, he assures us, the others necessarily result, consisted in believing in the *corruption of human nature*. They believed in the existence of what they figuratively termed the *heart*, literally the *will*,—that this is the seat of a disease whose only remedy is regeneration and sanctification. This *heart* or *will* in which they believed, our author frankly assures us, so far from being diseased, does not even exist, and that regeneration is nothing but successful persuasion. He condescends then to tell us what meaning we may apply to the term *heart*. This DEFINITION is the BASIS of all his reasonings. It is THIS that is to remove all the errors of the church. Were the Fathers and the Reformers of the church still alive, with what joy would they listen to this definition! Ye holy men, rich in faith, gifted with genius, skilled in the languages of the Bible, whose lives were divided between

the interpretation and preaching of the word of God, rejoice! A light is to beam forth from *philosophy*, and dispel the licentious errors, which you have drawn from the *Scriptures*! Let us listen to his definition, (Ser. 1, p. 6,) "*The spiritual heart is the fountain of spiritual life; is that deep-seated, but voluntary preference of the mind, which lies back of all its other voluntary affections and emotions, and from which they take their character.*" This preference, it must be kept in mind, is not involuntary or forced; no, it is altogether a *voluntary* preference. This foe to any thing which he can represent as *physical* in the mind, informs us that it is *deep-seated*. He has given us the geography of it; "it lies back of all the other voluntary affections and emotions, and from this they take their character." The advocates of orthodoxy had supposed, in opposition to this reformer, that there were in the mind moral and intellectual susceptibilities or powers, but that emotions, and what he calls *affections*, are but momentary mental states or acts. They had not been aware, that these last have a *permanent existence* in the mind; and a *place* in front of the voluntary preference. We had supposed too that the character of voluntary affections and emotions, depends on their *nature*, and not upon the *fact*, that the voluntary preference lies behind them, *giving* them a character, *making* the same things, which have *no character of themselves*, sometimes of *one character*, and sometimes *the opposite*.

Mr. Finney cannot, by this voluntary preference, mean the faculty of the will, of which volition or preference is merely the act. This is the doctrine which he is opposing, and we would not suspect so shrewd a reasoner to contradict himself. Preference, if it mean any thing, is an act of the mind. It is this act, which the sinner is bound to change. Is it a past act? It is too late to change it. Is it a future act? It is too soon; for it has, as yet, no existence. Is it a present act? It must be. Yes, the sinner is bound, by the same act, not only to exercise voluntary preference, but to change voluntary preference.

To exercise voluntary preference, then, and to change voluntary preference, must be the same act. There can be, from the nature of things, no act of changing it distinct from exercising it. The *heart* and the *act of changing it*, are the same thing. To require a man, then, to change his heart

or preference, according to our author's definition, is to require not only what is *impossible*, but what is *inconceivable*.

We afterwards gather from his reasoning, that he does not mean that the sinner *literally* changes his *heart* or *preference* at all. For once he gives to his text the generally received interpretation. He acknowledges that by one volition we cannot directly call another into being; indeed, we should think it strange, if a person should prefer a different and opposite preference. He means, we at last find, only that the sinner must prefer exactly contrary from what he does prefer. This, he tells us he is *ABLE* to do, and the only difficulty is, he is *NOT WILLING*. Motives must be *forced* upon his mind; his *great disease* being in reality a *wilful want of consideration*. This he tells us, (page 23,) "*is not merely the cause of sin, but sin itself.*" Sin is thus boldly and openly accused of being the cause of itself—the sinner, one would suppose, might now, according to the author, be acquitted.

We have heard his definition. Shall we apply to it so grave a name as *heresy*? We think it deserves no harsher term than *absurdity*. Is this the doctrine that is destined to change the face of the world? Yes, we must adopt this Pelagian view of man's heart, because the orthodox views of a depraved heart, which needs regeneration, he tells us, make God an infinite tyrant, people hell with colonies of sinners, and destroy the sinner's accountability! Formerly it was thought that God creates man with a heart which *He* alone can change. New divinity has taught us that God creates man without a heart; that the sinner must *make his own heart out of nothing, and that the sinner alone can change it*. Strange that the sinner, left perfectly *independent*, having it at his *option* to make what heart he *pleases*, should *uniformly* prefer to make a *bad one*!

Having ventured some remarks on the consistency of the author's definition of heart, we still feel it a duty to take some notice of the *inaccuracy* of this definition,—an inaccuracy, which pervades all his attempts at metaphysical discussion, and leaves him at liberty, with tolerable logical exactness in deduction, to establish almost any conclusion which may suit his caprice or convenience. These remarks are offered merely to show how little confidence can be placed on reasoning where definitions are so inaccurate:

not to disprove the existence of such a heart as he has defined,—something incapable of proof or refutation. With regard to mental phenomena, the appeal must at last be made to every individual's consciousness; and if any man shall be found who lays claim to such a heart, we should think it useless to contradict him. The epithet *voluntary*, applied to preference, is strictly tautological; yet it has an influence on the subsequent reasonings. The term *preference*, has reference to those great moral opposites, *sin* and *holiness*, *God* and the *world*; and a change in this preference, constitutes a change of heart. The term *preference*, applied to these objects, is certainly unfortunate, since it implies that both holiness and sin may be loved, and one, on the whole, be preferred. But these objects, from their very nature, are opposites: if one be loved, the other must be hated. The author assures us, that the sinner, so far from deigning to weigh, will not even consider the opposite class of motives: but if, as he assures us, it be true that the sinner constantly exercises preference, that term implies that both classes are constantly before the mind, of which the one is chosen and the other rejected. Besides, should the sinner succeed in banishing a certain class of objects from his mind, motives to holiness, or a change of heart, are necessarily before him at all times. If he banish God from his thoughts, the world is still before him, which excites his love, but should call forth his hatred; sin is before him, and viewed with love instead of aversion. Moral objects cannot be banished from his mind, and they will call forth holy or sinful feelings.

Aside from making the heart a mental operation, (preference is certainly nothing more,)—something which has a *momentary existence*, and not *permanently belonging* to the mind,—we have a mental act, and no object of that act; preference, and nothing preferred. Can preference exist and have no object? exist where nothing is chosen, and nothing rejected? Does preference, in the abstract, constitute a human heart? If this cannot be, then it only remains, that it be preference for either holiness or sin; and we can see no great difference between that preference for holiness or sin, which he acknowledges, and the taste for holiness or sin, which he imputes to his opponents.

Preference, which he says constitutes the human heart, must, from its definition, mean an act of the mind. But he

uses the singular number: does he mean that there is but one act of the mind, as there is but one heart? Is it a permanent act? how then can the sinner be required to change it? From his using the abstract term *preference* in the singular number, we have no doubt, but the writer had some obscure idea of such a faculty as the human will; and that it was this which he was attempting to describe, while professing to deny its existence. Neither nature nor language will permit a novice in intellectual philosophy, to contradict the principles of his own constitution, without, at the same time, contradicting himself. Here, however, the proposition is obscurely affirmed, in what was meant for its denial.

Our author assures us that philosophy has now become so far perfected, that men can correctly interpret the Bible. The Reformers, he tells us, "were continually interpreting the Word of God according to the systems of mental philosophy, that then prevailed; consequently, the gospel had not yet its primitive effect;" they "introduced into it embarrassments and contradiction, mystery and absurdity." Did these holy men make the Scriptures bend to philosophy? make philosophy their standard, and use Scripture only to authorize the vain speculations of a presumptuous reason? The imputation is bold, uncharitable, and false. The gospel, as taught by the Reformers, is the same as that which is now received by all evangelical denominations, and none but the boldest and most hardened of its enemies have ventured to call it, a "mixture of contradictions and embarrassments, of mystery and absurdity."

The new philosophy of Mr. Finney, which is so speedily to change the face of the world, had been invented and propagated centuries before by Pelagius. The church, however, and the Reformers, still retained a belief in the corruption of human nature, and its need of regeneration; they regarded neither the arguments nor objections of philosophy; but believed the Bible a sufficient authority for all the doctrines which an honest, prayerful, and learned interpretation, should draw from its pages. We have no doubt that the discovery just named is original with Mr. Finney, though not new to the church. His time and talents have been, we regret to say, in a great measure, wasted in the invention of an old heresy, which might have been found in the most common abridgements of Ecclesiastical History, ready made to his hands.

A quotation from Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, followed by some extracts from Mr. Finney's Sermons, will show that we have here only a new discovery of an old error. "The authors of this heresy were Pelagius and Cœlestius, both monks; the former a Briton, and the latter a native of Ireland. They lived at Rome in the *greatest reputation*, and were *universally esteemed on account of their extraordinary virtue and piety*. These monks looked upon the doctrines which were commonly received concerning the *original corruption of human nature*, and the *necessity of divine grace to enlighten the understanding and purify the heart*, as prejudicial to the progress of holiness and virtue; and tending to lull mankind in a presumptuous and fatal security. They maintained that these doctrines were as false as they were pernicious; that the sins of our first parents were imputed to them alone, and not to their posterity; *that we derive no corruption from the fall*; but are born as *pure and unspotted as Adam came out of the hands of his Creator*; that mankind are therefore *capable of repentance and amendment*, and of arriving to the highest degrees of piety and virtue *by the use of their natural faculties and powers*; that, indeed, external grace is necessary *to excite their endeavours*, but that they have no need of the *internal succours of the Divine Spirit*."

Pelagius denied the commonly received doctrine of the original corruption of human nature, and the necessity of divine grace to enlighten the understanding and purify the heart. What less does Mr. Finney? He says, (Serm. 3, page 11,) "For if the nature itself be depraved, then regeneration must be physical." That purification of the heart which the church has always believed to be necessary, in consequence of the corruption of our nature, he brands with the epithet of physical regeneration; and tells us that this, together with the kindred doctrine, which he styles physical depravity, makes God an infinite tyrant, and absolves man from his allegiance. Pelagius too maintained that these doctrines were pernicious, and as false as they were pernicious. Mr. Finney, without deigning to explain, or explain away, one of the numerous passages which have satisfied the whole church, that the Bible teaches these doctrines, thinks it sufficient if he can prove them unphilosophical. Pelagius taught, that we derive no corruption from the Fall, but are born as pure and unspotted as Adam came out of the hands

of his Creator. This is the sum and substance of the system. Mr. Finney assures us, (Serm. 1, page 16,) "Sinners make their own wicked hearts," and (same Serm. page 8) he teaches us that Adam made his. "He immediately preferred God as his supreme ruler, and this preference was a perfectly holy heart." He tells us that men conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity are as really created in *the image of God* as Adam was. Pelagius taught, that men are capable of repentance and amendment, and of arriving at the highest degrees of piety and virtue, by the use of their natural faculties and powers. Mr. Finney says, (Serm. 1, page 17,) "Were it not that I suppose there is a sense in which a man's heart may be better than his head, I should feel bound to maintain, that persons holding this sentiment, that man is unable to obey God without the Spirit's agency, were no Christians at all,—obligation is only commensurate with ability." Pelagius taught, that mankind need external grace to excite their endeavours, but that they have no need of the internal succours of the Divine Spirit. Mr. Finney, equally with Pelagius, denies what ancient Reformers meant by the internal succours of the Holy Spirit, and believes only in what are generally called the common influences of grace, confined to the understanding. He believes, (Serm. 1, page 23,) "that it is the sinner's wilful inconsideration, and diverting of his attention, that lays the only foundation for the necessity of the Spirit's influences. The Spirit *forces* upon his attention and consideration those motives which he hates to consider and feel the weight of." Thus, far from teaching that man is unable to repent and believe, he tells us that he is *unwilling*, only because he is unwilling to consider and weigh the motives which should induce him to repent and believe. His disease is not even *unwillingness to obey*; it is only *unwillingness to weigh motives*, and the sinner must be *forced*, not *persuaded*, to weigh them.

Here we are told, that human nature is not corrupt: more, that there is no such thing as human nature, distinct from the moral character of an individual: human nature and human character are found to be synonymous terms. There is no real difference in men, except what is produced by motives. God must know, that those who now love him most ardently, with sufficient motive would as cordially hate him. Superiour force of motive would transform a seraph to a damned spirit, or a damned spirit to a seraph; change

heaven into hell, or hell into heaven. The Fall of man, which made the Atonement necessary, is formally denied. Sinners come into the world as pure as Adam came from the hands of his Creator. The fact, that sinners make for themselves wicked hearts, he tells us (Serm. 1, p. 16,) "is entirely the result of temptation to selfishness, arising out of the circumstances under which the child comes into being." Thus the cause of human wickedness, is not to be sought in *human nature*, but in *Divine Providence*. The change introduced by the apostacy, is not a *change in man himself*, but some unknown *change in his circumstances*: *inability* is only the *inability* of motives to get access to his mind. Sin has been introduced into the mind of every individual by *Providence*, and continued by *inconsideration*. We learn too, that the sinner, by an act of preference, does more than prefer—he even changes and reverses preference; and this, not *past or future* preference, which is an *impossibility*, but a *present* one, which is a *contradiction*. The renovating and purifying influences of Divine grace, in which the great body of evangelical Christians always have been, and still are united, are formally denied. We are now told, that the Holy Spirit does not in any sense renew and sanctify the heart. He only *persuades* the sinner to do it. The influence of motives, it seems to the philosophic mind of the author, accounts for this change; and on a subject which the Scriptures have told us is incomprehensible, he must make his comprehension the limit of his faith. He acknowledges that the sinner *hates* the true character of God, when *feebly presented*; but it appears perfectly rational that he should *love it with the whole heart*, when *powerfully exhibited*. An object which, *feebly* seen, excites only aversion, may be expected, when presented *vividly*, to kindle the warmest love. The last act of the mind, in view of a certain motive, may be *perfectly sinful*; and, with the same motive, and no change in the mind, the next act may be *perfectly holy*.

If Mr. Finney means, with Dr. Emmons, to deny the existence of *that faculty, the will*, on which President Edwards wrote one of the most acute and cogent pieces of reasoning which the world has ever seen; if he leaves only volition or preference, which Edwards calls its affections or operations—the enquiry remains, does he mean, with Dr. Emmons, that there are innumerable volitions, preferences,

or hearts? or does he mean, that the abstract voluntary preference, which has no object, and lies dormant behind the other voluntary affections and emotions, is the only accountable act of the mind—so that there is but one heart? His succeeding reasoning shows that he meant neither. He does not mean to say, that man puts forth one act of preference, which is never repeated: he intends to state only, that man, having once preferred holiness or sin, his succeeding preferences continue to be of the same character with the first; and he uses the term *deep-seated voluntary preference*, to state the fact, that the same general preference is a quality of all succeeding volitions. So we find, at last, that the heart is not what Dr. Emmons describes it, an *infinite number of volitions*: it is not even *one*—it proves to be merely a quality of mental operations. Thus, we see, that although God has created man once, and given him a nature which makes him a subject of moral obligation, yet these writers have found it necessary to make him again, and bestow on him a constitution which makes his accountability more accordant with their ideas of justice: doing, if possible, more violence to man's nature by their absurd theories, than they have done to the Holy Scriptures by their bold interpretations. The one has made the heart a bundle of volitions, and man himself an infinite series of incoherent perceptions and emotions—leaving no room for identity, and no subject for accountability. The other has made the human *heart* but a *quality* of mental operations.

One would suppose it enough for a single individual to assert, that God's people, renewed and led by his Spirit, have always drawn from his Word, doctrines, the very enunciation of which makes the Lord of the Universe an infinite tyrant, authorizes man's worst rebellion, and makes the most licentious of doctrines, Universalism, in Mr. F's view, the only expedient by which the ways of God can be justified to man. (Serm. 3, page 72.) But this is not enough, in the *presumption of correcting the heresy of the church universal*. Mr. Finney introduces an error, which has been *known, rejected, and execrated* by the children of God for many centuries; an error which now forms the essential constituent of all the systems which are opposed to evangelical doctrines. Mr. Finney has presented no new objections against these doctrines: he has only more boldly and more loudly reiterated the false charges which have always

been preferred against them by the Socinians and Unitarians. He has sided with those zealous asserters of the spirituality and extent of man's obligations, and shares their alarms at doctrines which have even the appearance of impairing man's accountability, or countenancing his licentiousness.

Mr. Finney, in these Lectures, advances some new views on the subject of prayer. We will quote a few passages in which they are pretty fully developed. "Faith consists in believing that we shall receive the very things that we ask for." But of this we must have *evidence*. He continues, "A person is under no obligation to believe, and has no right to believe a thing will be done unless he has *evidence*. It is the height of fanaticism to believe without *evidence*. The kinds of evidence a man may have, are the following: First, Suppose that God has especially promised the thing. Secondly, Where there is a general promise in the Scriptures, which you may reasonably apply to the particular case before you. If its real meaning includes the particular thing for which you pray, or if you can reasonably apply the principle of the promise to the case, there you have evidence." "In case of those promises of a general nature, where we are honestly at a loss to know in what particular cases to apply them, it may be considered rather as our privilege, than as our duty, in many instances, to apply them to particular cases; but, whenever the Spirit of God leads us to apply them to a particular object, then it becomes our duty so to apply them." "If the case comes up to enquire as to the *time* in which God will grant blessings in answer to prayer, you have this promise, 'While they are yet speaking, I will hear.'" Thirdly, "When there is any *prophetic declaration, that the thing prayed for is agreeable to the will of God*. If the time at which the event is to come is specified, or may be learned from the prophecies, and appears to have arrived, Christians are bound to understand and apply it, by offering the prayer of faith." Fourthly, "Where God makes a revelation by his Providence, by giving to Christians a *spiritual discernment respecting its movements and developments*, Christians are bound to pray in faith." Fifthly, "The Spirit leads Christians to desire and pray for things, of which nothing is specifically said in the word of God." p. 56. "And if you are led by the Spirit of God to pray for certain things, you have just as much reason to expect the thing to be done, as if God had revealed

it in his word." "He excites the very desires he is willing to gratify. Take the case of an individual. That God is willing to save, is a general truth. But how shall I know the will of God respecting that individual, whether I can pray in faith, according to the will of God, for the conversion and salvation of that individual, or not? Here, the agency of the Spirit comes in to lead the minds of God's people to pray for those individuals, and at those times, when God is prepared to bless them." Respecting this *evidence* which is made to prove that certain blessings will be bestowed on particular persons at certain times, though our author is able to fix the time, by detaching a passage from its proper connexion, and perverting its meaning, yet we had not been aware, that any particular persons have been mentioned *by name*. He doubtless means, that the promises are directed to us as *Christians*, and if so, our *expectation* that we shall receive a blessing, on his scheme, ought never to be any *stronger* than our *assurance* that we possess the *character* to which the promise is annexed, which, at most, does not amount to that *certainty*, which this prayer of faith supposes.

Mr. Finney, by boldly and grossly misapplying or misinterpreting the texts which he deigns to use, seems to make faith consist in a *presumptuous license in interpreting promises*, rather than in a *humble confidence* in the *faithfulness* of God to *fulfil them*. Page 91, he says, "A general promise may, with the same propriety, be applied to the *conversion of a soul*, as to the *performance of a miracle*." But what necessity is there for making Providence prophetic? God has promised to Christians, the life that now is, as well as that which is to come; assured them that he is more willing to bestow the influences of his Spirit on them, than earthly parents to bestow favours on their children; that he who has not withheld his Son, will, with him, freely give them all things; that all things are theirs; that all events shall work for their good; and are not here blessings adequate to all their wants, sufficient work for faith, and sufficient objects of a holy desire? After forbidding us to say what we shall do on the morrow, and telling us, that we know not what a day will bring forth, does he expect us to *believe* where he has scarce allowed us to *guess*. Besides, such faith could lay claim to no *greater certainty*, than the *presumptuous conjecture*, on which it would be founded.

Respecting *prophecies*, we had always supposed it the duty of Christians to believe and plead the promises which God has made, respecting the future extension and glory of the church; though they cannot yet fix the precise time of their full accomplishment. Our ignorance of the time, does not detract from the certainty of their fulfilment, or from our obligations to believe and plead them. Their accomplishment is suspended on the *prayers*, not less than the *labours* of the church.

With respect to *holy desires*, from the fact that the *objects* of them are so *general*, we should hardly think it *possible*, even if it were *allowable*, to *interpret* them as *revelations*. Things material are not the proper objects of spiritual desires. There are no internal spiritual desires that exactly answer to the removal of a particular disease, the success of a given project, food, raiment, and health; the Christian should have the same object, the glory of God, before his mind, in offering petitions for all these things. Infinite Goodness will always bestow on the Christian, the very blessings that Infinite Wisdom sees best for him to receive. He who at once inspires, hears, and answers prayer, withholds one blessing, only to bestow another which better meets the Christian's wants. God *refuses* his *petition*, while he *gratifies* his *desire*. Besides, who has taught the Christian that holy desires are revelations? They are what the Bible commands him to possess; what the Christian ever aims to possess; they are given him to enable him to do his duty; to maintain peace of conscience, communion with heaven,—to impart *holiness*, and not *knowledge*,—to make him a *Christian*, not a *prophet*. When we desire the glory of God in the accomplishment of any scheme, whose success seems to us connected with his glory, does this imply that the connexion, which, to our finite reason, seems *probable*, is *certain*? Is this desire given to the Christian, to teach him the future, or simply to enable him to feel as he ought in view of the course of Providence? Do the benevolent wishes of the holy heart *anticipate and fix the events of Providence*?

Prayer, or communion with God, we had been taught to consider, as constituting at once the *life and happiness* of the Christian. It is something more than mere petition. It is adoration of the perfections of the blessed God, thanks for his blessings, confession and godly sorrow for sin, trust in the merits of Christ for forgiveness, holy desires for tem-

poral and spiritual blessings, and faith in the veracity of God who has promised them. God inspires the Christian with such a sense of his corruption, his weakness, his ignorance, and his innumerable wants, that prayer *seems* the *spontaneous* language of the renovated heart. It is the great channel through which the Christian receives all his invaluable blessings. Interrupted, his graces wither, his strength declines, his peace is destroyed, his happiness is lost. Neither religion nor the world can give him satisfaction. Our author seems to place the whole of prayer in petition; and most of our petitions are to consist of intercession for others. He speaks with the most improper levity, of adoration; censures men "for spinning out a long prayer in telling God who and what he is." From his denial of man's corruption, and making the operations of Divine grace to consist merely in *forcing* the creature to consider and weigh motives, it might naturally be expected, that he would not think that the Christian has much to do in his own heart, or much need of assistance.

With respect to these views of prayer, it is somewhat strange that they have never been adopted, or even generally known in the church. Mr. Finney assures us, that nothing but what he calls the prayer of faith, is really prayer—that "they who know not what this is, have good reason to doubt their piety." They certainly have every reason to *disbelieve* it, or *consider themselves in a backslidden state*, if they have always lived without prayer. Thus, after expressly charging the whole church, for many centuries, with *being heretics*, he now, by direct inference, accuses them of being *hypocrites*, or *backsliders*.

Mr. Finney at times admits the obligation of submission in prayer; but his views leave no room for it. He assures us, that we must know what the will of God is, before we have a right to offer the prayer of faith. If so, the Christian cannot say with his Saviour, "Not my will, but thine be done." There is no occasion for it. He has learned this already, or his prayer is presumption; and God's will and his own he knows are the same.

These views, which seem to ascribe so much efficacy to prayer, are but a complete and formal denial of its influence. A person must know that a blessing is just about to be received, before he can have a right to believe and pray. Faith, then, does not *procure* blessings: it only *predicts*

them. God is not influenced to bestow blessings in consequence of prayer, but either without any regard to it, or in anticipation of it. Faith is the *effect*, and not the *ground* of God's determination to impart answers to prayer.

Mr. Finney tells us, that this faith is built on *evidence*: of course it can be no *more certain* than the *evidence* on which it rests. It has generally been supposed, that mere intellectual belief is an *involuntary act*, an operation of the understanding. It is difficult to see how it can possess a moral nature at all. We may be voluntary in *surveying*, or in *seeking* and *collecting* evidence; but when once we have *sought* and *found* evidence, we *necessarily* believe. But it is with an *important limitation*, that he admits of a belief of the understanding. Hear his definition:

"We want to know, in what cases, for what persons and places, and at what times, we are to make the prayer of faith—that is, to believe that we shall receive the very things we ask for? I answer, when you have evidence from promises, &c. &c., that God will do the things you pray for." What now is necessary to authorize the prayer of faith, which rests on evidence, and can be no surer than the evidence on which it rests? What must we know before we have a right to exercise faith, or can exercise faith? We must know, that it is God's will that we do the thing we pray for. Faith then consists in *believing* that God will do the thing we pray for, when we *know* he will do the thing we pray for; in *believing* that a thing will take place, after we *know* it will take place; in *believing* a thing, after we do already *believe* it. Thus, the Christian is told, that he has neither an ability nor a right to believe, until after he has believed. No wonder, he assures us, that it is so little a matter of speculation, that its advocates cannot always believe even in the existence of such a faith, which cannot *exist* till after it *has existed*.

The Christian's desires, it seems, are no longer to be regulated by the *commands of the Bible*: they *themselves constitute a revelation*: they are *promises* on which he is to rest his *expectations* of Divine blessings. The professor of religion is permitted, when at a loss for the *meaning of the promises*, to interpret them *by his own desires*. How soon may he be expected to extend the *same principle* to the *Divine commands*? Providence is turned into prophecy, and the ignorant and the deluded are permitted to interpret

it. Here is all the license that fanaticism has ever found necessary for the wildest and the wickedest schemes. Here some of the grossest abuses with which the enemies of revivals have ever charged them, are formally authorized, by one who sets himself up as their great advocate and patron.

After demolishing, by philosophy, those traditions of the elders, which, he says, corrupt the law, he next proceeds to remove the law itself, to show that it is neither holy in its nature nor just in its demands; that holiness really consists, not in *loving* God, but in *thinking* of Him—thus giving us a new law. The following quotations contain the very spirit of his system:

"People talk about religious feeling, as if they thought they could, by direct effort, call forth emotion. *We might as well think to call spirits up from the deep.* The emotions are *PURELY involuntary states of the mind.* They *NATURALLY* and *necessarily* exist in the mind, under certain circumstances calculated to excite them. But they can be controlled *indirectly*; otherwise there would be no moral character in our emotions, if there were not a way to control them. We cannot say, Now I will feel so and so towards such an object; but *we can command our attention to it, and look at it intently till the proper feeling arises.* Let a man call up his enemy before his mind, and his feelings of enmity will rise. So, if a man thinks of God, and fastens his mind on any parts of God's character, he will feel: *emotions will come up by the very LAWS of mind.* If he is a *friend of God*, let him contemplate God as a gracious and holy being, and he *will have emotions of friendship kindled up in his mind.* If he is an *enemy of God*, only let him get the true character of God before his mind, and look at it, and fasten his attention on it, *and his enmity will rise against God.* So any *action, thought, or feeling*, to have moral character, must be directly or indirectly under the control of the will. If a man voluntarily place himself under such circumstances as to call *wicked* emotions into exercise, he is entirely responsible for them. If he place himself under circumstances, where virtuous emotions are called forth, he is praiseworthy in the exercise of them *PRECISELY IN PROPORTION to his voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence.*

"What I want is, to have you distinguish between *emotion* and *principle.* By emotion, I mean that state of mind of

which we are conscious, and which we call *feeling*; an *involuntary state of mind* that arises, *of course*, when we are in certain circumstances, or under certain influences. There may be high-wrought feelings, or they may subside into tranquillity, or disappear entirely. But these emotions should be *carefully distinguished* from *religious principle*. By principle, I mean the *voluntary decision of the mind*; the firm determination to act out duty, and to obey the will of God, by which a Christian should always be governed. When a person is fully determined to obey God, because it is right that he should obey God, that I call principle."

Here are some important principles. The spirit of them pervades the work before us. In fact, they are a summary of his system.

1st. That love to God and enmity towards him are not *voluntary emotions*; that, of themselves, they have no moral nature, but *borrow* one from the *circumstance*, that the will has an *indirect* influence in calling them into existence. 2d. That a person is *responsible* for his emotions, *precisely in proportion* to his *voluntariness in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence*. 3d. That *love to God and all Christian graces*, are to be *carefully distinguished from principle, or a determination to obey the will of God*.

Whatever may be the result of metaphysical speculations on the subject of moral agency, we suppose, either that the law is still in force, or that man is released from all allegiance to his Maker. Upon this law, which requires that we love God with the whole heart, and our neighbour as ourselves, hang all the law and the prophets; it comprehends all the preceptive part of the Bible: is the sum of man's moral obligations: all the Christian graces, by an easy analysis, are resolvable into love to God and man as their essential principles; these affections alone, which have always been regarded, not only as voluntary, but volitions themselves, give value to external obedience, which should be but an outward expression of them: external obedience must spring from these affections, or others which are lawful. If from the latter, it is no longer obedience but sin. *Involuntary emotions*, from the very definition of the terms, cannot be of a moral nature. Our author, therefore, assures us, that they *derive* a moral nature from the *circumstance* that the will has an *indirect* agency in calling them

into existence. But how happens it that God has placed the sum of human obligation—all that is *holy* in affection or *valuable and praiseworthy* in action, what constitutes the happiness of heaven, and is heaven itself—in something which has no moral nature in itself, but *borrow*s it from a CIRCUMSTANCE? So, then, the law itself is neither holy in its nature, nor just in its demands, but is supposed to *acquire a holiness and justice from the circumstance*, that the will may exert at least an *indirect* and remote influence in fulfilling it. Here we are taught, that mere volition gives its *whole value to holiness itself; a character to an emotion before that emotion exists*. We find, then, that when the Christian turns his thoughts on the perfections of God, and is conscious of love; when he turns his eyes upon the ocean, and has the emotion of sublimity, or his thoughts upon a distressed family, and has the emotion of pity; or upon an affront, and has the emotion of revenge and hatred, it is the will which *gives* a character to these involuntary emotions. No enquiry either must be made into the *motives* which induced the person to call these emotions into existence. It would seem that whatever the author calls *voluntary* must not only be *right in itself*, but be able to make even *obedience to the law right*.

Again, he has told us that a person is responsible for his emotions, only so far as he has been voluntary in bringing his mind into circumstances to cause their existence. His grand objection against orthodoxy is, that, in his view, it teaches that something besides unwillingness prevents the sinner from duty, and if it does, he says God must be an infinite tyrant. But what is duty? Is not love to God and man the very sum of it? Yet he tells us that *the will cannot directly call these emotions into existence any more than it can call spirits from the deep*. But it can *indirectly*. Well. The sinner, no matter from what motives, calls up the true character of God before his mind. Here, according to our author, his responsibility ends. He is conscious of enmity. Mr. F. *acquits* him while the law of God *condemns* him. Now, it is either a *quibble*, or a *deception*, to tell a person that it is only *unwillingness* that prevents from duty. God does not demand *willingness to weigh motives*, or *willingness to obey*, but *obedience itself; holy affections expressed by holy actions*, not *willingness to exercise love*, which is *nonsense*, but *love itself*. Respecting volition in

calling up motives, what person of common sense ever thought it possible to love God without *thinking of him*, and what serious mind ever supposed it *innocent* not "to have God in all the thoughts?" Who, before Mr. F., ever thought that holiness and duty consisted in *thinking of God*, not in *loving him*?

Again, the *involuntary emotions of love to God and all the Christian graces*, are to be carefully distinguished, not only from actual obedience, but from that determination to obey God, which constitutes **PRINCIPLE**. What kind of *principle* must that be which is to be so carefully distinguished from all that is *holy in affection, or valuable in action*? A vague general resolution to obey God, because it is right, from a conviction that it is our duty, a conviction which every mind must have if the testimony of conscience has not been silenced. *A resolution to obey God*. What kind of obedience is that, into which the love of God is not expected to enter? It must be mere *external obedience*, and *that from sinful motives*. A person is required to yield external obedience from right motives, as much as to yield it at all. Mr. F. insists much on submission to God, which he strangely defines to be a resolution to obey God, as a condition of salvation. If the sinner, on the spot, expresses such a resolution, a resolution perhaps *reversed* as suddenly as *formed*, he is encouraged to hope. But Mr. F. carefully distinguishes a general, vague resolution to obey God, from those spiritual affections which have always been considered the only true obedience, and the only safe evidence of a change of heart. He tells us, after this, that he has met with thousands of awakened sinners, who never knew, till they conversed with him, what it was to feel the pressure of present obligation. What ideas of the nature, value, or obligation of spiritual affections, can he have, who calls them involuntary emotions, and classes them with those sympathies, which belong to us as animals, or those emotions, which we necessarily feel in view of the grandeur and beauty of nature?

The following quotation will show how much influence, what he denominates principle, is expected to exercise on the mind of those whom he calls Christians.

"Teach them how to cultivate a tender conscience. I have been often amazed to see how little conscience there is even among those who, we hope, are Christians. And here

is the reason of it. *Their consciences were never cultivated. They never were taught and told how to cultivate a tender conscience.* They have not even a *natural conscience.* They have dealt so rudely with their conscience, and resisted it so often, that it has got blunted, and *does not act.*" Can philosophy teach any other way to cultivate conscience, than habitually to obey? and do not Christians understand their obligations to this? It is like telling the ship-master to cultivate the *rare habit* of consulting his compass. Is it not the character of the Christian, that he habitually labours to keep a conscience void of offence towards God and man? What has he to do but duty? Is he not working out his salvation with fear and trembling? Is not God also working in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure? Has he not renounced all sin? Does he not hate it more than the most loathsome object, and fear it more than suffering? He who does not make it his great object to avoid all sin, and his great business in life to keep his heart, is as *really* an Antinomian, as the boldest Universalist. He who teaches that persons can be Christians on easier terms, establishes the gospel on the ruins of the law.

After removing the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel and the law itself, he proceeds to lay violent hands on the positive institutions of Christianity, to make room for new measures. p. 168. Let us hear him:

"When a measure has novelty enough to secure attention to the truth, no other *new measure* should be introduced. You have secured the great object, NOVELTY. And the more *sparing* we are of our *new things*, the longer we can use them. By a wise course, this may undoubtedly be done for a long series of years, until our present measures have sufficient *novelty* in them again to attract and fix public attention. And so we shall never want for *something new.*" p. 249. "Perhaps it is not too much to say, that it is impossible for God himself to bring about reformations, but by new measures." He informs us that the Reformation itself, the revival in England under Wesley and Whitefield, and in this country under Edwards, were in reality nothing but the introduction of new measures. p. 240—241.

We presume that most of the opponents of new measures will agree with Mr. Finney, in asserting, that the only tendency to do good, which new measures possess, consists in their novelty. But, while he contends that they should be

often changed for those still newer, we think it would be far preferable to banish them for ever, and return to that respect which is due to long tried and divinely appointed means of grace. Is it a safe doctrine, that God has established no connexion between means and his blessing? Are we to be taught that he cannot bless, but by new measures? that the regular institutions of the gospel are defended and continued only from the indolence of their supporters? that their only tendency is to sink the religious community in a lifeless formality? We are now told, that religious institutions are only artifices, to catch the public attention; that their *influence* lasts no longer than their *novelty*; and that they are to be changed for others, which the caprice or prejudice of individual ministers may introduce. Religious institutions, then, are to be in a state of perpetual change. But when the public is thus frankly told that they are nothing but tricks, will they not be likely to withdraw their confidence alike from them, and those by whom they are proposed? But what proof is alleged in favour of the position, that all improvements in religion have always been owing to the introduction of new measures? Is it not true, on the contrary, that every corruption has gained admission by adding new measures to apostolical institutions? Has not every reformation consisted in returning to the purity of ancient doctrines, and the simplicity of ancient institutions? Was not the Reformation of this character? Did not the peculiar influence of Whitefield, Wesley, and Edwards, consist in insisting on the grand peculiarities of the gospel, which had been kept out of sight by the latitudinarian spirit of the English Establishment, and the Arminian errors of the New-England divines?

New measures have been introduced by new divinity, and seem to have a close, an inseparable connexion with it. The dangers of self-deception from the deceitfulness of the heart, the delusions of Satan, and the influence of our wishes on our belief, once so much insisted on, are now laughed at. Mr. Finney tells us that there is no need of a sinner's doubting; that his doubts are so much evidence against the reality of his conversion.

With respect to the anxious seat, we doubt the right of ministers to require, and the utility of requiring, a public profession of a desire to become pious. With regard to the effects of this measure, we have no doubt that it has produ-

ced as much *disgust* among Christians, as *delusion* among sinners.

Christians have always found it necessary to increase the number of meetings in times of revivals; not, however, to produce revivals. With respect to protracted meetings, they interfere with necessary duties, especially the duties of the closet; on which the success of all public means depends; they owe their origin and influence to that new divinity, which teaches that a change of heart is effected merely by force of motive; and that the great benefit of means consists in collecting the largest possible amount of motive, and bringing it to bear upon the mind of the sinner. New measures cannot have a lasting popularity with those who believe that it is God alone who gives efficacy to means and instruments; that he has established a permanent connexion between the regular means of grace and his blessing; and that he is jealous of his own glory, and demonstrates the inefficiency of means and instruments, even when he grants them the greatest success.

These meetings, which break down ministers, and which our author tells us produce a *spasmodic religion*, are, from their very nature, only occasional means; but their *tendency* has been most seriously to impair all respect for the regular institutions of the gospel. They have been almost wholly laid aside in many parts of the country, and Christians are employed in enquiring into their effects. It remains to be proved, whether the church has been *overspreading* the world, or the world has been *overflowing* the church.

We have seen that Mr. F. introduces the Pelagian heresy; that he holds only to what the church has always called the common influences of the Holy Spirit; that he encourages the most dangerous fanaticism with regard to prayer; that he teaches that the spiritual affections are only involuntary emotions, to be carefully distinguished from principle; that the natural influence of the regular means of grace, is only to produce a lifeless formality. We have been astonished at the infrequency of his quotations of Scripture; that he seems to take it for granted, that the audience will dispense with *its authority*, if they can have *his reasonings*, or *know his wishes*. He often barely tells them, *I want you to do thus, I want you to feel so*, as if his *wishes* would have more weight than *God's commands*, or rather as though he himself were at once their *God* and *Bible*. We deem it

a duty, as he complains so much of censures, to quote some of his own. First he tells us, p. 398, "The church has *entirely mistaken the manner in which she is to be sanctified.*" Respecting the influence of the ministry heretofore, p. 348, "The truth is, that very little of the gospel has come out upon the world for these hundreds of years, without being clogged and obscured by false theology. People have been told that they must repent, and, in the same breath, that they could not repent; until the truth itself has been all mixed up with error, so as to produce *the same practical effect with error*, and the gospel that has been preached has been *another gospel, or no gospel at all.*" Respecting our young ministers, p. 177, "I appeal to all experience, whether our young men in seminaries are thoroughly educated for the purpose of winning souls. *Do they do it? EVERY BODY knows they do not.*" Those who so ably conduct our theological seminaries, p. 177, "are men of another age and stamp from what is needed in these days of excitement." Some of them are modestly advised to resign. P. 269, he tells us, "that no doubt there is a jubilee in hell every year, about the time of the meeting of the General Assembly." That "nothing will excite opposition in the Presbyterian church so soon as a spirit of prayer." The General Assembly, we trust, is aware that there is an appeal from him, who has judged the heart, to Him who knows it, and perhaps, has not much to fear, either from the jubilees of the devils, or the censures of Mr. Finney.

We think, however, that these censures spring rather from the nature and limited extent of his education, than from any rancour or malice of feeling. Doubtless, like Saul of Tarsus, he thinks he is doing God service while censuring the doctrines, officers, and institutions of the church. We cannot but think, however, that an itinerant preacher, with his popular talents, zeal, and acquired influence, would be like a tornado passing through our churches; doing some immediate good, together with much permanent mischief; utterly prostrating all respect for the ministry, doctrines and institutions of the gospel; upon which depend the *purity* and *permanence* of religion. We are rejoiced that he has been called to the head of an institution, which may now serve as a model to those literary and theological seminaries which he has so severely censured.

We think that Mr. Finney has been instrumental in

plunging multitudes into a fatal delusion ; of widely diffusing a bold and licentious fanaticism : how far guilt belongs to him, it is neither our province or wish to determine. Evangelical divines have always inculcated on young converts the duty and importance of anticipating the unchanging decision of the last day, by habitual and rigorous self-examination ; they have inculcated the Divine command, which premises that as Jesus Christ is in professors, except they be reprobates, they should prove themselves, find those lineaments of the image of Christ, which have been written on their hearts by the finger of God. Especially have the ministers of the gospel in this country been assiduous in their endeavours to discriminate between true and false religion ; and none more so than President Edwards, under whose authority Mr. Finney has more than once attempted to take shelter. This able divine wrote one of his most valuable treatises as a help to self-examination. It has always been the belief that a good hope, so far from being shaken, will be strengthened by being tested ; and that self-examination is unfriendly only to delusion. Divines, heretofore, have taught that the work of the Holy Spirit consists in producing the Christian character perfect in all its lineaments ; that Christian affections are to be tested, not by their intensity, but by their nature, their permanence and power ; by the fact that they produce an obedience universal, habitual, and cordial ; and that after all, we need to search ourselves and pray God to search us, lest we perish in a fatal delusion. After all the exertions of the ministry to prevent self-deception, how often have facts proved that numbers have been deceived ; and how many, whom the trials and temptations of the Christian life have not detected, may we fear will be undeceived, when it will be too late to repair their mistake.

It has always been the belief of the evangelical ministry, that the devil, who can transform himself into an angel of light, can, by the great subjects which revelation discloses, work powerful feelings in the mind of the sinner, and very nearly counterfeit true religion. We know, indeed, that the great things of eternity, of themselves, operating as motives, will produce most powerful impressions on the unrenewed heart. Mr. Finney places the whole of religion in the influence of motives on the natural heart. Though he speaks of a *new heart*, yet after all it is the *old heart* that makes it. It is only an artful abuse of language. We still speak of

heart, though Mr. Finney has told us, that there is no such thing as heart, distinct from voluntary preference; we cannot but think with the old divines and mankind in general, that there is such a thing as the heart, or flesh, or carnal mind, of which, aversion to the character and authority of God, insubordination to his will, hatred, anger, envy, malice, ambition, and revenge, are the spontaneous affections. We have mentioned what has been the course of divines, hitherto, but what is Mr. Finney's? He proposes to the sinner who has already experienced the inefficiency of a thousand resolutions, a single resolve, expressed in terms of studied ambiguity and obscurity;—a resolve "to submit to principle;" "to submit to obey God." He proposes to persons of all characters and conditions, when in a state of excitement and agitation which precludes deliberation, one resolution, and if the sinner says he has made it, he is forbidden to doubt; he is told that it is almost certain evidence against him to doubt; that a good hope, or religion, is matter of consciousness, and a doubt almost an absurdity. Now what is the tendency of this course, but to collect, cheer up, and drive forward a herd of ignorant and deluded persons into the toils which the devil always keeps spread to ensnare the unwary?

No doubt the great enemy of mankind as *effectually* secures his victim, by inspiring him with a false hope, as by plunging him into the wildest dissipation. But who can measure the responsibility of pursuing a course so directly calculated to further his views? With respect to Mr. Finney, we consider him rather as an instrument than an agent. It is true, he has not, as we had till lately supposed, the plea of ignorance. But fanaticism is capable of producing a delusion, which will as *really* confound the distinctions between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, on some subjects, as insanity itself. How far it should operate as an excuse, we are not bound to determine. Early in his career, Mr. Finney received the friendly advice and exhortation of several gentlemen, distinguished for their talents, wisdom, and experience—one of them better entitled to be heard with regard to revivals, than any man living. His errors were clearly pointed out, their tendency fully shown, or rather their consequences most exactly predicted. The opinions of these gentlemen were entitled to an attentive and prayerful examination: at least they had a claim to *respect*. But his

mind had reached that state, in which arguments and objections alike confirm one in error. He now sees his system developing itself in the most fearful manner. It is in vain for him to cast the blame on those whose misfortune it has been to be compelled to witness and share the shame which inconsistency, gross immorality, and often barefaced hypocrisy, have brought upon religion. No human force can arrest the influence of this system : it must show itself ; and any more open and deliberate attempt to cast the blame of such backslidings on others, will serve only to impair confidence in Mr. Finney's integrity. Those who believe in nothing higher than a morality, which draws its motives wholly from this world, justly regard the virtue of the mere moral man, as a fixed and permanent principle. Christians believe that piety is " God working in the heart of the believer, both to will and to do according to his good pleasure," —continuing and perfecting the work which he has begun, so that the path of the just shall shine brighter and brighter to the perfect day. What shall we say of revivals, where not half, sometimes not one-fifth, sometimes not one-tenth of the converts, have preserved even the form of godliness, for a few months only ? These persons, whom policy, self-respect, a decent regard for their own reputation, worldly motives, as well as those of religion, should have restrained from grossly violating their solemn engagements, have forfeited the respect both of the church and the world, fixed a lasting and deserved stigma on their own character, and brought even religion itself into suspicion. Yet we generally find, that those persons who have deservedly forfeited the esteem and respect of man, too often presume on the favour of God ; and cling to their false hope, till the delusion, which has brought disgrace on the church, brings destruction on themselves.

But it would be well if the influence of this strain of instruction were confined to its unhappy victims. It extends far beyond them. The evil falls heavily on the church. Are persons to be received to the church, who come forward and assure us, and *boust* that they put their hands to the plough, without first setting down to count the cost ? Are persons to be received as supporters of the purity, guardians of the discipline, and depositories of the doctrines of the church, upon an evidence, the strength of which would not justify a person in entrusting a trifling sum of money to their

care? Can they who know next to nothing of Christian doctrine, of the nature and extent of Christian piety, of their own hearts, who have merely made a solitary good resolution, and know not yet how they shall keep that, can they be able to measure or feel the responsibility they take on themselves, by setting themselves forth as living exhibitions of the purity which Christianity inculcates and produces; examples for the world, epistles of Christ, which must be known and read of all men? The effects of this course, we have said, have already been fearfully manifested; but we have only begun to witness them. Its effects must be, even supposing these individuals succeed in retaining the form of piety, to fill up the church with persons sceptical of the doctrines, impatient of the discipline, and regardless of the harmony and peace of the church; above all, who will more than neutralize the influence and example of the sound and spiritual members. These persons will encourage, and even seem to authorize and justify the impiety, the scoffs, and the arguments of infidels; none of which have so much force as the irreligious lives of professors of religion. They will make religion appear not only contemptible, but ridiculous.

This system of religious instruction brings the doctrine of the Divine influence on the heart of the Christian, into doubt and suspicion. The believer feels that these influences of the Holy Spirit are precious beyond expression; important as the interests of the soul; the source of all his strength, comfort, and joy; indispensable to his salvation. It is one of his most fearful responsibilities, that he can, by his inconsistent life, produce scepticism on this important doctrine, lead others to doubt the promise of those succours which are necessary to their salvation, to do even more. But, if the world see professors of religion animated by the same spirit, governed by the same motives, and even guilty of the same open sins with themselves, will they not naturally say, not only that their professions are hypocritical, but also that their pretensions are groundless and enthusiastic; that they do not accomplish or even attempt any thing beyond the ordinary powers of man. To authorize such remarks, is a sin, to which all others seem small. That God works in the heart of the Christian, is clearly a doctrine of Scripture, and philosophy has never had any thing solid to object against it; that he works in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure, a cordial obedience to the spiritual,

but just and reasonable precepts of his word, is taught in the same sentence; and philosophy is guilty at once of presumption and impiety, in casting reproach on this doctrine. The Bible assigns the fall of man as the reason which makes this agency necessary. But what are we to say of a system which teaches the existence of Divine influences, at the same time that it denies their necessity; which teaches that man has only a bad habit of volition, which he might be supposed about as able to correct, as to acquire. What shall we say of one, who teaches that the Christian, notwithstanding this influence, "will not obey God unless he is greatly excited;" that he goes back from the path of duty, and does nothing to promote the glory of God, except in times of a revival, which is very seldom? What shall we say of a system, where the sacred doctrine of which we have been speaking, is thus united with a bold Antinomianism? Mr. Finney, like the original inventor of Pelagianism, lays vast stress on some particular and often minor points of morality; he denounces the use of tobacco, coffee, and tea; indeed, imposes on the church of Christ almost as many shackles as the abrogation of the ceremonial law removed; but still he tells us, that the Christian may and does habitually disobey God; that a revival is a renewal of obedience, even to the believer. What are *revivals*, as they have heretofore been understood? They take place in churches, where neither members nor ministers allow themselves habitually to slumber, but always use the means of grace; where they live near to God; where they realize the things of another world by faith; their warnings and instructions, sanctioned by a holy life, give evidence, force, and influence, to the truths of revelation; they eagerly and perseveringly seek spiritual riches, both for themselves and others, and yet have witnessed but occasional conversions. Here God shows at once the influence of prayer, while he demonstrates the inefficiency of means and instruments, in increasing the numbers of his church; he displays his sovereign power, suddenly converts numbers, and receives the glory which he claims.

But what is an excitement, which Mr. Finney calls a revival? "It supposes that the church are sunk down in a backslidden state;" "that their hearts are as hard as marble;" "that the truths of religion appear only like a dream;" "a revival is nothing else than a new beginning of obedience towards God, with regard to the church;" "unless they

are greatly excited, they will not obey God." Now what does he say they do, when they are aroused? Why, they wake up, rub their eyes, bluster about, and vociferate a little while, and go to sleep again. The Christian, *out of a revival*, that is, the greater part of his life, is *asleep*, and *does not obey God*; in a revival, he *VOCIFERATES A LITTLE*.

But what will be the influence of Mr. F.'s system of instruction, and his new measures, on our religious institutions? This influence has plainly shown itself, where these measures have been long employed. Mr. Finney and his adherents should know, by this time, that they owe their influence wholly to the remaining respect in the minds of the community, for the institutions, doctrines, and ministers of the gospel. He is stupidly undermining himself and his new measures, and success would be their immediate ruin. New measures owe their influence wholly to remaining respect for the means of grace. It is folly, if nothing worse, for Mr. F. to endeavour to destroy the influence of that vast majority of the clergy, who hesitate to receive his discoveries; nothing but their firm and persevering opposition will prevent new measures from falling into hands which will destroy his influence as easily as he has that of a large number of devoted ministers; that will at once sink new men, new measures, and new divinity, into utter neglect.

The church, too little disposed to be instructed by the history of the past, is compelled to learn wisdom by her own sufferings. Ecclesiastical history, as well as the Bible, had pointed out the danger of mingling bold, subtil, and barren philosophy, with the truths of revelation. A sound and scriptural theology, had in vain pointed out the true consequences of some of the common speculations on moral agency. Providence has permitted a bold and reckless hand, to reduce one theory to practice, and show the legitimate, but frightful results of licentious speculations on the doctrines and institutions of Christianity, in such a manner as to silence and shame all cavils and objections.

Every thing seems to indicate the importance of returning to that scriptural, practical, and spiritual exhibition of the truths of Christianity, which characterized that constellation of able divines who shone forth in England when the Reformation and the revival of letters had well united their influence. This country has produced many powerful works on doctrinal theology; but can it boast of producing

many popular works of practical divinity since the days of Edwards? Numerous facts make it evident that the science of holy living, worth all the rest, needs to be more diligently and systematically cultivated. It is a fact, that the literary taste of the Unitarians has put a value on many of these old divines which is hardly felt by the evangelical. It does seem that preaching would be far more successful if, instead of vainly attempting to prove man an accountable being, we could be persuaded to believe conscience, and the Bible, and insist on the justice and perpetual obligation of the law, in its strictest and most extensive demands. The sinner would be convinced at once of his corruption and his guilt, see the need of grace to cleanse, and mercy to pardon. He would see the adaptation of the offices of a Saviour to his own infinite wants,—embracing him, would see him to be infinitely precious and lovely.

We cannot but think that the interests of religion would be greatly advanced, if divines, from the pulpit, dwelt far more on the evil of sin, the corruption and guilt of the sinner, the character and offices of Christ, the duties of the closet, the care of the heart, the necessity of possessing a spiritual mind, and being detached from the world. Were the duties of the closet insisted on, and performed as they were once, we are persuaded the influence would instantly be felt. It would have an influence on the temper, the spirit, and conduct of Christians, which would instantly attract the attention and respect of the world; it would add, not only to the comfort of professors themselves, but would give tenfold vigour to all the benevolent operations of the day.

With respect to Mr. F.'s arguments against depravity and regeneration, which he is pleased to call physical, we confess it is an ingenious way to disprove the existence of the disease, by denying the existence of the heart in which it is seated. His arguments owe their force to this denial, and it is somewhat too late for an individual to come forward and say that there is no such thing as a will, of which envy, pride, hatred, ambition, and revenge are the affections.

We have been surprised at the numerous contradictions contained in his lectures; we had considered them as oversights, and concluded that his denial was as good as his assertion; and this might be true were the memories of his hearers perfect. But we find a thing asserted to prove one thing, and denied to prove another. The props must be re-

moved from under one part that other parts of his beautiful fabric might be supported.

With regard to Mr. Finney's charges against a very great portion of the clergy as unfriendly to revivals; his strange defence of new measures; his sweeping censures on the characters, attainments, and designs of a great majority of the clergy; his adducing the authority of Edwards, in support of a measure which that great divine had pointedly condemned; we think that Mr. F. has consulted his circumstances, and the extremity of his system of new measures, rather than his own feelings, or the *naked* truth. We do not feel disposed to apply the rules of a rigorous morality to some of the artifices of his book: and it is only as he stands connected with new measures, and takes the lead in the prevalent system of disorganization, that we have felt permitted to allude to his character at all. We say we do not know how much guilt may attach to these artifices, though we can see much mischief as the result. The truth is, Mr. F. is now aware that he has pushed on too far; advance and retreat are both alike difficult. He is conscious that the public confidence is now fast ebbing away from him; and both charity and humanity forbid that we attach a responsibility to his convulsive flouncing which could belong only to deliberate motion.

ART. VIII. ON RADICALISM.

BY THE EDITOR.

No. II.

An exposition of the effects of Radicalism.

It was attempted, in a previous number, to trace Radicalism back to the principles from which it springs. It now remains to follow it down to the effects which it produces. This is the more important, as it is, after all, rather by their effects, than their principles, that different systems and measures are commonly judged of. Men are slow to condemn any thing, whatever may be said of its abstract nature, which is seen to be productive of the public good. And, on the contrary, if its tendencies are plainly hurtful, nothing which can be alleged in its favour, will save it from general reprobation.

It is our design to show, *that the good results which are claimed as the effects of the Radical mode of reform, are falsely ascribed to it, and that, on the contrary, its proper influence is injurious.*

The argument most frequently used by those who abet that system of Radical Reform, which has been already described, is, that, let moralists say what they please of its nature, it is still the means of accomplishing great and good ends, not otherwise attainable. To confirm this, they refer to the example of some successful Reformers, who have adopted this mode of proceeding; and ask, with triumph, what great Reformation was ever effected without its aid.

The fallacy of this argument consists in claiming results as the appropriate effects of the Radical style of proceeding, which are owing, either directly to different causes, or to the providential counteraction of the natural tendencies of the system to which they are ascribed.

Good results are sometimes claimed as the effects of Radical efforts, which are really owing to different, and

even opposite causes. The course of things is often very much as follows :—Through the operation of those silent, but deep-working powers, which are ordained by God for the renovation and elevation of man, the state of society is gradually changed. A sound public sentiment is formed,—a public conscience is created. The whole moral atmosphere acquires a tone which is strengthening to whatever is pure and good, but in which nothing which is evil can long subsist. But now, in this state of things, where every good result is on the point of being realized, a new agency, which had no share in bringing on so favourable a crisis, is thrust violently in between the proper causes and their near effects, and from its immediate proximity to the latter, receives the credit of their accomplishment. It is here, as it often happens in scientific investigations, where, after the way had been prepared by ages of patient experiment, some lucky and unpremeditated hit brings to light the long-sought principle, and eclipses the fame of those labours, by which stores of knowledge had been accumulated, and by which the grand discovery would have been ere long attained. In like manner, when some great reform is witnessed, the credit of its accomplishment, which is due only to the long-continued operation of the stated means of human improvement, is often usurped by some extraordinary and violent agency, which has not a particle of salutary efficacy, except what it derives from its intrusive interposition, as a kind of conductor, between the remote causes and their final results. The formation of a purified and invigorating moral atmosphere, is the great work. Where this exists, and there only, philanthropy has an element in which it can live and act. It is this all-pervading, high-toned moral sentiment, which sustains, and accelerates every good enterprise, while it smites every evil work with languor, or the stroke of death. And this moral sentiment, which is the grand condition of success in every project of reform, is produced, not by special agencies of benevolence, but by more deep and stated causes.

In other cases, *the good ascribed to Radicalism is owing to the providential counteraction of the proper tendencies of this system.* Through the violence and recklessness which characterize this mode of Reform, the elements of society are often thrown into confusion ; parties are formed, and arrayed in bitter hostility against each other ; prejudices are excited, which prevent the farther progress of the im-

provement begun ; and a storm of passion is raised which is ready to vent itself upon whatever obstructs its course, and to spread promiscuous ruin through the moral and social kingdom. In this state of most deplorable turmoil and uproar, when those by whom the tempest has been raised, unable longer to controul it, stand aghast in view of its unsparing rage, and expecting sudden destruction,—in this state of things, Providence sometimes interposes, in a way the most unlooked for, to prevent the dreaded evils. That same power which shifts the gale, and bids it drive the shattered barque, ready to dash upon the rocks, into a place of safety, and then chains its fury and lulls it to rest ;—even so turns the hearts of men, when most vehemently set upon evil,—marks out a safe direction for their stormy passions, and then, after accomplishing by them his own good purposes, makes them to cease,—causes the wrath of man to praise Him, and the remainder of it restrains. The excitement, the confusion, the danger, the terrour, were the proper effects of the Radical spirit ;—to this, too, would the ruin just escaped have been justly charged. The unforeseen deliverance is from God. 'Tis He, in these moments of our self-wrought terrour and peril,

" 'Tis He, our fears to cease,
Sends down the meek-eyed PEACE.
She, crown'd with olive-green, comes softly gliding,
Down through the turning sphere,
—His ready harbinger,—
With turtle wing the stormy cloud dividing,
And waving wide her myrtle wand,
She strikes a universal peace through sea and land."*

But how often is the pure, serene, and blissful state, thus brought out of darkness and tempest by the Divine interposition, regarded as the proper effect of the angry elements from which it is educed ! and how contrary is this to truth ! It is as if the day, instead of being derived from the rising sun, should be ascribed to the night out of which it is brought. It is as if the beauteous edifice which rises upon the ashes of a dreadful conflagration, should be ascribed to the destroying fire, rather than to the skill and industry by which the ruins of the fire are repaired.

If now it is considered, how much of the good which is claimed as the effect of the Radical style of effort, may be

* Milton's Christmas Hymn.

accounted for in one or the other of the ways just mentioned; there will be but little left to warrant the plea of utility, so often urged in its behalf. It would indeed be contrary to many of the plainest moral principles, if any good at all should *naturally* flow from a system of such unmingled evil, as Radicalism has been shown to be. As there is no virtue in this system, it would seem to follow, that none could go out of it. From a root so bitter, a stock so crabbed, and branches so prickly, how can pleasant fruits be expected? Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?

But we proceed further to show, that *the direct tendency and natural effects of the Radical spirit are evil.*

Such they are, first of all, upon the *personal character* of those who are infected by it. If the Radical spirit grows out of flaws and faults in personal character, as has been before shown, it reacts upon them, and makes them tenfold more glaring. Under the influence of this spirit, the whole man rapidly deteriorates.

As it is to some intellectual deficiency that Radicalism may be first traced, so it is in the *understanding* that its deleterious influence first appears. It kindles passions which, like a fever, produce a debility proportioned to the violence with which they have raged.—It is characteristic of the Radical humour, to fix upon some particular object, selected at random, from the wide field of benevolence, to the neglect or exclusion of every other. To this object it confines the thoughts and feelings, and thus blinds the judgement, and distorts the intellectual frame. Through the laws of our mental constitution, we are liable to err, not only by thinking too little, but also by thinking too much, upon any one object. The mind's eye, like the eye of the body, dilates as the field of vision widens, and contracts as it diminishes, until the most comprehensive sight, by poring too long and too intently upon one thing, is rendered, at last, microscopic. The perpetual working of one idea is too much for the brain to bear, and often produces *monomania*, if not the entire derangement of the mental faculties.

It is said that after the Rantian philosophy had been broached, and had seized and absorbed the attention of the German scholars, one could scarcely enter a mad-house, without meeting some raving philosopher. And it is to be presumed, that our Retreats for the Insane would bear simi-

lar testimony to the melancholy effect upon the human mind of those undue excitements on some matters of a practical nature, to which our community is so prone. This effect has, indeed, to a certain extent, been sadly conspicuous in the case of many good men, whose only error, at first, was too exclusive a devotion to some favourite object which they had espoused, but who, in process of time, have run into such wildness and extravagance of opinion, as to excite the suspicion, that they had lost the balance of their minds, and that, as to one point, at least, they were really *insane*.

While it is painful to allude to such instances, it is proper they should be held forth for the warning of those who are accustomed to work themselves up to excessive zeal in behalf of the objects, which, one after another, engage the attention of the benevolent public, without once thinking of the injury they are thus doing their own minds. If they allow themselves to be perpetually revolving some single thing, especially if it be of an exciting nature, they will almost inevitably acquire a mental bias, by which, even if reason be not unsettled, their judgement will be warped, so that the confidence reposed in them must be shaken, and their whole influence greatly impaired.

The effect of the Radical spirit upon the *temper and disposition* of those by whom it is indulged, is still worse than upon their understanding. Overlaying, as they do, the faults of others with every colour of exaggeration, they come to regard them as monsters of iniquity, quite beyond the pale of charity, towards whom, accordingly, they allow themselves to exercise the most unmingled detestation. There is some truth in the remark, that by hating *vices* too much, we may come to love *men* too little. Nothing tends more to quench every philanthropic sentiment in the human breast, than an habitual indulgence of those angry feelings, those severe and uncandid judgements, and that reproachful language, by which the Radical temper gives itself vent. Where this indulgence has been long continued, there has been invariably induced over the character a cast of bitter misanthropy.

It cannot be denied, that persons of the best dispositions are often seduced from the right path, by the high pretensions and apparent utility of the Radical mode of reform. But the dispositions by which they were drawn into this dangerous alliance, are soon supplanted by those more conge-

nial with the impetuous career on which they have entered. In the first glow of that chivalrous enthusiasm, with which they rush upon the high towers and strong holds of wickedness, there is something of generosity, which awakens our interest, if it cannot gain our approbation. But, behold them in the next scene of this melo-drama of reformatory enterprise! Disappointed of the immediate success which they anticipated, and dismayed by the unexpected vigour of the resistance made to them, they give way to a momentary discouragement. From this state, however, they soon recover themselves, and renew the assault;—but with less of good will, less of cheerfulness and hope, and more of impatience and vexation. Their onset is again unsuccessful. And here a new set of feelings arises. Their just abhorrence of the evil assailed, gives place to rage against those by whom it is so pertinaciously defended. Their love to the cause in which they are embarked, is abated; while to conquer its enemies, and to triumph over them, becomes the reigning passion of their souls. Irritated by the obstinacy with which they have been resisted,—thirsting to revenge the wounds they have received, they mingle once more in the conflict. In that disgraceful war of passion which now ensues, there is no longer any difference apparent between the infuriated assailants, and the enraged adherents of evil. The same passions are indulged, the same weapons wielded, on both sides. Where now is that serenity which springs from the consciousness of right, and of the Divine favour? Where now is that charity, which doth not behave itself unseemly,—unvaunting, long-suffering, unprovoked? attributes by which the true Reformer,—the Christian philanthropist,—is ever distinguished. “Behold, I send you forth,” said our Saviour to his disciples, “as sheep among wolves.” But here the sheep are changed to wolves; and wolves meet wolves, and bite and devour one another with rabid ferocity. When it comes to this, there is no longer any hope for our valiant heroes of Reform. In such fighting they are sure to be beaten; and at length retire from the field, exhausted with fruitless labour, stung with shame, and covered with disgrace, and sink down at last into a state of fretful petulance, sullen dejection, and malignant misanthropy.

There is another effect of the Radical spirit upon personal character, more deplorable still. *It tends*, by an insidious process, which is hardly discerned even by those in

whom it takes place, *to undermine their moral integrity*. That moral delinquency, both in lower and higher instances, does follow hard upon every species of ultraism and zealotry, is an observation so common, as almost to be proverbial. The history of fanaticism always leads us, by rapid transitions, from the heights of a boasted purity almost superhuman, to the lowest depths of moral pollution. Nor is it difficult to give some account of a phenomenon at once so frequent and so remarkable. Those who in some things go beyond the commandment, will be very apt to feel, that, in other things, they may stop as far short of it. They will naturally hope to be indulged in certain occasional *short comings*, out of respect to the great excess of their virtue, in other particulars, above the ordinary standard. They will readily flatter themselves, that persons of such uncommon merit will not forfeit the character of goodness, even should they deviate now and then from the line of strict rectitude. It is not the deluded Romanist alone, who believes, that sinful indulgences may be balanced by works of supererogation,—that sins of omission may be atoned for by the performance of certain *consilia evangelica*, which go beyond the common standard of duty,—that the debts to Divine justice which the righteous contract, may be cancelled by drafts upon their treasury of good works. These are principles which have their origin in the deceitfulness of the heart, and are universally operative, until eradicated by a deeper reformation, than that from Popery. But while all who make any pretensions to goodness, are liable to their influence, the zealous Reformer is peculiarly exposed to their power, and in many sad instances has unconsciously become their victim.

There is another way in which this demoralizing influence of Radicalism is exerted. Men of that vicious humour of reform which we are now describing, not unfrequently select for its exercise, some remote evil, the lawful removal of which is to them impracticable, and the continued existence of which is therefore a wrong for which they are not personally responsible. They soon succeed, however, in persuading themselves, by means of a logic of their own, that it lies within the sphere of their duty, and thus they are bound to accomplish its immediate subversion. This sense of personal obligation is greatly enhanced, where the evil in question is heinous in its character, or when the end they

have in view has any thing of sacredness in it, any thing which appeals to moral or religious principle. Under this high-raised, though groundless sense of obligation, they band themselves together, and engage, as it were, that they will neither eat nor sleep until they have removed the evil of which they complain. But in prosecuting their endeavour, they soon come upon the impassable barriers which mark the sphere of their duty, and begin to find, to their surprise, that, in this case, *ability* is not exactly commensurate with *responsibility*,—certainly, that they are not *honestly* able to do all which they had *supposed* themselves responsible for. But instead of arguing, in this dilemma, the nullity of the supposed obligation, from the want of honest ability, they hold fast to the idea of responsibility, and reason from it inversely, that what *ought* to be done, *can* be done. And what *can* be done, they manfully resolve, *shall* be done.—“This evil, which curses earth and affronts heaven, *must* and *shall* be removed.” This is resolved upon;—the die is cast;—they themselves are publicly and solemnly pledged; and it is no time now to be scrupulous about the *means*. Their righteous object must be gained, if not in one way, then in another;—if not by fair means, then by foul;—if not on the highway of honest endeavour, then through the by-way of duplicity and stratagem. Thus does that mistaken zeal, which *reaches over* the limits of what is lawfully practicable, as to the objects at which it aims, incline insensibly to *overreach*, in the means which it employs.

This point may be well illustrated by a passage from the history of Charles I. “After the resolution had once been formed by the commons,” says an acute historian of that monarch, “of invading the established government of Church and State, it could not be expected that their proceedings, in such a violent attempt, would thenceforth be altogether regular and equitable. But it must be confessed, that in their attack on the hierarchy, they still more openly passed all bounds of moderation; as supposing, no doubt, that the sacredness of the cause would sufficiently atone for employing means the most irregular and unprecedented. This principle, which prevails so much among zealots, never displayed itself so openly as during the transactions of this whole period.”

But this deteriorating process does not stop here. These unlawful means which were at first adopted from their sup-

posed necessity in order to a good end, are afterwards often retained from choice. The conscience, being blunted by their first admission, loses its sense of their criminality, while the heart, being depraved by their use, acquires a real appetite for their spirit and pungency. So that what has been said of some Reformers, incredible though it seem, may not be wholly untrue, that *a guiltless reformation would appear to them flat and insipid.*

By steps so gradual, has this false zeal in doing good led many thoughtlessly down to this deep corruption of moral principle! And thus may we account for the afflictive spectacle, too often witnessed, of *immoral* means, openly and statedly employed in different departments of *moral* reform! the spectacle of men, while engaged in opposing fraud and oppression, adopting measures fraudulent and coercive!—using misrepresentation and falsehood, petty management and deep stratagem, whispered calumny and open proscription, as occasion may require, in the service of humanity and virtue!—doing for conscience' sake what their own conscience must condemn, and seeming ready, (so entire the derangement of their moral nature,) to break every precept of the moral law, through their zeal to keep it in a single point!

The principles which lead to such practices, require to be most carefully examined. Men of the stamp just described, when admonished respecting the obliquity of their course, will sometimes admit, "that the measures to which they resort are wrong;—but yet the end for which they are employed is good, and they seem to be necessary for its attainment,—and the advantages to be gained will, it is to be hoped, overbalance the evil attending their use,—which, moreover, is sanctioned by the authority and example of great names." By such specious arguments do these men justify themselves in doing evil that good may come! But let them well consider, that no secondary or assumed responsibility can annul their primary obligation to keep the plain commandments of God;—that true benevolence can never lead men aside from the path of rectitude;—that no one can be properly responsible for any results which may not be lawfully attained;—that to plead the goodness of an end in justification of doubtful or improper means, is to adopt one of the most profligate doctrines of Jesuitical casuistry, under cover of which the most horrid enormities of crime

have been, and may again be perpetrated ;—that to console one's self in the use of forbidden methods, under the idea of their being necessary to the attainment of good ends, is to forget the wo pronounced upon those by whom the offence cometh, though it must needs be that offences come ;—that to weigh off actual crime against contingent advantages is a business which, supposing the scales of their wisdom ever so well adjusted, they are never called to perform ;—and finally, that what is manifestly wrong can never be made right by any authority of names, by any ingenuity of reason, or by any eloquence of praise.

" Not all that heralds rake from coffin'd clay,
Nor florid prose, nor honied lies of rhyme,
Can blazon evil deeds, or consecrate a crime."

We have dwelt the longer on these various effects of the Radical system upon personal character, because, though they are real and deplorable, yet, from being more covert and confined, they have been often overlooked. And it is to these personal effects more particularly, that we have been desirous of directing the attention of those of our readers, who are looking forward to public life, or are about to enter upon its duties. There is much in the spirit and carriage of Radicalism which appeals to the youthful ardour and enterprise of persons in this position. But if it has a bright side, it has also a dark side, which it behooves them to look at. And, before they commit themselves to it, let them consider that, however mighty may be its energies, or however radiant its glories, its embraces, like Jove's, must prove fatal to those who allow them. An alliance with this system will be attended, on their part, with an almost certain sacrifice of all that is just and enlarged in view, of all that is lovely and excellent in disposition, of all that is strict and ingenuous in principle. Would they then be delivered from mental bias and error,—from malice and all uncharitableness,—from deceitfulness, and blindness, and hardness of heart,—let them shun the infection of that spirit which will inevitably involve them in these evils ! Like the fabled Kelpie of the Scottish mythology, which, by cheering lights lures the benighted traveller from his path into bogs and fens, and then seizes upon him, drags him through tangled brakes, puts out his eyes, and maims his limbs, and at last drowns him in turbid waters ;—even so does the Demon of Radical-

ism seize hold of those whom, by its specious pretensions, it has decoyed from the right path, worry and harass, rend and tear, blind and disfigure them, and at last plunge them into the gloomy gulf of delusion, scorn, bigotry, and guilt.

Ah ! gentle youths, your eager steps ne'er lose !
Nor let this Sprite mislead you to the heath !
Dancing in murky night o'er fen and lake,
He glows to draw you downward to your death,
In his bewitch'd, low, marshy willow brake.
What though far off, from some dark dell espied,
His glimmering mazes cheer the excursive sight,
Yet turn, ye wanderers, turn your steps aside,
Nor trust the guidance of that faithless light !
For watchful, lurking 'mid th' unrustling reed,
At those mirk hours the wily monster lies,
And listens oft to hear the passing steed,
And frequent round him rolls his sullen eyes,
If chance his savage wrath may some weak wretch surprise !

On him, enraged, the Fiend, in angry mood,
Shall never look with pity's kind concern,
But instant, furious, raise the whelming flood
O'er its drown'd banks, forbidding all return.
Or if he meditate his wish'd escape
To some dim hill, that seems uprising near
To his faint eye, the grim and grisly shape
In all his terrors clad, shall wild appear.
Meantime the watery surge shall round him rise,
Pour'd sudden forth from every swelling source.
What now remain but tears and hopeless sighs ?
His fear-shook limbs have lost their youthful force,
And down the waves he floats, a pale and breathless corse.*"

We proceed now to show the ill effects of Radicalism upon the *particular cause* which it aims to promote.

It is here presumed, that in the whole business of moral reform, physical force is out of the question. The proper labour of the Reformer is, to gain the will of those who are in the wrong, and lead them to the voluntary abandonment of the evil complained of. And the way to accomplish this object is determined by the very laws of our minds. If the will is to be gained in behalf of any object, it must be through the judgement, the conscience, and the affections. Reason must be addressed by sober arguments ; the moral sense must be aroused by solemn appeals ; the passions in which the evil is rooted, must be corrected ; the prejudices by which it is sustained, must be removed ; and by all the methods of affectionate persuasion, the heart must be brought to favour the desired reformation. This is the course almost instinctively

* Collins's Superstitions in Scotland.

adopted by every sensible man, when truly interested to gain his point—a course so plain, that even a wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err in it. But the Radical adopts a very different course. In opposition to the known laws of the human mind, he begins by abusing the adverse party, and pursues a course calculated at every step, not to conciliate, but to offend them; not to convince their judgement, but to blind it; not to rouse their conscience, but to stop its action and drown its voice; not to remove their prejudices and depraved dispositions, but to confirm and inflame them. So contrary is the course pursued by him to all that experience teaches, or that wisdom dictates, as to the manner of moral influence, that one is sometimes compelled to suspect, that he is less concerned to secure the proposed good, than to render himself conspicuous in promoting it. However this may be, his method of promoting reform is such as to ensure his failure. It bars the door against him, and prevents his getting even a hearing. So far from removing the evil against which it was directed, it tends only to establish it, and to put off to a great remove the time of its overthrow.

How often, under the genial and all-pervading influence of Christianity, has some mighty form of evil been gradually melting away—its foundations being undermined, and its bands relaxed, until it has seemed ready to fall; when, suddenly, it has been frozen, yes, petrified into changeless rigidity, by the rising against it of the Medusa-head of ultra-opposition. And there it must stand, immoveable and beyond the hope of mitigation, until the horror of this scowling phantom is effaced and forgotten.

Recent occurrences among us furnish a melancholy comment on the truth of these remarks. So obvious have been the ruinous consequences resulting to some of the noblest moral enterprises of the day, from their being urged too far or too violently, by this ultra and radical spirit, that they will occur of themselves to the mind of the reader, and relieve us of the painful necessity of specifying them. No direct opposition from the enemies of these enterprises, could have done them half the injury they have sustained from the indiscreet and mistaken zeal of their friends. It would seem as if the adversary, looking with a malignant eye upon the good effected by means of these enterprises, and seeking to destroy them, but despairing of the accomplishment of his purpose in the way of direct hostility, had devised this as his great expe-

dient—to join with them, under the semblance of pious zeal, and drive them on to such extremes, as must repel their best friends, create a strong reaction against them, deprive them of the public confidence, and thus in the end secure their overthrow. But whatever may be his agency, he doubtless looks with complacency upon the arrest of these useful enterprises; and owns, as peculiarly congenial, that spirit which is so efficient in hindering their progress.

The blighting effects of Radicalism upon its immediate subjects and objects, having been thus exhibited, we are now to show its influence upon *other persons* and *other causes*. It is, however, to two points only, in that wide circle of mischief which here opens before us, that we can direct the attention of our readers.

The Radical style of procedure alienates and repels a large class of persons, who might be gained to the cause of reformation were it wisely conducted. We allude to that class of men, who, either from principle or temperament, adhere to whatever has been long established, are averse to change, and suspicious of improvement. This class has always comprised some of the wisest and best men. Their opposition must always be formidable, while their concurrence would bring to any cause in which they might enlist, a great accession of strength. Such men are sure to be repelled by witnessing the folly and extravagance, the vulgarity and violence, which characterize the radical way of reforming, and the evil consequences which follow in its train. In view of these evils, they cling more tenaciously than before to every ancient institution and usage, however unimportant. Their fear of change, excessive before, becomes now their ruling passion; and they start at the very name of Reform, and tremble at the shadow of turning. Suspecting every reformatory effort of covering over some revolutionizing project, they decline or oppose it. Taking their stand on the existing state of things, with all its abuses, they thus fortify themselves as in a citadel; and can be neither drawn thence by the most alluring prospects of advantage, nor driven thence by the most terrible threatenings of overthrow. To every call for improvement, they turn a deaf ear. Composing themselves in supine and imperturbable quiet, they parry every appeal to reason and conscience, by arguments drawn from the evils of innovation; and answer every reproach from the zealous philanthropist, by the great maxim

of conservation—"Better to be despised for too anxious apprehension, than ruined by a too confident security." The inflexibility, the immoveableness, the resolved unaddictedness to change, which these men exhibit, though bitterly complained of by Reformers, is an obstacle to their success, for which, in many cases, they may thank their own folly and rashness.

There remains one other general effect of Radicalism to be described. It is more deserving of notice, as more comprehensive of evil than all the rest. It is that in which, according to our view, consists the chief hurtfulness of this system—the head and front of its offending—in comparison with which, its injuring the character of a few individuals, or arresting the progress of a few particular enterprises, are hardly worth naming. *It is the tendency of Radicalism to suspend, or cut off, the good influences emanating from our fundamental institutions, literary, civil, and religious, even where it does not wholly subvert these institutions themselves.*

It will hardly be denied, that it is from civil government, with its laws and officers, its councils and courts, its rewards and penalties; from the church, with its ministry, its Sabbaths and sanctuaries, its Scriptures and sacraments; and also from literary institutions, as subordinate to the others, with the liberal studies, the arts and sciences, cherished in their bosom—that the influences are derived which constitute the well-being of society. It is the existence of these institutions, which distinguishes the civilized from the savage state. It is by their excellence that the true glory of a nation is to be estimated. Through their influence it is, that the grand traits of national character are formed, and the grand particulars of national destiny determined. Of all of them it may be justly said, that they are *ordained of God*; since in willing the happiness of human society, he must also be supposed to have willed the means necessary to this end. Of the institutions of government and religion, this is eminently true. In the highest sense, are these *of God*; and it is especially through the corrective and formative power which they exert, that He exercises his nurturing care over his human family, and would train us for the heavenly state. So intimately is the welfare of human society connected with the stability and prosperity of these institutions, that he who careth for us, has made them peculiarly sacred

and inviolable—has guarded them like the apple of his eye—has armed them, for their defence, with the power of the sword and of the keys—has required obedience to them on his own authority—has forbidden resistance, every manner of contempt, and even an evil word spoken against them, and annexed his own sanctions to their ordinances. Hence it is, that the crimes of treason and rebellion—of heresy, schism, and apostacy—and whatever else tends, not only to subvert these institutions, but in any way to impair their powers, are, by the common consent of civilized and Christian nations, regarded as capital offences—first against God, by whom they were ordained; and then against man, for whose benefit they were designed—and as justly liable to the highest civil penalties and ecclesiastical censures.

Now the Radical spirit, fraught as it is with contempt for these institutions, and opposition to them, envelopes the germ of all these crimes; and, when fully unfolded, produces them, and all their dreadful consequences. Viewed in this light, the great question of Conservation and Radicalism, which is now dividing the world, is of no trifling import. It is not, as often considered, one of those party questions, either side of which may be indifferently taken. It is not a question to be decided by taste, by birth, by class, or order. So far from this, it is a question of a highly moral nature—in the decision of which are involved the most solemn obligations of duty, on the one hand, and on the other, the deepest grades of criminality.

To say nothing here of the tendency of the Radical spirit utterly to subvert and overthrow these fundamental institutions, it is our design to show, that even while they continue, the good influences emanating from them are suspended, just so far as Radicalism prevails.

The good influence of these institutions depends on a few simple conditions on the part of those for whose benefit they are designed. The principal of these conditions are perhaps the following, viz. *that the public mind should be tranquil and undisturbed under the action of these institutions, that it should be penetrated with reverence and affection for them, and repose on their truth and divinity with unwavering confidence.*

The composure of the public mind is an essential condition of the efficacy of public institutions. The influences emanating from them are not sudden or striking, enabling

them to arrest and hold an averted or diverted attention. On the contrary, they are uniform, gentle, unobtrusive ; and accordingly require, in order that their powers may be experienced, a high degree of interested attentiveness and open susceptibility.

But this state of the public mind is wholly incompatible with the movements which the Radical spirit originates. These movements are bold, startling, and disturbing ; and are designed to be so, for the very sake of diverting the public interest from its proper and wonted objects to themselves. While they are bursting in rapid succession, and brilliant display, and captivating novelty, upon the astonished public, it can hardly be otherwise, than that the general interest felt for the old, established institutions, should be abated, and the diligence with which they are administered, be intermitted.

The effect of these rare measures upon what may be regarded as the regular daily business appointed by God for the advancement of society, is, to use a humble comparison, like that of a company of strolling players upon an industrious village. The worthless tricks and empty shows of jugglers and stage-actors are eagerly run after, and admiringly gazed at, and extravagantly paid for, by the simple villagers ; while those useful callings among them, by which their happiness might be greatly increased, are left to languish for want of encouragement and support. And not only so, but the active citizens,—the shop-keeper, the mechanic, the ploughman,—suspend meanwhile their respective employments ; and thus all useful business comes to a dead stand.—Not unlike this is the position into which our community is often thrown by the eccentric performances,—the grand *coups d'eclat*,—the antic feats of benevolence, played off before them by some of the vagrant actors on our public stage. These men, who despise the old-fashioned way of doing good, and have invented an improved method,—who can leap at results without the use of the necessary means,—these men who can conquer enemies by waving enchanted wands, open fast-closed doors by uttering mystic words, and break down impregnable walls by sounding magic horns,—these reforming Magicians of our times,—how often do they run away with the hearts and the money of the people ; while those upon whom the public prosperity really depends are left comparatively uncared for and unrewarded ! And

what is worse, the public functionaries themselves, the teacher, the magistrate, the pastor, are turned aside from the exercise of their appropriate callings, and join in the general amazement at the grand exploits of the wonder-workers in the business of reform!

But it is not merely by its strange and eccentric performances, addressed to an idle curiosity, that Radicalism diverts the public attention from its proper objects; but by agitations of a far more serious nature, appealing to deeper and more absorbing principles. Wherever it prevails, it breaks the harmony of the constituent elements of society, interrupts the settled course of affairs, produces endless change and wide commotion, and brings about such a state of things as cannot be witnessed without solicitude, a sense of insecurity, and apprehension of coming danger. In such circumstances, whatever is even a little removed from the first care of self-preservation, is likely to be disregarded. When every thing around is shaking,—when the most momentous interests are in jeopardy,—when the question of life and death is brought home to every bosom,—in this vast confusion, of which the Radical spirit is the author, and in which it riots, as its congenial element,—it is not to be expected that much interest should be felt in any of those useful vocations, which depend for their successful prosecution upon present quiet, and for their reward, upon the perpetuity of the existing state of things. The price of public stocks rises and falls according to the variations in public confidence, with scarcely more precision, than the esteem in which those liberal pursuits are held, which flourish only in peace. Both means and motives are wanting to all the learned professions, in the midst of general disturbance, and in the prospect of general revolution. The higher exercises of genius, the more expanded aims of patriotism and Christian benevolence,—whatever tends to adorn and ennoble society, and has a prospective bearing upon its interests,—are, at such times, immeasurably depreciated; while the demand proportionably rises for the lower political and military virtues, for the calculations of selfish policy, for soldier-courage, and brutal force,—and for all those sterner powers, which are necessary, indeed, for the preservation of society in perilous crises, but which, at the same time, drive it back towards barbarism, more rapidly than it ever advances thence, under better influences, towards civilization.

The unfavourable influence of public agitations upon learned pursuits, and all the departments of public instruction, is well described by Damiron in his *History of Philosophy in France in the nineteenth century*.^{*} After portraying the French Revolution in vivid colours, he asks, "What place could there be in such circumstance, for the thoughts of science? How could peaceful speculations, such as are requisite in abstract studies, be permitted to minds preoccupied by concern with matters so grave? Where could minds be found either strong enough, or cold enough, not to trouble themselves with affairs which excited so much dread? Where could be found the Archimedes, who in the midst of this political ruin, could pursue his scientific investigations in cold blood? * * How many learned men, and men of letters, were thrown by this movement, beyond the sphere in which their taste and talent had placed them, and compelled to take part in the assemblies, in the armies, or in the government, until better days should permit them to return to their studies or their art! * * From 1789, and even earlier, there was a general remission of purely intellectual labours. In place of chairs and academies, they had tribunes and clubs. The peace of the closet no longer remained, but was sacrificed to other necessities. Public instruction, being either neglected or destroyed, in the prospect of being reformed, ceased to produce any results. And as for philosophy, which, more than any thing else, has need of order and calmness, it is easy to see that in such a state of men's minds, it could not receive a very assiduous cultivation. One does not live for philosophy in the midst of such agitations. It is not born, and does not flourish, except under the peaceful influence of deep security, outward peace, and a kind of intellectual leisure, which leave it without distraction, without trouble, and without alarm. It is a little with the psychologist as it is with the naturalist;—he observes ill during a storm;—he too has his atmosphere, and all the chances of the tempest which agitate and toss it. If he does not perceive around him that stability of institutions, that accord of minds, those pacific dispositions, which are essential conditions of successful study, he becomes apprehensive, active in self-defence, and absorbed in the dangers by which he is surrounded."

What is true of institutions for public instruction, that

^{*} Damiron, *Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en France au dix-neuvième siècle*. Tom. I. p. 36, etc.

they require the repose of the public mind,—its freedom from agitating excitements, in order to the production of their appropriate effects, is pre-eminently true of our *religious institutions*. Their influence upon a mind harassed and disquieted, is compared in the Scriptures, to the sowing of seed among thorns. The cares of this life, the conflict of high-raised passions, solicitude and insecurity relating to our earthly lot, are indeed thorns, which choke the springing blade of that tender exotic, planted from above in the soul of man. If the powers of the world to come are to seize and mould the human heart, the claims of the present world upon our attention must not be urgent or imperious; but all around should be still and peaceful. In accordance with this truth, the Temple of Janus was closed when the Saviour appeared to set up his kingdom of peace in the world.

“ Nor war, nor battle’s sound
Was heard the world around,
The idle spear and shield were high up hung;
The hooked chariot stood,
Unstain’d with hostile blood,
The trumpet spake not to the armed throng.

“ And peaceful was the night;
Wherein the Prince of light,
His reign of peace upon the earth began.
The winds with wonder whist
Smoothly the waters kiss’d,
Whispering new joys to the mild Ocean,
Who now hath quite forgot to rave,
While birds of calm sit brooding on the charmed wave.”

“ It is according to the nature of things,” says the great Schleiermacher, in his eloquent *Work on Religion*, “ that in times of general confusion and revolution, the slumbering spark of religion should rarely be rekindled in the soul. However affectionately and patiently we may labour and wait, it will not in such times be kindled to life, even in those in whom, under more auspicious circumstances, it would have sprung into existence, in despite of hinderances, when no human institutions remain unshaken;—when we see those very things which determine our place in the world, and which link us in the earthly order, ready every moment not only to leave us, and be seized by others, but to be swept down in an all-absorbing vortex;—while some are straining every nerve, and calling aloud for aid from every quarter, to uphold what they regard as the very pillars of

art, of science, and of the social world, which seem now, through a mysterious destiny, to be spontaneously heaving themselves from their deepest foundations, and tearing off what has for ages twined around them; and while others are hurrying with the same restless zeal to clear away the rubbish of centuries, that they may be the first to settle on the fearful soil formed beneath them by the lava of the terrible volcano, yet scarcely cooled;—when every one, even without leaving his own place, is so violently shaken with the convulsions of the great whole, that he must be rejoiced, if, amidst the general whirl, he can fix his eye on a single object long enough to hold himself by it, and convince himself that any thing is yet standing;—in such a state of things, it were vain to expect that many could be found disposed to cultivate and cherish religious feelings, which flourish best in a state of calm. It is indeed true, that the aspect of the moral world is never more sublime and majestic than in the midst of such confusion, and that the light then condensed in momentary gleams is more intense than that of ages beside. But who can then save himself from the general agitation and solicitude? Who then can escape the power of selfish interest, at such times tenfold more urgent than at others? Who is able to behold all this, and maintain a settled and undisturbed composure?*

We have dwelt longer on the unfriendly bearing of public commotions and excitement, upon the best interests of society, because in this country we are peculiarly prone to them, and have, generally speaking, a very inadequate sense of their evils. In further illustration of these evils, we cannot forbear citing Lord Bacon's beautiful Fable on the mischiefs of tumult. "In Orpheus' theatre, all beasts and birds assembled; and forgetting their several appetites, some of prey, some of game, some of quarrel, stood all sociably together, listening to the airs and accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, than every beast returned to his own nature. Wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which so long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence, and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is

* Schleiermacher's Reden ueber die Religion, R. III. p. 143.

society and peace maintained. But if these instruments be silent, or sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion."

Now the Radical spirit is the great and universal AGITATOR. It is its proper work to disturb the repose so essential to the experience of the liberalizing and elevating powers of our literary, civil, and religious institutions. It is seditious and tumultuous Radicalism which makes that louder noise which drowns the airs and accords of Orpheus' harmonizing harp,—which makes inaudible the instruments by which men are sweetly touched, reclaimed from their savageness, and bound together in a well-ordered, virtuous, and happy society. So far, then, as Radicalism prevails, it does, by disturbing the public tranquillity, suspend or cut off the good influences emanating from our fundamental institutions.

It is a well known fact, in the natural world, that dews never fall on windy nights. And it is equally true, in the moral world, that the gentle and salubrious influences descending upon us from learning, law, and religion,—the silent and refreshing dews distilling from these higher spheres of light, order, and love,—are all swept away while the surface of society is traversed, to and fro, by the hurricanes of revolutionary Reform.

Another of the conditions above specified as indispensable to the efficacy of our public institutions, is, *that they should be regarded with veneration and love*. To enable them to command the respect and engage the affections of men, they have been wisely surrounded with certain appendages of form and ceremony, which may indeed be regarded as unessential to their existence, but which are useful, as conferring upon them, dignity and attractiveness. Viewed in this light, however unimportant they may be in themselves, they are not less approved by an enlightened reason, than owned and loved by a feeling heart.

But to the Radical spirit nothing is so intolerably offensive as these ceremonial appendages, wherever, and in whatever degree of simplicity it may find them. In connexion with secular institutions, it regards them as foolish and absurd; in connexion with religious institutions, as superstitious and abominable. It would strip from Government and Religion every vestige of that graceful drapery with which the hand of God, and the wisdom and piety of ages have conspired to array them, and leave them in the cold nakedness

of their earliest origin,—in the unadorned and sordid condition in which they emerged from the midst of barbarism.

Radicalism is thus to the outward institutions of Government and Religion, what *Rationalism* is to the principles and doctrines which lie at their basis; since it is the office of both to divest their respective objects of every thing which is mysterious,—of every thing which appeals to the fancy or the feelings,—of every thing which cannot endure the unsparing and heartless scrutiny of a superficial understanding. To speak more accurately of the relation subsisting between these two regent powers of the modern world,—Radicalism is the practical execution of the speculative scheme of Rationalism. It is the arm which accomplishes, what the narrow wisdom of the Rationalist devises, and seeks to conform every thing to his pitiful standard. Radicalism has been the constant attendant, and ready executor, of this new sprung Illuminism,—the destroying heat inseparable from this false light,—kindling in fury upon every object which proved impervious to those intrusive rays which would leave nothing unilluminated,—and burning away at least those comely and obscuring veils which have covered our institutions with a venerable and impressive mystery, even where it has not insinuated itself into the very frame of the institutions themselves, and dissolved their very substance, leaving them in frightful ruins,—fit monuments to mark the progress of these joint conquering powers of Rationalism and Radicalism!

The last condition above named as essential to the efficacy of our fundamental institutions, is, that *the public mind should repose on their truth and divinity with unwavering confidence*. Settled faith is the great subjective condition on which depends the efficacy of every moral cause. What influence can such a cause exert over one who has no faith in it? And since it is of the moral, and not of the physical or coercive powers of our institutions that we are speaking, it is obvious, that their influence must be just so far suspended, as men are of a doubting mind with regard to them.

But the Radical spirit is one of scepticism, with regard to all established institutions. Not content with tearing away their ceremonial appendages, it would bring their most essential parts into constant revision. To one into whose mind this spirit has breathed itself, nothing is settled,—nothing is

sacred. Great antiquity, the consent of ages, the authority of the wise and good, so far from constraining his belief for any institution, usage or opinion, are the highest incentives to his doubts ; and strange to say, he demands stricter proof for whatever has been long established and generally received, than for the most unfounded innovations. He will not only patiently hear first principles and foundation truths called in question, but is unwilling to have them settled ; he loves to be drifted away from those rocks to which others cling. He is always waiting for *new light* on things about which others wish for none, and hails, as the signs of coming day, what others dread as omens of gathering night. He is ever learning, but never comes to the *knowledge* of the truth,—never reposes on it with peaceful and unwavering confidence. And the doubts which he originates, he communicates to others ; and not to select persons, by whom they might be resolved, but to all with whom he meets,—to those who otherwise would never have dreamed of them,—who are more unable than himself to come to a satisfactory decision about them, and who will be thrown by them either into painful and irretrievable perplexity, or more probably, into downright unbelief.

Now what good influence can any institutions be expected to have when persons are thus disposed evermore to hold them in suspicion, and to subject them to discussion ? As well may a tree bear fruit, when its boughs are tossed with a daily tempest, and its roots heaved from the earth by a mighty frost, as any public institutions produce their appropriate effects, when swayed about by every wind of doctrine, and unsettled by idle questions and disputations.

This free and popular discussion is peculiarly adverse to the influence of *Religious Institutions*. While it is proceeding, that pious reverence entertained for them by the sound-hearted believer, is gradually worn away. His faith in them is first shaken, then destroyed. And the scepticism thus engendered, soon extends its influence beyond its first object to the whole circle of divine things, and becomes the settled, often the unalterable habit of the mind. A man's religious faith, like his personal honour, is a delicate thing, which is sullied even by the breath of suspicion. Like honour, too, while it is easily destroyed, it is hard to be recovered.

The nature and relations of the objects of religion, im-

pose upon religious discussion certain restrictions, which cannot be safely or innocently disregarded. The sacredness of these objects should exclude every degree of levity from their discussion. Their essential incomprehensibility should check the presumption which would solve their mysteries, and make them perfectly intelligible. The momentous interests staked on their belief, should overawe the voluntary prurience of doubts, and make them unwelcome to the mind. The deep hold they take of the feelings of men, should forbid the utterance of any dissentient views, which are not judged of sufficient importance to overbalance the harm of the strifes and parties which they will certainly engender, and should lead those who are constrained to publish their doubts, to study to do it in such a way, as not to shock the sensibilities of Christian people, or diminish their respect for the authority of Revelation.

These just restrictions are, however, intolerable to the Radical spirit. Under its influence many seem to have lost all sense of the danger of disturbing the public faith, and even to be ambitious of the honour of quitting the beaten track, and striking out new paths of religion. No matter how mysterious the objects of their doubts may be, or how intimately connected with the most sacred associations of mankind,—no matter how trifling may be their objections, or how recently they may have occurred, even if they have not yet taken shape in their own minds; they still proclaim them, and often in a way the most wounding to pious sensibilities; and, with a zeal proportioned to the insignificance of its objects, endeavour to proselyte the world to their wavering creed.

As to the abstract right of discussing the doctrines, institutions, and usages of religion, there can be no question: and none, certainly, as to the extreme impropriety of throwing out immature suspicions, and especially scornful cavilings, respecting objects on which the public faith has been accustomed to repose, and around which its most sacred associations have long been entwined. Of those who allow themselves in this free and irreverent discussion, the least that can be said, is, that they know not what they do. *New light* may be increased by their discussions, but faith and reverence proportionately decline. While they amuse themselves with this solemn trifling with divine things, Infidelity makes rapid inroads. Who that has witnessed the course of these discussions among us, and traced their effects, is not

ready to agree with Burke, that "it is the misfortune (not as these gentlemen think it, the glory) of this age, that every thing is to be *discussed*; as if our institutions were always to be a subject rather of altercation, than of enjoyment." And in comparison with those who expect so much advantage from this discussion, who will not think Burke nearer right, when he says, "there is no improvement to be expected in the great truths and institutions of morality and religion. They were understood as well before we were born, as they will be when the grave has heaped its mound on our presumption, and the tomb imposed its law on our pert loquacity."

Never can we experience the fulness of the renovating power which belongs to Christianity until we shall cease from those free discussions of its principles and constitution, for which a disputative humour will always find occasion;—until, wearied and wasted by controversies, we shall come, in unity of spirit, to receive this divine religion, with that submissive and cordial faith which it requires. Then, the conditions on our part being answered, might we expect to see, in the fruits of peace and righteousness which would every where abound, how rich are its resources for blessing the world. It is to be feared, however, from present appearances, that we have first to learn, in a still lower religious declension, and in the wider prevalence of irreligion, how far these resources may be rendered unavailing, through continued controversy. To us belong the admonitions and warnings addressed by John Howe to his contemporaries: "If we love divine truth, why do we not feed and live upon it, and enjoy its pleasant relishes; but relish gravel more, or chaff, or bran; for thither the agitation of continued controversy about it, doth soon sift it, the grain of flour,—the kidney of wheat,—being passed away, and gone from us. Can none remember when the disputative humour had eaten out the power and spirit of practical godliness? Thither things are again tending, if God, by severity or mercy, do not repress that tendency."

It will be perceived, that we have forborne to enlarge on the tendency of Radicalism *utterly to subvert and overthrow* our fundamental institutions. That this is its tendency, there can be no doubt. Were its principles to be carried out to their legitimate results in practice, all government would be prostrated, every institution demolished, and society resolved into a chaos far more horrid than that which

furnished the original necessity for its formation. But, through the interposition of that Being, who is the author of peace, and the lover of concord, these effects are rarely permitted, and when they do occur, are too obvious to require, and too awful to admit of any delineation. We have chosen, therefore, to confine our remarks upon our last general topic, to the effects of Radicalism in suspending the influences of our various institutions, even while they exist; effects which, from being ordinary, ought to be noticed, while they are less likely to be observed, from being negative in their character. Still, if what has been said be true, even these effects cannot be made light of. Let any one consider to what an extent the public mind is diverted from our fundamental institutions, either by the worse than worthless expedients which Radicalism would substitute for them, or by the all-absorbing apprehension and solicitude which Radicalism induces;—how the public heart is alienated from them by the unveiled nakedness and almost squalid poverty in which Radicalism has left them;—how the public faith in them is shaken by the endless questions which Radicalism engenders and protrudes,—let any one candidly consider these things, and he will be driven to the conclusion, that, as for all the high ends for which they are designed, these institutions might almost as well be overthrown, as to have the conditions of their utility thus for ever frustrated. How can a people be expected to advance in intelligence, in social refinements and virtues, in religious duties and joys, when the grand means of this advancement are cut off? If the influences emanating from these institutions are the life of public virtue and happiness, what can be expected from the withholding of the one, but the decline of the other? Surely as plants die in winter, must knowledge, social order, and piety perish, during a long-continued suspension of the genial and vital powers of our literary, civil, and religious institutions. Surely as a cold and dark shadow falls from the cloud which intercepts the light and heat of the sun, will ignorance, lawlessness, and irreligion, in triple folds of shade, rest on that spot of earth, between which, and those lights planted in the moral heavens to rule and bless us, the Evil Angel of Radicalism spreads abroad his dusky pinions. And where that blighting shadow long abides, there must every thing which renders Christian civilization desirable, gradually disappear, and all which renders Pagan barbarism dreadful, soon succeed. To predict famine, war, and pesti-

lence, when the sun and moon are eclipsed, is indeed superstitious ; but there is no superstition in foretelling a dearth of knowledge, the conflict of the social elements, and the plague of vice, when the lights of the moral world are prevented from shining. To ascribe these natural eclipses to the Principle of Evil contending with the Principle of Good, is indeed superstitious ; but there is no superstition in ascribing these moral obscurations to the Prince of Darkness, and the Ruler of the powers of the air. Mischief on so large a scale is worthy of him, and can hardly have an inferiour author. And the Radical spirit, instrumental as it is in producing these moral eclipses, must therefore be regarded as, at least, one of his impersonations, if not as absolutely identical with him, and as entitled, by way of eminence, to the name of **THE ENEMY**, and the **DESTROYER**. Implacably hostile to our institutions, obscuring these luminaries of the moral system, and threatening to destroy them, the Radical spirit cannot be better designated than as the Great Dragon of eastern mythology, supposed, when eclipses are seen, to be devouring the heavenly bodies.

Thus have we attempted to portray some of the pernicious effects resulting from Radicalism. Our picture has not been drawn from fancy, (though touched, it may be, with some of her colours,) but from the living page of history. When we look around on the individuals who have been actuated by the Radical spirit,—upon the particular objects to which it has been directed,—upon the whole sphere in which it has moved, we see confirmation strong of all which has been said. Nor are the evils now described, its accidental effects, merely, but on the contrary, its natural and almost necessary fruits.—The ruin of personal character,—the ruin of every benevolent enterprise,—the ruin of every public interest, are the foot-prints, by which you may surely trace the progress of this Destroyer. The particular evils now witnessed and deplored may pass away, but only to reappear, so long as this spirit is not cast out from those it has possessed, and driven from the abodes of men. The labours of patient philanthropy will scarcely have repaired the desolation of the last eruption, before the rising villa and flowering vintage will be again laid waste by a new lava-tide, disgorged from the same volcanic centre, whose dying fires are ever kept alive and fanned to fury by the whirlwind passions prisoned in its bosom.

LITERARY NOTICE.

The Ministry we Need. Three Inaugural Discourses, delivered at Auburn. June 18th, 1835. "— ἄνθρωπος λόγιος, δυνατὸς ὡς ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς."—Acts xviii. 24. New-York, Taylor & Gould.

THIS neat little volume comprises the inaugural sermon, charge, and address, which were delivered on occasion of inducting the PROFESSOR OF SACRED RHETORIC AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY, in the Auburn Theological Seminary. The sermon, by the Rev. J. W. Adams, of Syracuse, is a finished, eloquent, and deeply interesting production. After an introductory allusion to the burning ardour, the invincible energy, and the unparalleled self-devotion, which Paul brought to the work of the ministry, the author proposes to illustrate and establish the proposition, *That emotion in the preacher is necessary to an effective and successful proclamation of the Word of God.* Nor has he failed in his object. Having explained the term *emotion*, and limited its meaning to "that deep and holy movement of the affections, which has been produced by the energy of truth understood and believed," he proceeds to show that the themes on which the preacher is called to dwell demand emotion; that the want of emotion amounts to a demonstrative denial of the truth and importance of his message; that the advantages which truth has in the hands of a living preacher, over the same truth on the pages of inspiration, consist mainly in the power which he possesses of giving expression to the various emotions which truth is adapted to inspire; that those preachers who have been anointed with the unction of holy emotion have been far more successful than others; that the condition of our hearers is such as to call for emotion; that the Spirit of God exerts his sanctifying power chiefly upon the affections, which are the great sources of emotion; and, in conclusion, answers the enquiry, *How may this important attribute be secured to the ministry?* by the following positions:—that faith is the main-spring of all true emotion; that the preacher cannot feel an adequate and uniform interest in his work, without possessing profound and practical views of the truth; that great advantage may be derived from a familiar acquaintance with the works of such men as Leighton, Baxter, Howe, Edwards, and Payson; that parochial labours, faithfully performed, will strongly tend to sustain and deepen the interest which is felt in the ministerial work; that a previous self-application of the truths of the gospel, is indispensable, before the preacher can be duly qualified to speak to others, in a spirit that shall commend his message and honour his master; and lastly,—after remarking that, in his judgement, habits of extemporaneous delivery will contribute an important advantage for securing to preaching the attribute of emotion,—that to give an efficient and sacred unction to the ministry, it will be necessary to accompany it continually with prayer.

Had we room, it would afford us pleasure to adorn our notice of this sermon with some of its glowing passages and burning thoughts; but we commend it to the perusal—if not of some clergymen in particular—of all theological students—convinced, with its author, that as, on the one hand, "the great interests of the church are never so jeopardized as when committed to the care of men, who feel strongly, but know nothing;" so on the other, "that not all the endowments which the most profound and varied learning can give, will render a frigid preacher of the truth, a successful one."

The charge, which was delivered on the same occasion, by the Rev. Eliakim Phelps, of Geneva, has the rare merit of *breveity*, though it happily sketches the leading traits which are demanded in the ministry at the present day. Indeed, there is a remarkable coincidence between the topics which were successively introduced on the inaugural occasion; and as we are given to understand that it was undesigned, it renders these respective performances more interesting, and imparts to the title of the volume redoubled emphasis—the *ministry we need*.

The attention of most readers of this volume, will be particularly directed to the *Inaugural Address*—not, however, to the disparagement of the other reverend gentlemen who officiated on the occasion, but because every thing which comes from the pen of Dr. Cox is *sui generis*. We do not pretend to judge this distinguished individual by other men, but *by himself*; and the only question, in view of his performances, which ever occurs to us as exactly appropriate, is—*Does he fall below himself?* If he does not, we are very far from being dissatisfied, much less disposed to captiousness.

We never expect that Dr. Cox will confine himself to *Walkerian* words, or that he will observe Blair's rules of composition, or that he will not occasionally digress from the logical heads of his discourse. His is not a mind for ordinary trains of thought or modes of speech. We look for occasional words, which, though uncommon or never used, convey his exact ideas to all who are acquainted with the structure of language; for views which spring from a deep acquaintance with the Scriptures; for sentiments which bespeak a soul smitten with the love of truth, while we expect to be gratified by the corruscations of his genius, animated by his ardour, and emboldened by his faithfulness.

The friends of Dr. Cox will not be disappointed in his inaugural address. It bears the impress of his talents and piety—his enlarged views and catholic spirit. To analyze it, would convey no adequate idea of its merits.

We prefer to *hear*, than to *read* the doctor's thoughts; yet he writes very much as he speaks; and it is our custom, in order to read his composition to advantage, to place this "excellent nobleman of nature and grace," in the sacred desk, and in imagination to listen to his tones of earnestness and energy, to mark his appropriate gestures, and watch the varying expressions of his spirit-speaking face.

His theme is the ministry of reconciliation—"the chosen medium by which God conciliates men—the mighty moral enginery that accomplishes his brightest wonders—the authentic diplomacy of the King of kings, *working salvation in the midst of the earth.*" The manner in which he treats his subject, in relation to the importance of the Christian ministry, and the kind of ministry needed in *this age and nation*, we need hardly remark, will amply repay the perusal of his brethren, if not be interesting and instructive to the church at large.

"Error-scenting notoriety" may not altogether like the odour of this little book; and the "lynx-eyed detectors of heresy" will not be forward to approve a work in which they are handled with such unsparing severity; but by "all the favourers, on principle, of a pious, sound, educated, scriptural, and accomplished ministry, in the church of God and throughout the whole world, as the MINISTRY WE NEED, to whom this little volume is most respectfully inscribed," it will be read, and, we trust, circulated.

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